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The thesis was constructed under the belief that Africa requires concrete solutions to 
address the neo-colonial rut it has found itself in. Deploying the ideology of "Pan-
Africanism" as a cross-breed "theoretical-conceptual-analytical" framework, the thesis 
hypothesises that a "common African currency" has potential to serve as a viable 
solution to Africa's development trajectory. To test this hypothesis, a research 
methodology known as “naturalistic inquiry” is deployed to analyse and explore both 
the benefits and constraints of a common currency. The key themes guiding this 
exploration are the challenges Africa faces, potential solutions, the concept of unity as 
well as epistemological disobedience which is questioning of the Global Imperial 
Designs. The crux of the thesis is that there must be a shift from political thinking to 
economic thinking.  As the case of Europe’s own successful monetary quest shows, a 
"re-thinking" of the current system is mandatory in order to develop. In summary, 
without a credible African currency, the means of development will forever elude the 
continent. This assumption is worthy of being tested. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1. Introduction of Research Problem  
Like all grand theories, Pan-Africanism is an aggregation of a number of different 
ideas. In 2002, the Pan-African agenda culminated in the unveiling of the African Union 
(AU). The concept of “Union” was an upgrade from the former “Organisation” as the 
latter’s mandate came to an end with the complete “decolonialisation” of Africa with 
South Africa in 1994.  In the contemporary era however, a greater effort is required 
from the Pan-African ideology to reposition Africa in the globalised world. Currently, 
Pan-Africanism and its assumptions of solidarity and equality are not in tune with the 
realism of power in the international system.  
The current international system has been deeply affected by the 2008 financial crises 
which brought the world closer to “apocalyptic point zero” largely due to the global 
capitalist system.  This system has produced massive ecological crises, inequalities 
and poverty, war over raw materials, food and water as well as the explosive growth 
of social divisions and exclusions. In this period of global economic uncertainty, there 
is a growing belief that the ideology of Pan-Africanism can produce tangible outcomes 
for Africa’s development. Felix, for example, posits that Pan-Africanism must exist as 
an alternative economic model to make the continent relevant in the global economic 
equation.1 This would entail the creation of a Pan-African market2 and in the long term, 
the transformation or evolution of the AU into a Union Government of Africa (UGA). Both 
exploits will be impossible without serious confrontation with Western hegemony.  
The motivation behind this research is to provide a concrete discussion on Pan-
Africanism “in action” through the analysis on the viability of a common African currency 
or “Pan-African currency.” This proposition is timely given the state of the international 
political economy and the rising alarm concerning the Washington Consensus, which 
seeks to compound the existing world order further. This existing world order is 
characterized by the West’s pursuit of its strategies and interests through hard 
                                                          
1 Felix, Chinewe, 2002, "Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: A critical appraisal of the relevance 
of Pan-Africanism", Enugu State University of Science & Technology, Nigeria, p. 10 
2 Olapade, Markus, et al, 2016, “Regional integration for Africa: Could stronger public support turn 
‘rhetoric into reality?”, Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 91 
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powered economic means which has resulted in the economic exploitation and 
marginalisation of Africa.3 
At the same time the West is seeking to entrench its hegemony, China, India, and 
Russia are exerting an influence which appeals to the Global South.4 The rise of 
Donald Trump and Brexit are very much reactions towards the “post-western world” 
exemplified by “Eurasian” attempts at shifting the “centre of the world”. As history has 
shown, hegemonic transfer is extremely violent. The last two hegemonic transfers 
resulted in Nazi Germany, the fall of the British Empire, and 60 years of global “Cold 
War”.  Therefore, understanding Africa’s position in the midst of such global anarchy 
is paramount.  If African visionaries do not begin to shape the new era of international 
relations, then Africa will remain marginalised, exploited, underdeveloped and most 
worryingly as an exporter of wealth.  
Signs of “hegemonic agitation” are becoming visible as seen in the 2018 United States 
(US) triggered trade war with China which has had strong economic repercussions in 
emerging markets. The trade wars’ instigating factor is the US dollar hegemony which 
has seen the US government print some US$4.5 trillion between 2009 and 2014.  This 
Quantitative Easing (QE) is just one display of US structural power which creates and 
maintains an unfair global system in favour of the US and its Western allies.5 This 
example has been theoretically referred to as “Exorbitant Privilege”6 which refers to 
the advantage the US has due to its own currency being the international reserve 
currency. Accordingly, the US would not face a balance of payments crisis, because 
it purchased imports in its own currency. 
                                                          
3 Landsberg, Chris, 2011, South Africa’s “African Agenda”: Challenges of Policy and Implementation, 
Prepared for the Presidency Fifteen Year Review Project, p.3  
4 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J., 2013, “Empire, Global Coloniality and African subjectivity", Berghahn 
Books, Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qcvmf (Accessed 26 April 2019) 
5 Vermeiren, Mattias, 2013, “The Crisis of US Monetary Hegemony and Global Economic Adjustment”, 
Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262893644_The_Crisis_of_US_Monetary_Hegemony_and_
Global_Economic_Adjustment (Accessed March 2017)  
6 Eichengreen, Barry, 2012, “Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the 
International Monetary System”, Oxford University Press, UK 
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In the last few years, global reactions are gaining prominence against this “imperfect 
monetary order.”7 In Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is 
seeking to delink from the US dollar.8 The heavy weights of the Global South, the 
BRICS Bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have also been 
planning new financial architecture to address development problems. The 2015 
BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which seeks to challenge the IMF 
attests to this.  Also in 2015, China and Iran (who will soon be the world’s biggest 
exporter of petroleum) switched from the US Dollar to  the Euro in their trade.9 In 2018, 
China and Russia began trading in their respective currencies and also in that year 
India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a trade agreement which allows for 
trade in either Rupees or Dirhams.10 These events underscore the prediction that by 
2050, a group of seven emerging powers −Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey− will be 50 per cent larger than the current G7 of Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the US.11 While the world is reacting 
to the decay of American hegemony and gradually ditching the dollar for different 
options, Africa remains a net creditor to the West. A 2016 World Bank (WB) report 
elaborating on Africa’s weakened economic activity stated:  
Output growth decelerated sharply to 1.3%, the slowest pace in over two decades and 
not as stellar as the average annual growth of around 5% in the pre-global financial 
crisis period of 1995–2008. Regional growth in 2016 was insufficient to raise gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, which contracted by 1.3%. At the same time, Sub-
                                                          
7 Hoogvelt, Ankie, 2010, "Globalization, Crisis and he Political Economy of International Monetary 
(Dis)order”, Globalizations and Crises, Volume 7 2010, Issue 1-2, Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731003593133 (Accessed 23 April 2019) p. 51-66 
8 Chachavalpongpun, Pravin, 2003, “ASEAN-US Relations: What are the talking points”, Monographs 
429, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISBN: 9789814515511 
9 Russian Times (RT), 2018, “Why countries are dumping the dollar and why? 19 May 2018, Available 
at: https://www.rt.com/business/427177-who-why-dumping-us-dollar/ (Accessed 20 June 2018)  
10 India Time, 2018, “No more dollar trade: “Friends” India and UAE sign pact to trade in Rupee and 
Dirham”, Dec 6th 2018, Available at: https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/no-more-dollar-trade-
friends-india-uae-sign-pact-to-trade-in-rupee-and-dirham-358038.html 
 (Accessed 20 June 2018) 
11 Grimm, Sven and He, Wenping, 2012, “Emerging partners and their impact on African development”, 
In Lundsgaarde Erik, 2012, "Africa toward 2030. Challenges for development policy", Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK 
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Saharan Africa's poverty rate remains high: 41 % of the region's population—were 
living in extreme poverty in 2013.12 
Incidentally there have been vast improvements in Africa’s economic growth over the 
last decade. There are numerous reports highlighting Africa’s revival, but overall the 
“Africa Rising” façade has continued as a means of legitimating the export-led primary 
commodity economic model. Bond refers to this as “overhyping of Africa’s growth 
prospects.”13 Overall, something is wrong in the African development trajectory. At the 
continental, regional and sub-regional levels, the mechanisms and norms for 
progression are burdened by weak implementation, insufficient buy-in and an absence 
of strong leadership.   
Against this background, this thesis proposes that a “Pan-African currency” could:  
(a) Serve as a tool to distance Africa from firstly the current neocolonial relationship it 
has with the West and secondly the aggressive hegemony of the US dollar 
(b) Be a tool to tackle the core issues of Africa’s developmental challenges by 
stimulating significant economic development.   
These two propositions are the thesis’s main aims.  The two aims are best examined 
via a political analysis.  This political analysis will be developed by exploring concepts 
such as monetary integration, the challenges which hinder the development of a 
currency and what could be done to over the challenges.  This will be processed by 
analysis of the benefits and constraints that such a currency would bring.  The 
overarching research questions that will guide this discussion are:  
• What are the driving forces of the common African currency project? In whose 
interest and for what purpose? 
                                                          
12 World Bank, 2017, “Assessing Africa’s policies and institutions: 2016 CPIA results for Africa”, 
Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/891501500349324004/Assessing-Africas-
policies-and-institutions-2016-CPIA-results-for-Africa (Accessed 23April 2019)  
13 Bond, Patrick, 2016, "BRICS banking and the debate over sub-imperialism", Third World Quarterly, 
Vol 37, 2016, Rising Powers and South-South Co-operation, Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1128816 (Accessed 29 March 2019), p 611-629 
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• How would genuine economic and monetary integration go about in Africa? To 
what extent are these systems viable?  
• What can the African common currency project learn from the European and 
Asian experience? 
• How is an African currency the antithesis of global capitalist system?  
• What are the new modes of thinking about African development? 
All these research questions point in the direction of “African development.” As Sardar 
notes, the word “development” contains a notion of superiority.14  Since its inception 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, development has been synonymous with “progress” 
and “modernisation.” But progress is always a movement away from something that is 
considered inferior: one progresses from a (perceived) lesser state to a (perceived) 
higher state of existence. The basic assumption of development, no matter how it is 
defined, is of a linear teleology vis-à-vis the standard yardstick of measurement: 
Western civilisation.  
Thus in addressing the questions of “African development”, the thesis will explore 
literature on International relations (IR), economic and monetary systems, issues of 
regionalization and integration, and sovreingty vs supranationaliy as all these facets 
relate to the establishment of a common currency. Overall the research hypothesizes 
that a :  
 “Pan-African currency” embodies the ideaology of Pan-Africanism.  Pan-Africanism is 
about uniting Africa so that it becomes one solitary cohesive piece  in a globalized 
world. The implementation of a Pan-African currency has the abilty for Africa to foster 
the notion of unity,  come to terms with its challenges and overcome those nagging 
challenges which have pestered the continent for decades.   
                                                          
14 Ziauddin, Sardar, 1996, "Beyond Development: An Islamic Perspective", The European Journal of 
Development Research, Dec 1996, Vol 8, Issue 2, p 36-55 
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The hypothesis is valid given that idealism in International Relations has proven that 
policy can have results even before implementation.  
1.2 Introduction to the Literature Review  
Knowledge has been strongly influenced by arguments of Western thought in which 
truth was presented as absolute reality viewed through only one prism and science 
and reason held as the solution to every problem. In that era of modernism, progress 
was conceived as the goal of society. This formed a world view that there was only 
one path to development; Industrialisation, urbanization and capital-intensive 
technology. These factors, the central pillars of Western socio-economics, are not a 
universal remedy and examples from Asia show that the Western model to 
development does not apply globally.  Whereas dominant theories of development 
perceived traditional and socio-cultural values as impediments to development, more 
recent authors now highlight the importance of these factors. Consequently, models 
built around the idea of Western states are therefore unlikely to be well placed to 
explain the behavior of African states. 
In creating an African position and solution to development, a Pan-African currency is 
viewed as the ultimate instigator of such a goal. In exploring Pan-Africanism, the 
research concentrates on four fields: ideology as a motivating factor, economic and 
monetary integration, African challenges and overcoming them, and lessons from the 
European and Asian experience in unity and integration.  In exploring these four fields, 
the main bearing will be relating how common currencies are a tool for development.   
To examine thoroughly the four above mentioned fields and their linkages, the 
research chose the theoretical framework of realism. As one of the more dominant 
theories of International Relations, realism provides the most powerful explanation for 
the state of war which is the regular condition of life in the international system.15 
Realism teaches leaders to focus on interests, to see peace through strength and to 
recognize that great powers can co-exist even if they have antithetical values and 
beliefs.  Realism has a number of intellectual antecedents known as classical realism 
                                                          
15 Dunne, Tim and Schmidt, Brian C., 2001, “Realism”, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, 2001, “The 
Globalization of World Politics”, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 141 
16 
 
which relies on illustrious figures to inform the raison d etre. Kat for example notes the 
importance of these “illustrious figures” in forming revolutionary ideologies which left 
an impact on the world.  He gives Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev as examples 
of elites who played key roles in transforming and incorporating the Chinese and 
Soviet economies respectively into the capitalist system.16  
The link between the ideas of intellects and action in IR is important because Pan-
Africanism and its various lineages have been heavily influenced by intellectuals; from 
Steve Biko, to Marcus Garvey to Kwame Nkrumah to Walter Rodney for example. This 
linkage is important because realism warns against universal moral principles and 
warns state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interest in order to adhere to 
some indeterminate notion of “ethical” conduct.  That is, Africa must careful to imitate 
and thus must define its own interests.  
In analysing realism and in order to showcase its strengths as to why it is the preferred 
theoretical framework of this research, this literature review will make use of opposing 
theories.  Such a pretext is in line with realism which considers that “no one realism” 
exists but rather various different types. According to Kat, realism in the study of IPE 
must be complemented with elements of other theoretical approaches to avoid 
weakness in explaining several aspects. 17 Similarly, Pan-Africanism also tends to 
experiment with different types of arrangements in order to formulate different policies 
and action plans. This is mandatory given the complexities associated with African 
issues and changing perspectives as scholars attempt to grapple with the realities and 
challenges of 21st century International Relations.   
In reviewing the literature, the researcher aims to find the gaps or holes in the existing 
knowledge as well as concentrate on the validity of the debates.  The literature is 
deconstructed to expose the underlying assumptions, concepts, and theories that 
buttress claims and set the stage for the methodology of the research that is then 
                                                          
16 Kat, Mazhid, 2015, “A Conceptual Analysis of Realism in International Political Economy”, Available 
at:  https://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/a-conceptual-analysis-of-realism-in-international-political-




described. This incremental, culminative process characterizes the development of 
normal science in its attempts at coherency.18 
1.2.1 Realism  
Realism is considered a theoretical broad church, embracing a variety of authors and 
texts.  Despite the numerous denominations, all realists subscribe to the defacto father 
of realism Han Morgenthau.  Morgenthau’s three “s’s”; statism, survival and self-help 
are considered the three pillars of realism.  
 
Figure 2 The three "s's" of Realism 
 
 
The first “s”, statism, is the principle which supports the organization of humankind into 
particular communities.  The values and beliefs of that community are protected and 
sustained by the state. The link between statism and Pan-Africanism may be viewed 
in three paradigms.   
                                                          
18 Rudesam, Kjell E., 2007, “Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content and 






Figure 3 The link between Statism and Pan-Africanism 
 
The first paradigm is that Pan-Africanism regards the state as an outdated and 
redundant function; an obstacle in the success of Pan-African endeavors.  African 
states are at the epicenter of the difficulties, directly and indirectly responsible for the 
challenges Africa faces due to weak institutions, rampant corruption, undemocratic 
and unruly behavior of their governments and officials, as well as unjust policies that 
accelerate conflict. As such challenges become normalized, the authority of national 
governments gradually erodes contributing to what the realist thinker Mearsheimer 
labeled “the anarchic nature of the international system.”  
With the state and its functions becoming outdated, the prospects of economic 
integration via the merging of states becomes a handsome option.  Most commonly 
referred to as “international economic integration”, to Robson economic integration is 
“the institutional combination of separate national economics into larger economic 
blocs or communities.”19 The essentiality of economic integration is that states will 
transfer loyalties to supranational bodies.  In doing so, the fundamental case for 
superimposing integration is that it will make the integration of markets more effect, 
                                                          
19 Robson, Peter, 1998, “The Economics of International Integration”, Routledge Press, New York, USA, 
ISBN-10: 9780415148764, p. 1 
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with beneficial effects on resource costs, economic efficiency and growth.20 Integration 
can also counter serious potential calamities because states are increasingly 
becoming interdependent and more exposed to financial, economic or social crises of 
a global character. Under these conditions, it has become very difficult for any one 
state, or group of countries to manage crises or develop policies in isolation.21   
To an extent, the theory of functionalism rather than realism best captures the 
rationality behind economic integration.22 Functionalism arose during the inter-War 
period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the state as a 
form of social organisation. The functionalist approach seeks conditions that promote 
peace and prevent disharmony among states and thus provides an explanation on the 
basis of international cooperation and the evolutionary nature of the development of 
international organizations. Functionalists stress the importance of community bodies 
viewing society as a system or a structure of integrated parts which fit together to form 
a whole. Functionalism sees international co-operation as the first step in the 
integration process. Its argument is predicated on a gradualist/incremental approach 
to integration that is embedded in the common conviction or need by people to pool 
their efforts in order to achieve a common objective. The logic of the theory is that, 
cooperation and interdependence among states grow as states integrate in non-
political areas like economics and technology.  
The downside of functionalism however, and the reason why realism outmaneuvers it, 
is that functionalism perfectly describes Western phenomena for example like 
“European functional spill-over.”  Functionalism seeks to imitate or mimic European 
integration success without considering African realities. African economic integration 
in the words of Cheeseman has been a “charade with a lot of rhetorical support by 
                                                          
20 Robson, Peter, 1998, “The Economics of International Integration”, Routledge Press, New York, USA, 
ISBN-10: 9780415148764, p. 1 
21 The Presidency, National Planning Commission, 2012, “National Development Plan 2030: Our Future 
Make it work”, NDP, ISBN: 978-0-621-41180-5, Available at: 
http://www.npconline.co.za/medialib/downloads/home/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%
20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf (Accessed 22 July 2018) p. 215 
22 Jiboku, Peace A., 2015, “The Challenge of Regional Economic Integration in Africa”, Africa’s Public 
Service Delivery & Performance Review, Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312667610_The_Challenge_of_Regional_Economic_Integr
ation_in_Africa_Theory_and_Reality (Accessed April 17th 2019) 
20 
 
politicians versus the real state of economic integration.23  In importing European 
functionalism without question, Africa suffers from institutional duality.  Institutional 
duality refers to the plethora of parallel institutions which make governance ineffective 
and especially supranational governance so.  According to Kidane, institutional duality 
has “contributed to the chronic problems of governance and violent conflicts that have 
ravaged many parts of Africa.”24  The functions which need to be linked together in a 
network of organizations for the functionalist principle to work are non-existent and 
there is not yet a consensus among states or a convergence of the various regional 
blocs.25   
A further reason why realism outdoes functionalism may be been seen in the 
functionalist approach to integration which has been gradual, incremental or simply 
according to Dawn, “too slow.”26 Lecoutre discusses this functionalist vs realist 
approach on the discourse of the formation of the United States of Africa. The 
maximalists (realist)advocate for the immediate creation of a United States of Africa, 
while the gradualists (functionalist) have stuck to a “stage-by-state” integration process 
taking place with the RECs.  An important question to ask here is; have the gradualists 
not been given enough time to decide since the debate on a Union Government first 
emerged in the 1960s? Neo-functionalism advocated that economic integration had to 
precede political integration yet in Africa political integration is still dominating the 
arena. So while functionalism on paper offers the “overwhelming” case for integration, 
realism on the other hand offers a more radical approach to African economic 
integration. Such analysis suggests that narrower aspects of the regional integration 
agenda are more likely to succeed in the short term, while formal integration processes 
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may do well to build on informal, more functional regional integration in the medium to 
long term.27 
The second relationship between “statism” and Pan-Africanism is that African states 
are stuck in either a “colonial”, “neo-colonial”, or “post-colonial” category.  
Morgenthau’s definition of power, relates to these three “state of minds.”  Morgenthau 
noted that power was “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.”  There 
are two important points that realists make about the elusive concept of power.  First 
is that power is a relational concept.  Power cannot exist in a vacuum but only in 
relation to another concept.  Secondly, power is a relative concept, calculations need 
to be made not only about one’s own power capabilities, but about the power that other 
state actors possess.  Therefore, in the midst of the colonial, neo-colonial and post-
colonial state, where does Africa’s power lie? If its resources were to go by, then it’s 
clear that its power lies in the hands of non-Africans. It is only with true decolonization 
via a Pan-African currency that Africa can start engaging with its own power.   
How can we describe the three different stages of coloniality? We may begin with 
coloniality which is a leitmotif of global imperial designs that has been in place for 
centuries. Walter D. Mignolo argued that “coloniality names the experiences and views 
of the world and history of those whom Fanon called les damnes de la terre , those 
who have been, and continue to be, subjected to the standard of modernity.” 28 To 
Gatsheni-Ndlovu, at the center of the modern international system is “coloniality”’,  
which is defined as “one of the key constitutive elements that entrench the worldview 
defined by a Eurocentric global social order that was constructed during the time of 
colonial encounters between Europe and Africa.”29 In this context, Anibal Quijano 
articulated “coloniality” as a Eurocentric project based on the imposition of a racial, 
ethnic and gender classification of the global population as the cornerstone and 
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defining element of the modern international system. In everyday language, 
Eurocentrism is usually understood in the sense of European ethnocentrism, as “the 
idea or practice of placing Europe at the center of one’s worldview.”30 
The official decolonization process which brokered political independence for African 
states did not succeed in removing coloniality. Muchie notes that “after receiving the 
crown of formal political independence, Africa surrendered the economic jewels to the 
internal structure left by the colonial powers in the interest of serving colonial 
hegemony over Africa”. This was the crux of Nkrumah’s philosophy.  In 1953 he stated 
that “we are fast learning that political independence is not enough to rid us of the 
consequences of colonial rule.”31 His much-quoted statement “seek ye first the political 
kingdom” is a reference to the “economic freedom” needed to be truly independent.   
What hampered true “decolonialization” was the pact between the new syndicate-local 
African elite and the former colonial powers which created a discourse of economic 
development that misdirected Africans from establishing Pan-Africanism as the 
ideology of African liberation. Goran best surmises this noting that “the formal rules 
that have been introduced by the colonial powers were largely kept intact after 
independence, but the values and norms that underpin a purposive bureaucracy were 
brushed aside.” Africa entered a period of sabotage ad technicist and economistic 
tinkering; abandoning largely the Pan-African ideal in its radical version to establish 
concepts, discourses and practices to free Africa. Thus, decolonization became false 
decolonization.32 According to Muchie, Africa’s crises have intellectual, political and 
economic reasons much of which has been a relic from the incomplete decolonization 
of the continent.33 
This false decolonization has resulted in “neo-colonialism.”  Wamba Dia Wamba 
concludes that "the neo-colonial state has continued to make it very difficult for African 
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people to interact and relate to themselves.”  In this era then, Africa has remained as 
an exporter of wealth in the form of raw materials, illicit financial flows, or debt 
repayment.34,35 The African Development Bank (AfDB) purported that from 1980 to 
2009, African states lost up to US$1.4 trillion in illicit financial flows.36 Between 2010 
and 2015 the figure was approximately US$50 billion per annum.37 The latest 
approximation is US$65 billion per annum.  The neo-colonial prism (prison?) then 
becomes essential in understanding “Pan-African realism.”  This prism manifests itself 
not just as an artefact of the designs of the West, but has been buttressed by the 
willingness and complicity of Africa resulting in neo-patrimonial relations.  
Africa’s failure to decolonize has resulted in the “post-colonial state” which continues 
to affect development long after direct colonialism and administrative apartheid have 
been dethroned. What has compounded the phenomenon of coloniality is that the 
post-colonial state as an inherited institution continues to exert colonial-like brutalities 
on African people.38 For example, in 1960, the apartheid police force opened fire on 
protestors in the township of Sharpeville outside of Vereeniging. This act has become 
known as the “Sharpeville massacre.” When the democratic police force open fired on 
striking miners outside Marikana in 2012, it became known as a “tragedy.”  In the DRC 
there are an estimated 200,000 rape survivors today. A 2011 report recorded that 1000 
woman were being raped daily.  Rapes in the DRC have been systemized into a 
warfare tool.  These examples are just two of the many brutalities that the post-colonial 
state revisits on its population.  
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The post-colonial environment is actually a system unlike the conventional state 
system with like units. Actors in this environment are composed of “unlike units jostling 
for pre-eminence in a near Hobbesian state.”39 Ngugi Wa Thiong’o described this 
when he noted “the African mindset has continued to reproduce coloniality as their 
future even after direct juridical colonialism has been dismantled.”40 This reproduction 
of coloniality amounted to what Frantz Fanon termed "repetition without change" that 
was itself a product of pitfalls of consciousness. This was possible because 
colonialism was not simply a process of conquest, annexation, occupation, settlement, 
domination, and exploitation, it entailed emptying "the native's brain of all form and 
content" on top of committing epistemicides such as distorting, disfiguring and 
eventually destroying the history of the colonised.41 Other leading decolonial thinkers, 
theorists and activists such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Aime Cesaire, Albert Memmi, Anibal 
Quijano, Samir Amin, Kwame Nkrumah, Enrique Dussel, Walter D. Mignolo, Ramon 
Grosfoguel, Steve Biko, Lewis R. Gordon, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and many 
others, have all identified racism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and coloniality as major 
challenges preventing the emergence of a genuinely post-colonial world.  
Thus, the “post-colonial state” is no better off than the colonial or neo-colonial states. 
The post-colonial state has to be deconstructed and de-validated in order to begin to 
reconstruct the foundations for peace.42 Ndlovu-Gatsheni concurs noting  what, 
therefore, needs to be understood is not just the “not yet uhuru” post-colonial 
experience but the invisible vampirism of technologies of imperialism and colonial 
matrices of power that continue to exist in the minds, lives, languages, dreams, 
imaginations, and epistemologies of modern subjects in Africa and the entire global 
South.43  This process that Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes may then be called 
“decolonization.” Simply put decolonization seeks ending the domination of Western 
epistemological traditions, histories and figures.  In particular decolonization calls for 
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the end of domination of Western world views and the incorporation of African and 
global perspectives, experiences and epistemologies.44 Decolonization is 
distinguished from an imperial version of history through its push for shifting the 
geography of reason from the West as the epistemic locale from which the “world is 
described, conceptualized and ranked” to the ex-colonized epistemic sites as 
legitimate points of departure in describing the construction of the modern world 
order.45 Decolonization is then the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions 
of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political 
hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression 
in the modern/colonial world. 46  The term was popularized in the 1960s and 1980s 
with Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi and Ngugi wa Thiong’o leading the field.  
The decoloniality found in realism aptly explains Africa’s position in the world as well 
as knowledge production and power, and the post-colonial state.  Thus, it may be 
argued that decolonial theory provides the foundations of “Pan-Africanism.” In fact, for 
Pan-Africanism to become a major counter world view, “decolonization” cannot be 
divorced from it. The importance of decoloniality is magnified by Ndlovu-Gatsheni who 
wrote “there is no way to understand how the present ‘global political’ was constructed 
and constituted into the current asymmetrical modern power structure that is inherently 
Euro-North American-centric without a clear knowledge of coloniality.”47 
Considering this, a Pan-African system cannot be realized without decolonization of 
power, knowledge, and being. This is why it is pertinent for all those constructing 
African futures to fully understand the constitution of the present and at the same time 
comprehending how the modern world system works.48 Taken together, coloniality of 
power, coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge constitute a formidable global 
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coloniality that stands as a bulwark on the path of Pan-Africanism.  Pan-Africanism 
seeks to break the mold of post-independence African politics, not strengthen it.49   
The third and last paradigm which links statism to Pan-Africanism is that statism has 
been heavily influenced by what realists call the “the balance of power.”  The “balance 
of power” refers to the posture or policy of a state or group of states protecting itself 
against another state or group of states by matching its power against the power of 
the other side.  In this paradigm it is then understandable why Africa holds such little 
“weight” in the balance of power. Pan-African seeks to address the balance of power 
by demanding a new international order, seeking the renegotiation of African 
dependencies, and a favorable treatment of Africa within the system.50  Pan-
Africanism aims to make the state, region and continent viable and relevant to 
compete effectively in the international power game.51  It further seeks to overcome 
Western ideologies in favor of African centered economic, social and political 
trajectories. In moving away from the various Western policy prescriptions, Pan-
Africanism removes the limits on the debates of Africa’s political economy.52  
Intellectual interaction on how Africa is understood in a globalized world suggests 
Africa is central to understanding the multiple transitions that are taking place within 
global capitalism.53 Le Pere concurs noting that “Africa is located in the interstices of 
a global capitalist order.”  As a result, Pan-Africanism cannot be viewed as a simple 
one-dimensional concept but as a set of methodological and analytical approaches. 
Pan-Africanism asks questions of African centered import, including how the current 
and predicted future circumstances may be reshaped for Africa’s benefit. It is essential 
then that Pan-Africanism develop its own “systems of meaning” that require epistemic 
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disobedience, that is, general rejection of Western epistemology or economic 
hegemony.54  In developing systems of meaning we “re-imagine the future.”55  
Such re-imagining is vivid in the works of Shivji, Pheko, Hierro, Muchie and Norman, 
of whom the latter notes “the dominant governance agenda needs to be radically 
overhauled.” To Shivji, “generating a Pan-Africanist discourse is the task of the post 
neo-liberal generation of African intellectuals.”56 Pheko describes a strategy calling for 
unification of African financial markets and economic integration.57 Hence, there is a 
need for further discourse on how Africa’s strategic resource endowment may 
transform into tangible development outcomes.  Hierro augments the rationality by 
noting that it is “rather archaic and lazy to still be guided by values of bygone eras.”58 
Hierro argues for new economic thinking of economic growth because calculations on 
economic growth have been “fed” with values based on clumped and sometimes 
arbitrary indicators, to churn out (impersonal and disconnected]) “data” on our futures. 
She notes that “still, in this day and age, we appear to value the ideology of numbers 
and scientific, hard or ‘big data’ for example, over the observable truths around us.”59 
Realism’s position on “re-imagining” is found in the discourse of Kenneth Waltz who 
tries to overcome the problem of power by shifting the focus from power to capabilities.  
He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following 
areas; size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability and competence.60  While Africa lacks the latter 
three capabilities, it definitely makes up for it the first three. (Figure 4 below) Waltz’s 
first three factors give impetus to the belief that a Pan-African currency could be the 
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tool to make the continent viable and relevant. Furthermore, Waltz proposition gives 
impetus for Africa not to remain on the disproportionate side of the balance of power.   
For Africa to use its potential in Waltz’s first three capabilities to make up for its lack 
of power, it will require innovation which Africa has lagged behind in comparison to 
other parts of the Global South. According to Muchie, since independence, the African 
state has suffered from low capacity for innovation and development due to the nature 
and character of the state, its location in the global knowledge production flows and 
the skewed international capitalist system. Efforts at national, regional and continental 
levels to boost innovation through the establishment of national systems of innovation 
and regional systems of innovation have not yielded enough result.61    








Resource endowment / 
Economic capability 
Nigeria 18.3 200  2.7 37.2 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves in 
Nigeria as of 2011 
Congo (DRC) 18.4 85 3.2 “Limitless water” from 
the world’s 2nd largest 
river 
Tanzania 17.6 58 3.2 Exported $1.6 billion in 
gems and precious 
minerals in 2018  
Ethiopia 17.8 110 2.5 Exported $500 million in 
Gold in 2014 
Niger  15.3 22 4.1  The world’s 4th largest 
Uranium reserves 
 
Innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product, process 
or method.62 Innovation entails knowledge creation, diffusion and transfer to the 
actors, activities, institutions, spaces and their interaction. Innovation generates 
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competitiveness, drives growth and structural transformation through increased 
productivity.63 A 2016 joint United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
AfDB and AU report remarked that innovation is the geist of economic integration.  
Undeniably the Pan-African system to develop a currency would be a “innovation 
system.” Innovation systems work by capturing the specific interaction of “innovation 
knowledge” as the independent variable and spatial, sectoral and institutional 
arrangements as the dependent variable in the context of the activities and actions to 
bring about transformation and development.  Freeman described an innovation 
system as “the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import, and diffuse technologies.”64 As a heuristic concept, 
the “system of innovation” helps to focus on knowledge and learning activities among 
various actors and institutions that provide a competitive advantage in the long term. 
The main characteristic of this concept is its flexibility in terms of its application to 
various geographic regions, as well as to various actors.   
An innovation system is the epitome of realism in that in new systems and actors need 
to integrate knowledge, innovation and learning to solve problems, based on their own 
resources, with self-reliance, rather than resorting to dependency. This directly relates 
to the other “two s’s” of realism; self-reliance and survival.  Innovation systems just as 
realism does, stresses the need for flexibility of the various actors and their geographic 
regions. Innovation systems suggest that ideas, actors, institutions and incentives 
must interact in order to create new opportunities in production, distribution, markets 
and circulation. 65 This speaks directly to “historical” or “practical realism” which 
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examines how the ultimate skills of a state leader is to accept and to adapt to the 
changing power political configurations in the world politics.  
Overall, realism which embraces a variety of authors and texts is similar to the systems 
of innovation theory which also allows for alternative and multiple ways of navigating 
theory and practice. According to Scerri, a leading author on African innovation 
systems, the theory permits institutions to be viewed as evolving organisms with an 
emphasis on history.66 This is important to Africa as many actors are heavily involved 
in institution-building and catching up, and hence innovation offers “a new approach 
than the time-tested theories of the old.”67 Innovation offers the much needed change 
in framework in understanding African diplomacy and foreign policy.68  
The emphasis on innovation is at the heart of the Pan-African currency project.  
Because the Pan-African currency has remained largely theoretical, there is need for 
“thinking outside the box” in framing Africa’s developmental problems.69  The link 
between innovation and development is seen in a 2013 UNECA study which stressed 
the vitality of innovation capacities concerning diversifying production and trade as 
well as providing the opportunity to “leap-frog” the technological process. It was noted 
that innovation might account for “half the economic growth in dynamic economies.”70 
Thus in developing the Pan-African currency what is required is a combination of 
social, economic and environmental gains which Muchie describes as an “innovation 
synergy.”71  
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Re-imagining Africa’s innovation systems enriches both development economic and 
the economics of innovation. Epitomized by a Pan-African currency, there is potential 
here in addressing real challenges in a “22nd century way.”  For example, Africa 
economic industrialization as it currently stands is unrealistic. Africa’s economic 
industrialization cannot destroy the ecosystem or reduce its population to a position of 
disadvantage. A Pan-African currency offers an alternative framework that employs 
evolutionary economics and innovation systems perspectives on the problems of 
development and underdevelopment. It furthermore comes with the opportunity and 
need to advance theoretical knowledge further for empirical research framing, and for 
policy design application and learning.  
Overall, the link between “statism” and “Pan-Africanism” is that a Pan-African currency 
would address the weakening of national systems and the development of more 
complex accumulation regimes associated with increasingly diversified economies 
marked by burgeoning indigenous production and consumption capacities. Ironically, 
the weakening of the national SI in the evolution towards the regional one, may serve 
to enhance the legitimacy of the state and to strengthen it which is the crux of realism! 
It may be the vehicle for the transition from coercive and permissive social contracts 
to a prevalent productive model of the social contract, which is one of the more solid 
guarantees of the long-term sustainable viability of innovation systems.72  
Regarding the last two “s’s” of realism; “survival” and “self-help”, both these concepts 
apply directly to the benefits of having a common currency.  Before the direct link is 
examined, what is theoretically meant by survival and self-help? Survival is the 
principle of realism which resonates with most realists of all persuasions, that it, the 
pre-eminent goal in international relations is survival.  Survival is held to be a 
precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquests or merely 
independence.  According to Waltz, “beyond the survival motive, the aims of states 
may be endlessly varied.”73  To Mearsheimer and his famed theory of offensive 
realism, the ultimate goal of the state is to achieve a hegemonic position in the 
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international system.  States, according to this view will always desire more power and 
are willing if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power even if 
such an action may jeopardize their own security.  A good example here was the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 which paved the way for the dissection of Poland but 
in fact jeopardized the USSR’s own security!    Regarding the principle self-help, we 
may refer back to Waltz who brought to the realist tradition a deeper understanding of 
the international system within which states co-exist.  In an anarchic structure of the 
international system, security can only be realized through self-help.  That is “self-help 
is necessarily the principle of action.”74 In the self-help system, structural realists argue 
that the balance of power will emerge even in the absence of a conscious policy to 
maintain the balance.  Waltz argues that balances of power result irrespective of the 
intentions of any particular state.   
If we think along the lines of survival, a Pan-African currency offers a way out to an 
Africa which is trapped at the poverty line of world dynamics.  Africa, despite its size 
and population and resources only contribute less than 3% of the world’s GDP.  In 
2008 for example, Africa entire GDP at $1.6 Trillion  was equivilent to Brazil or 
Russia’s!75 In 2015, Africa’s combined GDP according to the world bank was $2.42 
trillion which was equivalent to Frances!  With so many theories tried and tested on 
the continent, a Pan-African currency offers a life-line to Africa to emerge from its 
unremarkable growth.   
In terms of self-help, a Pan-African currency would have an enormous impact on trade 
which for most states is a matter of life or death.76  Only 10% of African trade is “intra”, 
the lowest in the world meaning that Africa is extremely marginalized in a globalized 
world. 77,78  A common currency could develop sound economic policies and which 
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would allow more people to enjoy a higher standard of living.79   Self-help explains that 
Africa cannot rely on others to guarantee its survival.  In IR, the structure of the system 
does not permit friendship, trust, and honor, only a perennial condition of uncertainty 
generated by the absence of a global government.  A Pan-African currency would by 
virtue enhance African governance or what realism defines as “collective action.” 
While the liberal and neo-liberal schools of thought have been more effective in 
explaining the “construction of regimes”, liberal theory has been described as “for 
better or worse, the half-sibling of neo-realism. 80 This is because the liberal agenda 
provides a Western epistemological framework accompanied by violence and force 
prevalent in realism.  This scenario, imposed on the world is described by Muchie as:  
Privitisation + deregulation + globalisation= dot.com driven turbo capitalism=prosperity 
expected to trickle down to ordinary population.81 
Liberalism seeks to establish patterns of rule, norms and procedures or in other words 
“institutionalization”, such as that embodied in the United Nations(UN) or World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Simply put, the neoliberal school of thought concerns itself with 
free trade and the capitalist economy as the techniques towards peace and 
prosperity.82 The emphasis on non-state actors, particularly institutions, grew in 
importance as their potential to act as mediators and/or “vessels” to achieve 
cooperation among actors in the system became more evident.83 Thus, the neoliberals 
see institutions as persistent and as connected sets of rules and practices that 
prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape the expectations of actors. Bringing 
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states together under an umbrella of laws and customs makes states more confident 
to comply with international rules. The crux of the liberal theory propounded that if all 
states would comply with rules, the resulting co-operation would result in absolute 
gains. Contemporary structural realists agree with liberals that regimes can facilitate 
co-operation under certain circumstances, although realists believe that in a self-help 
system co-operation is “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more 
dependent on state power.”84 Thus, a liberal or institutional approach is a rational way 
of understanding  International Political Economy (IPE), albeit, Western IPE.85  
However, neoliberal socio-economic and political thought is exactly what Pan-
Africanism is against. For example, according to Campbell, “international financial 
institutions (read neoliberal institutions) continue to preach about Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) without the necessary attention to the return of the illicit 
funds plundered.”86 Likewise, Scerri notes that the people who manage this unequal 
relationship with the international economic system are “able to derive from it the 
resources necessary for their domestic over-lordship.”87 What Scerri is referring to is 
the Bretton Woods institutions that stifle African development via their “development 
paradigms” which, for example, include the disastrous Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). SAPs have had too much emphasis on unleashing market 
forces and too little on equity and effective state-led development. These shortcomings 
are likely to have contributed to the generally poor performance of adjustment 
programmes in Africa in past decades. SAPs are great illustration of the West’s 
balance of power over Africa and how the liberal agenda facilitates it.   
In the final debate of realism vs liberalism it may be argued that realism concerns its 
self with pure power while liberalism concerns itself with free trade and the capitalist 
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economy as the techniques towards peace and prosperity.88  However realism should 
not be ignored within IPE because power and military capabilities depend on capital 
accumulation and economic development.  Realist terms like mercantilism and 
economic nationalism though not in heavy use in the contemporary era are still notions 
which the state cannot ignore.  In fact, a lot of realist terminologies have cloaked 
themselves into catch-phrases like globalization, Hyperglobalization, or “world 
economic theory.”  E.H. Carr understood that the science of economics presupposes 
a given political order and cannot be profitably studied in isolation from politics.  In 
essence, this is because economic strength underlies political power: the larger the 
economy, the more advanced national defence it can afford. Conversely, Carr pointed 
out that damaging the economy of a rival state is as crucial as defeating its armies. 
Moreover, he emphasized that economic power may be used as a tool of influence in 
two forms: the export of capital, and the control of foreign markets. An example of this 
can be seen in the importance of capital export as a means for the United States in 
what is known as the “dollar diplomacy.” Another example is the financial pressure 
France placed on Austria in 1931, forcing it to abandon the project of a customs union 
with Germany.89 
However, it is not to say that the Pan-African currency debate is all positive. According 
to Oladele, talk of common currency arrangements are “intellectually dishonest” 
because only when common money is instituted can there be real benefits which are 
associated with  economic union and cooperation amongst states.90 There are 
downsides to having a common currency such as loss of sovereignty and risk of 
uneven development within the currency area. 91   
Arguably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has made the 
most promising progress towards a common currency. Its “ECO” however has 
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struggled with implementation since 2003. Five postponements later, the ECO is 
expected to be realized in 2020.92  The delays and postponements led Oladele to note 
that a common currency  can be created with a lot less difficulty than our African 
leaders have made it look so far.  After all, without economic union, Africans have 
been in currency unions before. Examples include in British West Africa, the pound; in 
Eastern Africa, the East African Shilling and since colonial times, we have been 
witnessing the many perennial facets of the CFA franc. 93   
1.2.2 Conclusion of Literature Review  
To summarize the realist debate, realist believe that there is no centralized global 
authority that limits sovereign states and determines their actions. For this reason, 
nation-states are the only legitimate actors in international affairs and neither 
supranational nor domestic actors can restrict them. Under conditions of anarchy and 
an unpredictable future, nations rely only on themselves. That is why the main driving 
force in the self-help world is the national interest. The central concern of foreign policy 
is survival because of the uncertain future of the international system. Survival, in turn, 
depends on power. For such a portrait of the world, realists have often been criticized 
as pessimists. However, practitioners of realism see it not as a foundation on which to 
build the world order but as an epistemological tool of analyzing history and making 
forecasts for the future. In specific regard to the IPE debate, realism cannot deny that 
new economic conditions of economic openness have emerged.94 
A Pan-African currency from the realism perspective would be beneficial because 
Africa has a precarious relationship with the three “s’s.”  Africa needs a common 
currency to help reduce financial management by developing more efficient financial 
systems and payment facilities.95 Interconnecting of the union’s financial sectors offers 
an opportunity to strengthen their efficiency with broader avenues for investing 
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liquidities and sharing best practices and financial infrastructure. In addition, internal 
administrative costs imposed on enterprises where sales within a community involve 
several currencies would be eliminated. The liquidity services provided by a single 
currency circulating over wider areas as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and 
standard for deferred payments makes things simplified.96   
Overall, a common currency will increase macroeconomic stability characterized by 
an improved overall price stability, access to broader and more transparent financial 
markets and an increase in the availability of external financing. The fundamental 
economic case for superimposing a common currency is that it will make markets more 
effective.97 Furthermore, it is simply convenient; you do not have to keep changing 
your money every time you cross a national border any more than you have to change 
money when you drive from Kansas to Missouri.  It may offer a more reliable unit of 
value, since the ability of a shared currency to buy goods is not likely to change as fast 
as each separate national currency's purchasing power would change.  Therefore, 
nations would not need to keep large reserves, nor concern themselves overmuch 
with their variation.  
1.3 Methodology  
As the literature review has shown, the interwoven yet separate themes explored in 
this research are best explored using various theoretical lenses.  This is necessary 
given the diverse elements brought together under the umbrella of “Pan-Africanism.”  
Under this metaphorical umbrella, the various different competing and opposing 
concepts are laid bare. For example, on one hand the research highlights the benefits 
of the capitalist system while on the other hand proposes unproven idealistic systems.  
At times the research stresses the importance of European and Asian development 
archetypes while seeking African development trajectories. As these contrasts have 
influenced the literature review, they likewise have influenced the methodology and 
methods deployed.  
                                                          
96 Ibid p. 194 
97 Ibid p. 193 
38 
 
From the onset three points should be noted about this study.  
1) Pan-Africanism is very much an abstract concept. It seldom associates with 
numbers, dates, quantity or geographical locations. Furthermore, unlike other major 
ideologies/theories/philosophies such as Marxism, Keynesianism, Kantianism, 
Grotianism, Cartesianism or Mobutuism, which were developed by certain individuals 
and hence can be well lineated, Pan-Africanism has no founder or quintessential 
definition. It thus may be regarded as a purely intellectual concept.  
2) In dealing with purely intellectual concepts or “the abstract”, human understanding, 
analytical capacities and information acquisition are so desperately limited that nothing 
can ever be known to be correct. Truth is not static, it evolves. Whatever evidence is 
presented, there is always the possibility of finding unexpected facts that cause those 
that made the original decision to regret their selection. This relates to the relativism 
ontology which posits that knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, 
society, or historical context, and are not absolute. 
3) Chomsky’s “Galilean style” of inquiry method features “abstraction” and 
“idealisation.”98  The Galilean style seeks to move beyond superficiality by a readiness 
to undertake far-reaching idealisation and to construct abstract models that are 
accorded more significance. Chomsky claims that massive data dismissal was 
advocated by Galileo.  That is, Galileo was willing to say “look, if the data refute the 
theory, the data are probably wrong.”99 
Taking these three points into consideration, the research would best be explored by 
utilizing a mixed methodology which seeks qualitative data. The mixed method 
provides a rich and contextual perspective on issues that cannot be achieved in 
collecting numbers. This approach corresponds well with the above three points and 
is well suited for evidence-based research and systemic reviews of effectiveness. This 
method may “enhance” understanding in an area or provide “different” sorts of 
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evidence and insight into a problem.100 Furthermore mixed methodology is suitable to 
this research because the answers to the research questions is in the realm of 
relativism but the methods (natural inquiry) is rooted in realism. Relativism is about the 
existence of multiple realities which emphasizes context and that truth is not static, 
and that the findings must be used in similar contexts.   
The overarching type of qualitative method chosen is “naturalistic inquiry” which is an 
exploratory type of methodology. Naturalistic inquiry is when the researcher observes, 
describes and interprets data (see Table below).101 The general inductive approach 
provides an easy and systematic set of procedures for analyzing qualitative data that 
can produce reliable and valid findings.102 Such a method allows for the establishment 
of clear links between research objectives and the summary findings derived from the 
raw data. Furthermore, it allows the researcher to assimilate or saturate a concept.103  
In terms of the data analysis tool, the “mapping method” was deployed which is a 
simple method of analyzing qualitative data.  It provides a “shorthand” way of 
understanding often complex situations.  It allows for linkages to be explored from a 
surface level.104 The downside of using the naturalistic inquiry is that is results in 
generalizations and open to bias because truth will always be measured by the 
researcher.  This is also known as the “etic perspective” because the researcher is 
viewed from the perspective of the observer.   
Figure 5 Ten elements of naturalist design 
Focus of inquiry A Pan-African currency 
Determining fit of paradigm to focus Economic and Monetary integration 
Determining the fit of the inquiry 
paradigm to the substantive theory 
selected to guide the inquiry 
Pan-African Realism/Neo-realism, 
Decolonial theory, Neo-liberalism, 
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Functionalism, System of Innovation 
Theory 
Determining where and from whom data 
will be collected 
Experts (Criterion sampling)  
Determining instrumentation Questionpro (For interviews only)  
Planning data collection and recording 
modes 
Instrument collects and records 
Planning data analysis procedure Interpretive 
Planning the logistics N/A 
Planning for trustworthiness Phenomenological 
 
The research deployed interviews to ascertain the phenomenological aspect of the 
research. Phenomenological research refers to focusing on the experience and 
knowledge of individuals with a fundamental goal of arriving at a description of the 
nature of the particular phenomenon.105,106   The researcher identified 30 potential 
academics and bureaucrats in government and supranational institutions.   
QuestionPro, an online survey software which describes itself as an “insights 
platform”, was the selected forum to conduct interviews.  The software includes tools 
for creation, distribution and analysis of surveys.  
Three main ideas informed the designing of the questionnaire. The first idea was to 
ask why the research is adopting a questionnaire and to what purpose. It was 
considered that a questionnaire would give insights to common currency creation in 
Africa. The second pertained to adapting and adopting to what previous researchers 
have done in the past to ascertain if the research is in line with the current trends.  This 
helped to improve the questions to seek maximum data. The third idea concerned 
ethical considerations.  Within the questionnaire, the option to opt out was provided in 
line with ethical standards which allow for the participant to withdraw at any time.  
Another ethical consideration regarding ethics was the number of contacts made with 
interviewees. An initial first invitation letter, a reminder to inform recipients to complete, 
a final reminder informing that the survey was about to end and a completion email 
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which informed respondents that their response was received and were greatly valued 
were sent out.    
A questionnaire containing the following questions was uploaded to the software.   
1) As an ideology, what does Pan-Africanism lack in order to drive African integration?  
2) Please explain both the positives and negatives of a common continental African 
currency? 
3) By use of example, which African region has been the most successful in terms of 
integration and why?  
4) What are the necessary political and economic factors for an African currency to 
develop?   
5) Using examples of integration outside of Africa, what are the lessons for African 
institutions to take heed of?  
6) What are the contingency plans that Africa is making for the break-up of the present 
international financial system? 
7) What are the fault lines of the dollar in light of QE?  
8) IMF boss Christine Lagard said in July 2016 that the world is steadily moving 
towards a 1914 point. With intensified trade wars and protectionism in the wake of 
BREXIT, how will this bring about a new global configuration?  
The method for analyzing the interview data was “document analysis.”  Document 
analysis are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an 
assessment topic.107  Interview data was grouped into themes and coded. To prevent 
bias, a fellow researcher coded the interview data.  Data was discussed and reviewed 
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with peers.   In attempting to further reduce possible biasness, the researcher tried as 
much as possible to disassociate himself from the field and strictly adhere to the rules 
of scientific investigation.108  The researcher also sought to prescribe instead using 
terms which denote social facts.   
Besides the interviews, other primary data was sourced from the AU and regional 
bodies.  Periodic reports, press releases, AU Commission and executive reports, 
memoranda, proceedings, and documents containing resolutions and decisions were 
all used.  These are all publicly available. Research papers by external institutions and 
individuals undertaken on behalf of institutions will also be used as reference material. 
The criteria deployed in selecting the documents was according to Google searches 
which in most cases displays the most popular or searched for documents.  
Secondary sources in the form of accredited scientific journals, periodicals, quarterly’s 
and other scholarly documents will be utilized. Blogs, editorials, newspaper documents 
(both print and online) and opinion pieces will allow the researcher to keep abreast 
with unfolding events.  These sources also at times provide first-hand knowledge of 
what is happening in the world.   
Overall, what the researcher sought the most was case studies. Case studies help to 
bring in an understanding of complexities.  They can be used to extend experience 
and add strength to the existing knowledge through previous research.  Their 
contextual analysis revolves around a limited number of events or conditions and how 
they relate. More importantly, case studies will be used to compare and contrast and 
thus make sense of examples in the world.  This “comparative” approach covers the 
study of political experience for the purpose of making systematic comparisons. It is 
an ideal method for comprehending and analyzing principles, issues, and problems. 
The case studies undeniably enhanced the research.   
In terms of delimitations, the research encountered numerous ones.  The following 
bullet points highlight some:  
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• The term “Africa.” It is used in an intellectual context to describe relationships 
synonymous with the continent. Although some references used might refer to 
sub-Saharan Africa, this research does not differentiate between the 
neocolonial divisions of the continent. The term is understood here in a critical 
sense, as a shared set of interrelated ideas, values, norms, beliefs, desires and 
so forth. 
• Likewise, global imperial designs, Eurocentricity, Washington Consensus, the 
West, Transatlantic forum, Western hegemony, and the "West" are all used 
interchangeably. Their context refers to the same thing. 
• Numerous references to South Africa are used as a case study. As Africa’s de 
facto hegemon it is important to discover the trends which other African states 
seek to emulate.  
• A common misconception of decolonial thought is its censorious approach.  The 
literature review critiques Western political theory that is heavily laden with 
Western authors. This is not to say that in creating Afrocentric models, the past 
must be eradicated but rather, literature from the Global South must not be 
continuously ignored. Interaction with the West need not always be at the 
expense of African interests.109 
• The term “common currency” is used instead of single currency. 
Regarding the referencing, this thesis makes use of the footnote style. Footnotes will 
help readers engage with the text and slow the narrative down thus improving 
comprehension. This style is more suitable to research which uses a variety of 
sources, especially, websites, which are difficult to place as “in-text referencing.” 
However, a list of references was included at the end of every chapter for better 
accessibility.   
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1.4 Structure of Thesis 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the background knowledge and prerequisite knowledge for 
understanding. Chapters 4, 5, 6 are the crux of the thesis, providing the challenges, 
what needs to be done, and finally lessons from the European experience. Chapter 7 
provides the thesis findings as well as recommendations. Chapter 7 further weighs up 
the thesis analyzing if the benefits outweigh the constraints or vice-versa.   
Chapter 1: Introductory Chapter  
Includes the background and context of the study, the research questions and 
methodology as well as a discussion of key concepts.  
Chapter 2: A critique of Pan-Africanism and the Global Context of Currency since the 
Financial Crisis of 2008  
This chapter addresses the development of Pan-Africanism. The concept is defined 
and described from an idea, to African liberation, to calls for greater unity. The chapter 
further highlights Africa’s “location” in the international system in relation to the global 
context of currency since the 2008 global financial crises. Such background 
emphasizes the neocolonial rut that Africa’s economic situation currently inhabits. The 
chapter explores how Africa may unify through a Pan-African currency.  
Chapter 3: Economic Integration and Monetary Integration for Africa  
A common currency requires substantial economic integration which would eventually 
culminate in monetary integration. Monetary integration is the highest form of 
economic integration and would naturally require a common currency to better 
facilitate and extend the whole point of integration; development and wealth. This 
analysis contains a section on the costs of integration. Any exploration of monetary 
integration leads to the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) debate pioneered by Mundell.  
OCA is important in exploring key relationships between the state and monetary union.  
OCA examines the preconditions that would enable a successful monetary union. This 
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discussion is followed by an examination of the RECs which are the building blocks of 
African unity.   
Chapter 4: A Common African Currency: Why and Implementation Challenges 
Why does Africa need a common currency? What are the implementation challenges?  
Here four issues are explored which are synonymous with the African state and 
according to the literature purveyed, are the biggest threats to a common currency.   
Chapter 5: Shifting the AU from a Political to an Economic Institution 
Building upon Chapter 4, what then must happen to overcome the vested challenges 
and take the common currency debate to the next level? The crux of the chapter is 
that the AU, the institution of Pan-Africanism; must transform from a political institution 
to an economic institution. This will require institutional innovation.  Seven factors are 
discussed and analyzed.   
Chapter 6: What are the lessons from Europe and East Asia 
The study of comparative integration efforts has been quite fashionable for scholars 
of international political economy.110  How did Europe go about its own journey for a 
single currency?  What were the key factors and principals involved which made this 
transition and which factors have helped supplement Europe’s quest for closer 
integration? The purpose of this chapter is to show that continental integration is a 
practical and achievable result. 
Chapter 7: Finding, Recommendations and Conclusion    
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What can be made of the journey for a common African currency? What are the pros 
and cons of having a common currency?  Should it be recommended or does Africa’s 
development path lie elsewhere?  
1.5 Ethical Considerations  
The UJ Research Ethics Committee granted permission to conduct this research.  A 
consent form was sent to an identified list of potential participants. It was made clear 
that no further correspondence would take place with the identified participant other 
than a formal letter of thanks at the end of their participation.  
It was also made clear that the research is voluntary, implying that the participants 
might withdraw from the research at any time. The participants were fully informed 
about the research process and purposes. Safety and confidentiality of participants 
will be protected always. Trust, which implies that respondents will not be subjected 
to any acts of deception or betrayal in the research process or its published outcomes 
will be respected and ensured. The data collected will be destroyed after use.  
The research abided and was guided by the plagiarism policy and academic research 
ethics. The literature used has been cited appropriately and a comprehensive list of 
references has been attached to this thesis.  
1.6 Original Contribution to Scientific Knowledge 
A persistent criticism against the Pan-African movement is that while strong in theory 
and ideology, it is weak on practicalities, the demands of governance, the intricacies 
of state institutions and international systems and its institutions.111 Building on this 
notion, this research introduces to IR a theoretical framework based on knowledge 
that draws particular attention to Pan-Africanism as a driving force of African 
integration with the outcome being an African currency. The research is valuable given 
the global currency crises and strong challenges against integration, for example 
Brexit. Empirical-based characterisation based on an analytic account of the evolution of 
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an idea and a detailed characterization of the crucial case studies will have enormous 
implications for theory. 
The findings of the research will contribute significant ideas and make a positive 
contribution to knowledge and creativity in both practice and theory. Findings include 
but are not limited to:  
• An evaluation or blueprint for the AU to assess its course. 
• Increased political and economic development in Africa with the advent of a 
common currency. An increase in macro- and microeconomic perspectives. 
• Concrete economic growth given an African currency will stimulate intra-African 
trade and finance.  
• A comprehensive comparison and examination of the Euro. This will reveal 
lessons for Africa. The research will provide an empirical insight into the 
policymaking of the AU. 
• Contributes with insights into non-Western ideas of development. 
• An evaluation of the challenges Africa faces. The causes, symptoms and 
remedies.  
The academic contribution in studying rising power strategies from the perspective of 
knowledge production enhances the growing IR literature on the epistemic power of 
knowledge producing agencies and technocratic elites on strategies. The literature on 
regional integration indicates clearly that technocrats and experts play a crucial role in 
driving regional integration.112 For instance, Schmitter identifies the “creative talents 
of political elites especially the administrators of regional institutions who take 
advantage of frustrations and crises to redefine or expand tasks at the centre.”  This 
                                                          
112 Schmitter, P.C., 1969, “Three neo functional hypotheses about international integration”, 
International Organization, 23(1) Winter, 1969:161–166  
48 
 
thesis then can be modified to close the implementation gap for technocrats, donors, 
and other stakeholders when considering reform or policy change or reform coalitions.   
1.7 Conclusion  
Africa illustrates, in an emblematic manner, the disentanglement of a number of 
common assumptions concerning interactions between economic development, unity 
and action. This can be translated into a new awareness of the empirical and 
theoretical significance of unconventional trajectories previously treated as 
asymptomatic and, especially in Africa, as largely irrelevant.113  The tool for doing this 
is “Pan-Africanism” which described by Taddele, is a “consciousness.” Taddele notes 
that it is a: 
“High level of awareness about responsibilities, duties and historical position of a 
country and a people. Therefore, everybody cannot equally share it. It is all about 
relative consciousness and awareness, which depends to varying degrees on many 
factors including education, culture, exposure and so on.”114 
According to Muchie, Pan-Africanism is perhaps the only alternative to rescue Africa 
(self-help and survival). The tried and tested methods as explored in this research 
have not produced the required level of economic emancipation.  Thus it is time to 
experiment with new avenues and new perspectives. At its crux, Pan-Africanism is an 
ideal to bring people, economies, states, and learning institutions together.115 
Thus, in exploring Pan-Africanism, the research exports it and therefore strengthens 
it. Its importance or weight as an ideology cannot be underestimated. Africa’s 
institutions require a revitalization of the Pan-African ideal as well as its hegemons to 
disseminate the agenda and co-opt weaker states in their exercise of soft and 
benevolent power.  Pan-Africanism as this research will show is:  
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• A driving force behind African development 
• A basis for trade and hence integration  
• Implementable as the European experience has shown 
• Straightforward. Monetary integration needs to be as simple as possible. 
Creating too much criteria dilutes the process. 
What is Pan-Africanism, its challenges and why is it so important in relation to the 




Chapter 2: Pan-Africanism Critiqued and the Global Context of Currency since 
the 2008 Financial Meltdown 
2.1 Introduction  
The newly independent African governments of the 1960s turned from being 
preoccupied with governance to distributing patronage as a way of keeping the state 
and their authority alive.116 As the Fanonian phrase “Black skins, whites masks” 
entails, the formal rules introduced by the colonial regimes were kept largely intact 
despite independence yet the values and norms that underpin a purposive 
bureaucracy were overlooked. Metaphorically, as Zondi noted in describing the newly 
independent African state, a black driver replaced a white driver but the vehicle and 
its direction remained the same.  
In the contemporary era, this “state of coloniality” perpetuates itself in that the average 
African state continues to be a carbon copy of the colonial state both in substance and 
form. In substance, the clientele and patrimonial systems which thrived under 
colonialism continue as the preferred modus operandi of African governments. In form, 
the African states remain as bases for the export of raw materials to their former 
colonial masters.   
 
This substance and form describe what is known as “neocolonialism”, coined by Jean 
Paul Sartre and popularised by Nkrumah in the context of African decolonialisation 
efforts of the 1960s. The “neocolonial state” then is a “fictional character with an 
inability to consolidate its hegemonic control of political space through effective 
penetration, entailing control of peoples, winning the loyalty of the people for the new 
state and developing strong political institutions.”117 Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, a 
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former Pan-African Movement Secretary General, noted that neo-colonialism has 
“contributed in making it difficult for Africans to interact and relate to themselves.”118  
The continual perpetuation of neocolonialism has benefited external forces who 
practise a strategy of “divide and conquer” to their unequivocal advantage. Thus, 
within an environment where fragmentation is the norm, the result is superficial 
developmental progress.   
The 2008 global financial crises highlighted the lack of developmental progress Africa 
is making but more importantly revealed the neocolonial rut the continent is in.  The 
2015 Panama Papers, for example, showcased the financial mismanagement and the 
extent to which Africa is being plundered by those entrusted with power. Therefore, 
without serious financial architecture and the ability to manage and redirect its own 
development path, the fragmentation will continue.  
Taking the above into consideration, this chapter asked whether Pan-Africanism offers 
a “counter-position” to the neocolonial rut.  It is hypothesised here that as an ideology, 
Pan-Africanism has potential to facilitate cohesion and unity to counter the 
“fragmentation.”  This chapter analyses this notion in two sections.  
First, as the chapter title suggests, Pan-Africanism is critiqued in four steps. The first 
step defines Pan-Africanism asking what it is and which definition is best applicable to 
this research.  The second step is a historical analysis of the concept from idea to 
movement of unity. The third step examines the challenges facing Pan-Africanism. 
The fourth and final step examines whether the notion of ideaology is dead in 
International relations.  Within this first section, many Pan-African theories are 
explored, especially the thoughts of Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah.  On the 
latter, as Muchie noted,  “any re-visiting of Pan-Africanism without Nkrumah would be 
incomplete.”119 
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This analysis provides the background to understanding the second half of the 
chapter, which asks if the Pan-African ideology is strong enough to develop an African 
currency. Such a question is best answered via analysis of the global context of 
currency since the 2008 financial crises.  How then would a common currency develop 
Africa and strengthen the Pan-African agenda? 
2.2 Pan-Africanism Defined: The Evolution of an Idea from Liberation to Unity 
Pan-Africanism constitutes politics, ideology, organisations, and culture while 
reflecting a range of political views.120  It has been defined by many in different 
locations, eras, epochs and time periods and hence no single founder or particular set 
of tenets can be pinpointed.121 Adi and Sherwood concur, noting that contemporary 
writers have been “reluctant to provide definitions, acknowledging that the vagueness 
of the terms reflects the fact that Pan-Africanism has taken different forms at different 
historical moments and geographical locations.”122 Others, recognising that “definition” 
is dependent on time and place, often provide historical explanations of the 
development of the various Pan-African ideas and movements that have emerged 
since the late 18th  century.123 According to Horne, definitions of Pan-Africanism are 
largely “quintessential.”124 
Overall, however, 20th century Pan-Africanism was largely associated with appeals for 
self-autonomy. This status as a political ideology became a static, stone-engraved 
identifier for the concept and many modern authors have continued to view Pan-
Africanism only within the context of this political perspective.125  
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However, since the 1980s, Pan-Africanism has “evolved into a much broader and 
intellectually substantive concept”, refusing to be one-dimensional.126 As a set of 
methodological and analytical approaches, Pan-Africanism asks questions of African-
centred import, including how the current and predicted future socio-economic 
circumstances may transform for Africa’s benefit.  
In defining Pan-Africanism, four themes emerge.  These four themes capture the 
evolution of Pan-Africanist thought and practice.  
Figure 6 Four Themes of Pan-Africanism 
Theme Four themes Author 
1)  A universal expression of black pride 
and achievement 
du Bois, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
Asante, Muchie, ka 
Seme, Mbeki 




3)  A harbinger of liberation Legum, Walkers, Ackah, 
Howe, Thompson, Nasser 
4)  The political unification of the continent Legum, Azikiwe, Felix, 
Francis, Ali, Ageyeman 
 
As an expression of black pride and achievement, WEB du Bois viewed Pan-
Africanism as “an instrument of co-operation and understanding among people of 
negro origin to realize material and spiritual freedom.” The ultimate goal to du Bois 
was achieving “self-rule by Africans for Africans.” In 1927, du Bois elaborated on the 
need to explore Pan-Africanism for “co-operation among coloured people throughout 
the world with the purpose of liberating themselves from imperialism, discrimination 
and racism.”127  Similarly, Ndlovu-Gatsheni sees Pan-Africanism as humanity of black 
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people being doubted and it emerges as one way of telling the story of the modern 
world from the experiences of slavery, imperialism, and colonialism.128   
Asante’s definition also fits into Tondi’s first theme. Asante describes the: 
Afrocentric approach as the centrepiece of human regeneration. It (Pan-Africanism) 
challenges and takes to task the perpetuation of white racial supremist ideas, in the 
imagination of the African World, and by extension the entire world. It is purposeful, 
giving a true sense of destiny based upon facts of history and experience.129  
 Muchie similarly saw Pan-Africanism as an achievement stating; 
Pan-Africanism becomes the shared imagination, value, vision or ideology of a 
collective African rejection of a peculiar oppression. It is the language of resistance 
and defiance to build Africa on a new foundation of liberty, humanity and “infinite well-
being.130  
Lastly, two South Africans also provide definitions which fall under theme 1. Pixley ka 
Seme viewed Pan-Africanism as a regeneration of Africa as a new and unique 
civilization that is thoroughly spiritual and humanistic. Thabo Mbeki’s “African 
Renaissance” was an evolution of Pan-Africanism which has been conceptualised as 
rejecting the notion that Africans are exotic objects of others’ curiosity and that the 
people of the continent have immensely contributed to, and should by their own 
actions help to shape, human civilization.131  
Tondi’s second theme, a “return to Africa by the diaspora”, is captured in the work of 
Jamaican born Marcus Garvey, one of the most prominent Pan-Africanists. Marcus 
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Garvey immigrated to Jamaica in 1912 and founded the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA) with the goal of uniting all of African diaspora to "establish a 
country and absolute government of their own.”132  His philosophy, later to be called 
“Garveyism”, included the “back to Africa movement” and a black nationalism agenda 
focusing on the unification and empowerment of African Americans. Similarly the 
Trinidadian Henry Sylvester Williams emphasised Pan-Africanism’s “scattered and 
suffering people.”133 Williams was concerned with strengthening the unity of all those 
of African descent, so as to solve what he saw as “the problem of the twentieth 
century… the problem of the colour line”, and to “secure civil and political rights for 
Africans and their descendants throughout the world."134 Chika Onyeani as well 
heavily dwells on the potential of the diaspora in relation to Africa’s fortunes; noting 
that Africa receives more in remittances than from donors.135    
Tondi’s third theme; Pan-Africanism as a “harbinger of liberation” is highlighted by 
Legum who describes Pan-Africanism as “the casting aside of subservience to foreign 
masters in all forms, and their confident assertion that African interests are 
paramount.”136 Likewise, Walkers notes that :  
Pan-Africanism is usually seen as a product of enslaved Africans of diverse origins 
and their descendants finding themselves embedded in a system of exploitation where 
their African origin became a sign of their servile status. Pan-Africanism set aside 
cultural differences, asserting the principality of these shared experiences to foster 
solidarity and resistance to exploitation.137  
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Ackah defined Pan-Africanism as a movement by Africans in response to “European 
ideas of superiority and acts of imperialism.”138 Howe argues that Pan-Africanism 
represented a response to the waves of foreign dominance on Africa.139 To 
Thompson, “the idea of Pan-Africanism was intended to challenge the main activities 
of European imperialists, namely, the slave trade, European colonization and 
racism.”140    
Related to this strand of Pan-Africanism is “Pan-Arabism” which at times under the 
leadership of Game Abdel Nasser incorporated “Pan-Africanism.”  Commonly known 
as Nasserism, it advocated for the “liberation” concept  to “visualize Africa’s 
importance.”141 For Nasser, Pan-Africanism signified political liberation, the struggle 
against colonialism and imperialism, the “entrenchment of Egypt’s leadership on the 
continent” and a strong relationship “between Islam, Pan-Arabism and Pan-
Africanism”. To Nasser Pan-Africanism did not mean unity, in the sense of 
harmonisation, but rather solidarity. By solidarity, Nasser had in mind the provision of 
political and material support to liberation movements on the continent.142 
Tondi’s fourth theme represents the focus of this research, that is, the concept of 
“political and economic unification.” Legum described this type of Pan-Africanism 
noting, 
at times Pan-Africanism achieves a synthesis; at times remains at the level of thesis 
and anti-thesis. In one sense Pan-Africanism can be likened to socialism; in another 
sense it can be likened to the World Federation, Atlantic Union or Federal Europe.143  
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Similarly, Azikiwe saw the ideology as the collective solidarity leading to a political 
continental or regional union. Felix describes Pan-Africanism as a concept of “unity in 
diversity in terms of an extended and expanded African community.”144 To Francis, 
Pan-Africanism is a socio-political and ideological discourse as legitimacy for African 
action and collective solidarity.145 Duse Mohammed Ali, believed that economic 
considerations must inform the Pan-African vision and he maintained that the 
development of business and trade connections were crucial if “true independence” 
was to be achieved.146  To Ageyman, the realisation of the Pan-African objective would 
lead to “power consolidation in Africa”, which would “compel a re-allocation of global 
resources, as well as unleashing a fiercer psychological energy and political assertion 
... that would unsettle power structures.”147  
The institution of Pan-Africanism, the AU provides a definition which espouses the 
rationality of political and economic union.  In 2013, the AU described Pan-Africanism 
as “an ideology and movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide. It 
is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic, social, and political progress and 
aims to unify and uplift.”148   
Taking into consideration Tondi’s four themes as well as the AU’s own definition, Pan-
Africanism then represents “a praxillic and pragmatic framework for continental unity 
and development.”149 To further shape the discussion, this study will use two 
definitions; one by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni which speaks to decolonial thought and 
the second by Motsoko Pheko which pertains to economics and unity. 
To Gatsheni, Pan-Africanism is:  
                                                          
144 Felix, Chinewe, 2002, "Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: A critical appraisal of the 
relevance of Pan-Africanism", Enugu State University of Science & Technology, Nigeria, p. 9 
145 Francis, David J., 2006, "Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems, Burlington, 
Virgina Tech, Ashgate Publishing Company 
146 Adi, Hakim and Sherwood, Marika, 2003, “Pan-African History: Political figures from Africa and the 
Diaspora since 1787”, Routledge, London, Preface, viii 
147 Agyeman, Opoku, 1998, “Pan-Africanism and Its Detractors: A Response to Harvard’s Race Effacing 
Universalists”, African Journal of Political Science, Vol .3, No. 1, African Association of Political Science 
148 "Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance", AU Echo, Special Edition for the 20th AU Summit, Issue 
05, January 27, 2013, Available at: 
http://summits.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AUEcho_27012013_v2.pdf (Accessed June 2018)  
149 Felix, Chinewe, 2002, "Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: A critical appraisal of the 
relevance of Pan-Africanism", Enugu State University of Science & Technology, Nigeria, p 13 
58 
 
Re-emerging as a discourse within the global South, which offers a counter worldview 
to the dominant hegemonic Eurocentric worldview. Pan-Africanism recognizes, 
defines and interprets the current modern international system as a racially 
hierarchized, patriarchal, imperial, colonial, heteronormative and capitalist global 
social order.150 
Pheko’s definition: 
Pan-Africanism is the intellectual, political and economic co-operation that should lead 
to the political unity of Africa. It fosters radical change in the colonial structures of the 
economy, and the implementation of an inward-looking strategy of production and 
development. Pan-Africanism calls for the unification of financial markets, economic 
integration, a new strategy for initial capital accumulation and the design of a new 
political map for Africa.151 Contemporary Africa is challenged with difficulties rooted in 
its inability to unite territorially. The consequences have been national economies 
incapable of developing because of geographical, economic and political reasons.152 
Pheko’s call for a new strategy based on unification of financial markets and economic 
integration has remained mostly theoretical. Such a notion is the ultimate form of Pan-
Africanism.  
2.2.1 As a Movement for Unity  
The idea that there is value in unifying Africa dates back to the 18th century, evolving 
at different historical moments and geographical locations.153 After the balkanising 
1885 Berlin Conference, Pan-Africanism moved from being focused on anti-slave 
trade and anti-displacement to one centred on ending colonisation.154 This struggle 
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against imperialist powers in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere, became one of the 
most important “rallying cries” for Pan-Africanists during the first part of the century.155  
The formalisation of Pan-Africanism as a movement of unity crystallised at the sixth 
Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England in 1945. At this conference, the 
metaphorical “torchbearers” moved from the diaspora to the continent; as seen in the 
number of Africans who helped organise it, including Kwame Nkrumah.156 During the 
proceedings, George Padmore introduced WEB Du Bois as the “father of Pan-
Africanism” and invited him to chair the Congress. Kwame Nkrumah, as the rapporteur 
of the session, gave a wide-ranging address on the state of colonial Africa. He 
promised “strong and vigorous action to eradicate imperialism”, which he identified as 
“one of the major causes of war.”157 
The India’s peaceful independence in 1948 sent shockwaves throughout the colonial 
world.  Themes of liberation, anti-imperialism and economic emancipation took over 
the Pan-African agenda. In 1957, under the leadership of Nkrumah, Ghana became 
the first independent African state ending 121 years of British dominion. As president, 
Nkrumah established an economic union with the newly independent French colony 
Guinea in 1959. In 1960, Mali joined this union.158 Pan-African unity had reached its 
peak and began its downfall almost immediately.  
Nkrumah’s plans for a wider union were vehemently opposed by Ethiopian Emperor 
Haile Selassie, who used the hosting of a 1960 Pan-African conference to denounce 
continental unification.159 Here, a split in Pan-African ideology emerged, on one side 
those pushing for faster integration against those who believed Africa will unite 
gradually. Exacerbating this split was the Cold War’s capitalism vs communism 
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parallel. African leaders found themselves having to identify with one or the other 
ideology and thus the dream of continental unity began to wither. 
During the 1960s, the two schools of thought conflicted to shape the Pan-African 
discourse.  On one side, Ghana’s Nkrumah became a beacon that drew many from 
the diaspora to Africa thus creating in 1963 the Organization of African Unity (OAU).160  
At the OAU launch, Nkrumah reiterated: “African Unity must come, and it must be a 
real unity. Our goal must be a United States of Africa.”  The year coincided with the 
release of Nkrumah’s “Africa Must Unite” where he stated the case of an African 
Common Market to complement the Union of African States.161 He even committed 
Ghana’s “faith in African unity” and said that “we have declared our preparedness to 
surrender the sovereignty of Ghana, in whole or in part, in the interest of the Union of 
African States and territories as soon as ever such a union become practicable.”162 
Nkrumah believed that the only way to resolve the problems of imperialism and neo-
colonialism was in the form of unitary radical socialist government. 
Nkrumah’s Pan-African visions garnered many allies like Nasser, Sekou Toure and 
Ben-Bella who also agreed that colonial boundaries were illogical.  However, his plans 
for unification were scuppered by the “gradualists.”163 Many African leaders were not 
impressed by the rhetoric of Nkrumah and “were not even prepared to consider the 
possibility of political union.”164 For them unity was meant to be a gradual process.165 
The ideology of unity then became a good phrase domestically, but the majority of 
leaders were not willing to hand over their newfound sovereignty. The smooth nature 
of the first wave of independence and the weak ideological development that 
accompanied it meant that leaders were generally reluctant to move forward 
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quickly.166  Describing the rationale of the first generation of African leaders, Azikiwe 
describes them as having “deep-seated fears.”167 Indeed, these fears can be seen in 
the principles of the Monrovia Group (aka the gradualists) who favoured stronger 
independence rather than federation. Their Principles include, for example, “the 
inviolability of territorial integrity” and “the right of each state to self-determination and 
existence.” 168 
A key proponent of the gradualist camp was Tanzania’s first president Julius Nyerere, 
described as “one of the most eloquent exponents of the gradualist approach to 
continental political unity.” His focal role in the debate led many to characterise the 
entire debate as the “Nkrumah-Nyerere” debate.   
Nyerere pushed for a step-by-step progress towards Pan-African unity, beginning with 
strengthening individual states' sovereignties and building of RECs. His gradualist 
approach informed the formation of the OAU with a limited mandate of ensuring the 
total decolonisation of Africa as the first step towards achievement of continental 
political unity. With the radicals losing the argument no plan for unification (as opposed 
to statements of hope) were discussed.169  In 1964, the OAU met in Cairo and decided 
that respect for inherited borders would be inherited.170 Thus, the decision to embrace 
the colonial borders was cemented.   
Others, however, have been less judgemental of Nyerere’s role arguing that he tried 
to find a common ground between Nkrumah vs the others. Nyerere’s issue was that 
there were more serious and urgent problems within the state and dangers from 
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outside than “conquest to facilitate union.”171, 172  At retirement, Nyerere would regret 
some of his former stances lamenting on the lack of Pan-African unity.  He was quoted 
as saying, “'we of the first generation leaders of independent Africa have not pursued 
the objective of African Unity with vigour, commitment and sincerity that it deserves. 
Yet that does not mean that unity is now irrelevant.”173  
In the contemporary era, the most recent manifestation of Pan-Africanism was the 
creation of the AU in March 2001. While retaining its predecessor’s dedication to 
political and economic unity, the AU has sought to take on a broader mandate to meet 
the challenges of globalisation as well as taking the unity agenda to the next level. The 
AU’s mandate is to help secure Africa's democracy to create a sustainable economy, 
especially by bringing an end to intra-African conflict and creating an effective common 
market.174 The AU thus represents the present and future hopes of Pan-Africanism.175  
The vision of the AU and hence of Pan-Africanism is complete economic, military and 
political integration.176  This ideal, to be known as the United States of Africa or UGA 
would represent a new self-governing and democratic “country’ with its own 
parliament, head of state and military.177  Furthermore this UGA, would fit the Pan-
African definition discussed earlier in the chapter.   
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This vision, however, is far from reality and requires a lot of work. According to Mbire-
Barungi, a UGA would unite Africa by allowing for all people to interact freely without 
discrimination.178 In this dispensation, Africa would be able to muster a multilateral 
force capable of responding to emergency humanitarian situations caused by natural 
disasters, border disputes, or cross-border guerrilla warfare. Differences in culture, 
language, and religion would enrich, not divide, Africa. This Pan-African vision is 
where leaders are accountable not only to neocolonial interest. It is also an Africa that 
can stand on its own two feet technologically, without regularly kowtowing to the whims 
and idiosyncrasies of foreign powers, or struggling to import foreign technologies that 
are not appropriate to the African situation.179 
2.2.2 The Challenge of Pan-Africanism 
The struggle for liberation and the idea of unity were closely intertwined in Pan-
Africanism. The liberation wars against the common enemy of colonialism predisposed 
many to think of unity as a natural extension of liberation. The liberation heroes such 
as Hani, Lumumba, Kaunda, Azikiwe, Mandela, Mugabe, Gaddaffi, Ben-Bella and the 
Machels were all Pan-Africanist, operating beyond the confines of their own borders. 
The very existence of their movements depended on their Pan-African ideology as 
they relied heavily on the financial and moral support from each other to propel their 
costly armies. For example, Mandela received military training in Ben-Bella’s Algeria 
while Hani spent much of his MK career camped in Kaunda’s Zambia. Likewise, 
Mugabe received funding from Gaddafi and Machel’s FRELIMO forces were based in 
Dar es Salaam. Thus, the question of the unification of the continent would be 
determined solely by the leaders of the new individual nation states. 
However, soon after independence, the Pan-African liberation theory was engulfed by 
nationalism. This nationalism did not attempt to alter colonial boundaries or change 
state structures and had little to say about economic dependence. As the preserve of 
                                                          
178Mbire-Barungi, Barbara, 2004, "The African Development Challenge: Living the Experience", in 
Adesida, Olugbenga and Oteh, Arunma, 2004, "African Voices, African Visions, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, ISBN 917106530, p. 132 
179 Mbire-Barungi, Barbara, 2004, "The African Development Challenge: Living the Experience", in 
Adesida, Olugbenga and Oteh, Arunma, 2004, "African Voices, African Visions, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, ISBN 917106530, p. 132 
64 
 
the elites, independence was a cul-de-sac, with no future reference for the nature of 
post-colonial society.180 This created a dangerous precedent whereby rhetoric and 
agitation were more important than content and substance in domestic politics.181 
Indeed, the post-independence experience trend found the ideology of nationalism 
bankrupt in providing effective policy direction.  
As the feelings of blind nationalism overpowered rational thought, territorial spheres 
of influence were entrenched. The suspicions and negativity directed towards the 
colonialist were now redirected towards the “other” ethnic group, tribe, nation, or 
religion.182 Leaders preoccupied with safeguarding political power are ultimately 
suspicious of their neighbour and so they are reluctant to do anything that is going to 
benefit their neighbour at their own expense.183 For example, in West Africa, 
Ghanaians were forced out of Nigeria and vice-versa. In East Africa, slogans like 
‘Ugandanisation’ were fear-mongered, resulting in consolidation of territorial power 
and implementation of trade barriers. As a result, none of the three East African 
leaders were willing to subordinate themselves to the federal power superstructure in 
the name of an “East African Federation.”184  Regional cooperation then became 
impossible.185 Nyerere highlighted this phenomenon:  
Once you multiply national anthems, national flags, and national passports, seats of 
the United Nations, and individuals entitled to a 21-gun salute, not to speak of a host 
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of ministers, prime ministers and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful 
people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanized.186  
Nyerere (retrospectively) interpreted the dilemma of the Pan-Africanist as that of how 
to deal with territorial nationalisms that were diverging and moving away from Pan-
Africanism. The divergences were driven by local realities such as promotion of 
nationhood to contain imperatives of disunity, economic imperatives that dictated inter-
country competition over attracting foreign capital and investments, and promises to 
the people that needed to be fulfilled. He concluded that:  
The truth is that as each of us develops his own state we raise more and more barriers 
between ourselves. We entrench differences which we have inherited from the colonial 
periods and develop new ones. Most of all, we develop a national pride which could 
easily be inimical to the development of a pride in Africa.187  
Nyerere’s analysis may be considered the “roots of neocolonialism.” This sort of 
normalising of coloniality was manifested in the OAU as well. For example, in its 
charter, the OAU pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of all member states, 
upholding non-interference in member’s internal affairs as a central tenet. Hence the 
foundations of the new Africa were based on the old maps.188  
With the old maps and old systems still intact, it was only natural that the new 
governments would operate just as they did before.  Zondi described this as “replacing 
a white driver with a black driver. The car remains the same and moves in the same 
direction.”  Fanon expanded this argument in both the “Black Skins and White Masks” 
and “The Wretched of the Earth.”  
Fanon’s psychoanalysis led to the idea of “imitating the culture of the colonizer.” In this 
paradigm, this behaviour was more readily evident in upwardly mobile and educated 
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people who could afford to acquire status symbols within the world of the colonial 
ecumene, such as education abroad and mastery of the language of the coloniser.  In 
the latter, Fanon described a condition where the natives do not want the coloniser’s 
position or status, but the coloniser’s place.  
What both Zondi and Fanon infer is that the colonial state remains. That is, Africa and 
the African have been trapped in normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural 
state of the world. The danger of this was elaborated on by Ndlovu-Gatsheni who 
remarks that coloniality must be “unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it 
produces a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, 
deceit, hypocrisy and lies.”189 
The surrealism of the violence is evident in those who question the neocolonial state. 
They are often met with imprisonment or assassination; Ngugi wa Thiongo, Janani 
Luwum, Abdelkader Alloula, Wole Soyinka, Ken-Saro-Wiwa, Walter Rodney and Chris 
Hani are good examples.  Even the South African Republic between 1960 and 1990 
which may be considered a “newly independent state” responded similarly to Johan 
Heynes, Ruth First, and Steve Biko.  
The challenge then is that the post-colonial state has rendered the fourth theme of 
Pan-Africanism (political and economic union) redundant. The institution of Pan-
Africanism − the AU despite its valiant attempts has been unable to reconstruct the 
Pan-African vision.  The inability to challenge the neocolonial state is that the 
Nkrumah-Nyerere debate remains.   
The 2007 Grand Debate which happened on the side-lines of the AU Heads of 
government summit was to be the final battle between the two camps. 190  Yet, South 
Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Gambia, Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Mauritius voiced dissenting views, preventing the summit from a 
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decisive statement on a road map to union government.191 Neither the symbolism of 
Ghana at 50 nor the choice of Accra as the venue for the Grand Debate sufficiently 
motivated the summiteers to develop and agree upon a “road map” for the unification 
and integration of the continent.192 
With the debate having eclipsed 60 years now, many have included that “Pan-
Africanism suffers from a sheer vacancy of imagination.”193 It lacks realism about the 
fragmented nature of African economies, political systems and institutional structures, 
and what is possible given resource limits. It requires new theorisation under new 
historical conditions as its old questions have lost their salience. 
In order to purchase new salience, Pan-Africanism must be theorised anew and step 
away from academic mimetism or intellectual mimicry of the West.194 It is important to 
move away from rigid conceptions of cultural essentialism while retaining a notion of 
identity stable enough to be mobilised politically and ideologically.195 Such theorisation 
should be free from extant political discourses such as those of neo-Marxism and 
neoliberalism.  
The ideas of Mazrui offer insight on theorising Pan-Africanism anew. While he cautions 
against positing it against coloniality or post-coloniality, his work on creating 
“Africanity” is useful.”196,197 It entails Pan-Africanism developing its own systems by 
means of epistemic disobedience. Lastly, in confronting the challenge of Pan-
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Africanism, there is need for it to be  people-driven rather than the exclusive affair of 
heads of states and governments.198  
2.2.4. The future of Pan-Africanism  
If ideas are individual interpretations, ideologies are interpretive frameworks that 
emerge as a result of the practice of putting ideas to work.199  Ideology is commonly 
used to describe a particularly rigorous, comprehensive and dogmatic set of inter-
related values, based on a systemic philosophy which claims to provide coherent and 
unchallengeable answers to the problems of mankind. Ideology then, is the 
representational, metaphorical and precarious closure that stabilises meaning within 
specific contexts.200 As frameworks of interpretations, ideologies provide compelling, 
convincing and heuristically useful organisations of interpretive possibilities.201  
From an IR perspective, ideology is a set of closely-related beliefs, ideas, attitudes, or 
characteristics of a group.202 Ideologies shape IR as seen in, for example, the West’s 
liberal imperial interventions (Pax Americana), Hinduism in India, Islam in Arabia or 
Confucian values in the Far East.  DD Raphael in “The problems of political 
philosophy”, describes ideology as “a philosophical kind of theory; a doctrine, setting 
up “norms” or ideal standards for society and government, telling us what ought to be 
in the case, or what we ought to do.”203 
As a study, ideology has been subject to an interpretational tug-of-war among political 
theorists. Disputes have raged over the scientific standing of ideology, its 
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epistemological status, and its totalitarian and liberal manifestations.204 The focus of 
this section examines the latter two points, namely, is ideology dead?  
Marzagora notes the conflict between African intellectuals working towards the rebirth 
of the “subject” while Europe’s philosophers were decrying the “death of the ’subject’ 
as origin and foundation of Knowledge, of Liberty, of Language and History”.205 For a 
couple of decades, the 1960s and 1970s, the European deconstructive dissections 
and the African epistemological build-up developed side by side, but in opposite 
directions. The distance between the two philosophical programmes has increasingly 
been reduced over time but, despite this reduction, the distance persists up to the 
present day. 
The notion of a “post-ideological era” is apparent in the title of the West’s raison d’etre, 
“The end of history.” Since the early 1990s the liberalism/globalism agenda has sought 
to declare “all other ideologies as irrelevant.”206 The “Anglo-American world” sees 
ideology as “an alien implant, something concocted by spinners of dreams, 
otherworldly intellectuals, or machinators with totalitarian designs.”207  Soborski notes 
that although the liberalism/globalism ideology is no longer able to map the political 
world or inspire political action we should be wary of “sweeping ideological 
realignments.”208 In other words, Soborski is doubting ideology. Ndlovu-Gatsheni aptly 
summarises the West’s rationale behind the “ideology is dead” notion noting:  
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The current world order does not entertain and tolerate any form of radical thinking 
that is not in tandem with Euro-American neo-liberal thought. Such radicalism is easily 
dismissed as sentimental, nostalgic, anti-systemic and, at worst, as terrorism.209  
Thus, the radicalism of the 20th century that gave birth to the socialist system as an 
oppositional modernity within modernity and launched Africans to fight against 
colonialism and apartheid has been reduced to support for the neoliberal status quo. 
Gatsheni describes this “status-quo ideology” as “weak thought which misses the 
bigger picture of the coloniality of power and easily celebrates African agency without 
due consideration of structural constraints put in place by the dark side of modernity.”  
Why does the West want ideology to be dead? Why have they placed so much doubt 
about the relevance of ideology in “their post-modern era?” The answer is because 
ideology itself is abstract or an “immaterial subject.” This poses no harm. Ideology, 
however, becomes tangible in the form of a “world view”, which, in its simplest sense 
“provides a model of the world”.210 Sire defined a world view as "a set of pre-
suppositions (or assumptions) which we hold (consciously or unconsciously) about the 
basic make-up of our world.”211  World views are important in addressing the question 
of development because their outcomes create “world orders.”  
The slave trade was a world order based on a world view of the superiority of the slave 
owners. Colonialism was also based on a world view of racial superiority and economic 
expansion. The post-colonial state is based on neocolonial relations, clientelism and 
patrimonialism. The projection of these world views is backed up by the sustained 
application of “established reality” or “historical fact.”212 Thus when ideology is 
revitalised it “challenges history” which is the most powerful display of power.  As Sidar 
notes, “the real power of the West is not located in its economic muscles and 
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technological might. Rather, it resides in its power to define."213  In other words, the 
West is content with “The End of history.”  Fundamentally, the West fears 
encroachment on what Conrad referred to as “conceptual Eurocentrism” which is the 
“norms, concepts and narratives used to make sense of the past.” This agency defines 
and labels topics Eurocentric, even when Europe is not the issue.214  For example, in 
the recreation of Afrocentric histories, European history is still the template. According 
to Headley, the “Europeanisation of the world entailed reducing Africans to bystanders 
in the making of history”.215 This was achieved through such processes as racialisation 
of human population, enslavement, and colonisation of Africans. These processes 
practically colonised African imagination and disabled African agency. Mbembe refers 
to this as “epistemic coloniality”, that is, the endless production of theories that are 
based on European traditions.216 Asante concurs, noting that Africa’s source for 
imagination, interpretation and debate is based on what we have learnt from Europe.  
He notes:  
The combination of the European centuries gives us about four to five hundred years 
of solid European domination of intellectual concepts and philosophical ideas. Africa 
and Asia were subsumed under various headings of the European hierarchy. If a war 
between the European powers occurred it was called a World War and the Asians and 
Africans found their way on the side of one European power or the other. There was 
this sense of assertiveness about European culture that advanced with Europe's trade, 
religious, and military forces.217 
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This, Asante concludes, “distorts everything and renders us unable to digest African 
thought and culture.”218   
Therefore, in appraising Pan-Africanism as a “world view”, it has definite potential as 
a driving force for the simultaneous projects of integration, a common currency and 
eventual UGA.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni best captures this:  
Epistemologically speaking, Pan-Africanism can best be described as a world view 
emerging from the subaltern world, that is, a world inhabited by what Frantz Fanon 
termed the ‘wretched of the earth’.  The ‘wretched of the earth’ included those who 
experienced the slave trade, colonialism and apartheid, whose life experiences 
invoked a spirit of resistance and rebellion against the debilitating aspects of a racially 
hierarchized, patriarchal, imperial, colonial and capitalist modern global social order 
which authorized and enabled the dominant powers of the West to enslave and 
colonize black races.219 
It, however, as this research has presented, requires a massive re-configuration 
involving two focal points; rejuvenation and reinvention. Regarding rejuvenation, 
contemporary Pan-Africanism is a far cry from the Pan-African fervour of 2002, that is, 
Pan-Africanism has waned. The AU’s political engineer in Libya was eliminated and 
the continent’s two hegemons have been embroiled in domestic troubles. Pan-
Africanism’s slide into a historical artefact is for the chief reason that the Nkrumah vs 
Nyerere/Casablanca vs Monrovia debate(s) has never been resolved.220 In this 
conflict, the differences in approaches between the parties remain.221  
The 2008 “Grand Debate of Accra” was intended to finalise the argument but was 
conducted without attention to history. Accra then did not redress the deficit of 
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historical anchorage in the contemporary debates on the Pan-African ideal and hence 
the way forward was left undecided.  Therefore the “gradual incremental approach to 
African unity” continues along a slow and arguably reluctant path.222  A rejuvenated 
and meaningful Pan-Africanism requires “reinvention” because both global power and 
knowledge production have “invented Africa” by the process of conquest and 
colonialisation.223 ,224  This invented system has a long history according to Muchie 
who notes:  
...European imperial and racist rejection of Africans from 1500 to the present time; 400 
years of slavery plus 100 years of colonial irrational partition, and another 40 years of 
super power rivalry and continued indirect interference..225  
Haile Selassie was also a proponent of the reinventing idea, noting: 
in a very real sense, our Continent is unmade. It still awaits its creation and its creators. 
I am convinced that the Centuries-long period of the violent seizure and export of 
African slaves to the Americas and Arabia, and the European imperialist and colonial 
domination of Africa, “unmade Africa.”  
Mbeki, building on this argument noted that in striving to achieve the African 
Renaissance the focal point must be on the “remaking” of Africa. That “remaking” must 
aim to achieve exactly the objectives which Nyerere, Selassie and Nkrumah set before 
and during the establishment of the OAU.226  
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The greatest threat to reinventing Africa is that from a Gramscian perspective, political 
projects are driven by the power of the ruling elite’s ideologies.227 As such, Pan-
Africanism offers solutions that diverge from the elite’s status quo. Thus, ideology 
cannot be “dead” as it is needed more than ever to forge new categories of thought, 
construct new subjectivism and create new modes of description. Within this frame of 
thought as Max Lerner noted, ideas become weapons.228 For Pan-Africanism to be 
weaponised then it must overcome, as the Nigerian intellectual Nnamdi Azikiwe said, 
“parochialism in the realms of race, language, culture or religion which has led to social 
disintegration.”229   
In the battle of ideologies and their competing epistemologies, Pan-Africanism re-
defined cannot be fought in one political theatre only but rather in various domains and 
realms simultaneously; the reason being that the colonial matrices of power have 
permeated and infiltrated every institution of African life. That said, a Pan-Africanism 
based on economic ingenuities has the potential to create new economic and political 
maps. Beyond the legitimate concern about Africa’s development is the need to ensure 
that the 21st century ends the marginalisation of the continent from the global 
economy.230 The African contribution to the global discourse would then be a self-
confident project, not a reactive project. 
In summary, the Pan-African ideal is needed for the regeneration and restoration of 
Africa and to counter the West’s ideology of domination, exclusion and 
marginalisation. The Pan-African world view would be de-territorialised and eroded of 
nationally defined politics. Lastly, Pan-Africanism would need to not be inclusive as it 
was in the past as according to Taddelle Maru, not everyone shares the same Pan-
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African enterprise or responsibility.  The Pan-Africanism that waited for South Africa 
to join the OAU in 1994 is no longer a valid Pan-Africanism.    
2.3 The Global Context of Currency since 2008 
Since the 2008 financial crises, a new scholarship is gaining prominence which 
surmises that Africa is forced to accept detrimental development conditions and is thus 
at the negative receiving end of IR.231 One attribute of the scholarship is that colonial 
powers granted political independence while preserving their economic power.232 The 
ongoing American hard-powered hegemony reveals the extent of this preservation. 
According to Amin, it has developed certain features of liberal ideology in a new and 
uniquely dangerous form.233 Where European political culture since the French 
Revolution has given a central place to values of equality, the American state has 
developed to serve the interests of capital alone, and has been exporting this model 
throughout the world.234 American imperialism, Amin argued in 2006, will be far more 
barbaric than earlier forms and characterised by the pillaging of natural resources and 
a state of perpetual war.235 Libya, Syria, Yemen, and almost 20 year occupations of 
Iraq and Afghanistan attest to this “pillaging and war.” Likewise, in their seminal work 
on “Empire”, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argued that the notion of international 
order that Western modernity created is now riddled by a deep crisis.236 Gatsheni-
Ndlovu refers to this paradigm as “Global imperial designs.”237  
The global imperial designs have overwhelmed post-colonial states through the major 
public global governance agencies for trade and finance, specifically the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB and their SAPs.238,239 Bond describes this imperialism 
as “entrusted in the new set of multi-lateral and interstate relations and are considered 
more efficient and legitimate modes of imperial accumulation, especially through the 
Bretton Woods Institutions.”240  Where previously the data surrounding these notions 
was stifled, new evidence is emerging to back up these claims. Hudson, for example, 
has shown how IMF policies have propelled capital flight from the developing world.241 
Likewise Perkins in “Confessions of an Economic Hitman”, detailed the modus 
operandi of US government contractors. In his autobiography, he reveals how the US 
obliges leaders of the developing world to take on “development loans” for 
questionable construction and engineering projects. The loans which were designed 
to be unpayable would help to cement the status of local elites and give the US political 
influence and access to natural resources for US companies. Those who refused to 
play along were terminated. Explaining the Brazilian case, Marini noted:  
It is not a question of passively accepting North American power (although the actual 
correlation of forces often leads to that result), but rather of collaborating actively with 
imperialist expansion, assuming in this expansion the position of a key nation.242  
This new imperialism imposes its own form of rationalisation on states by streaming 
its activities on the one hand, through joint EU positions; while on the other hand, the 
US is increasingly focusing on a few strategic states as cornerstones of its activities. 
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Using the global imperial design framework as a lens, it becomes clear that the above 
tactics have long been at work in Africa. The Western-backed coup or life-long 
presidents are just two symptoms that accompany the design. Another aspect of the 
design is established voices promoting an “Africa rising” façade. The façade is only a 
means of legitimating the export-led primary commodity economic model. The 
established voices do not admit that while incomes were rising in the range of 6 per 
cent per annum, so too was Africa’s wealth decreasing by an equivalent amount. 
Describing this Taylor remarks,  
Africa is forced to celebrate an economic growth that is premised on a problematic 
intensification of resource extraction through diversification of partners, while 
inequality and unemployment increase and de-industrialization continues apace.243  
Similarly, Bond refers to this as the “overhyping of Africa’s growth prospects.”244 This 
overhyping is seen in the measurements of GDP in which extraction of non-renewable 
minerals is a credit and  does not count natural capital depletion as a debit.245 The 
2012 Gaborone Declaration declared that such is the equivalent of large scale looting 
of Africa.246 Statistics show that only 12 per cent of sub-Saharan African states were 
not losing net wealth at a time they were supposedly “rising.” The period of the 2002-
08 commodity price super-cycle boom was only the most pronounced moment of 
natural capital depletion.247  
These designs are just one of the many corrupt ways that wealth is withdrawn from 
Africa.248 These tactics include fraudulent invoices, transfer pricing, trading scams, tax 
avoidance, evasion of royalties, bribery, “round tripping” investment through tax 
havens, and simple theft of profits via myriad gimmicks aimed at removing resources 
extraction. These tactics have become known as “Illicit/illegal Financial Flows” (IFFs).  
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The illegal capital flight ensures that there are no resources for infrastructure, social 
development and development programmes.249 Examples of IFFs include:  
• IFFs between 2004-2013 cost South Africa US$21 billion per annum and 
Nigeria US$18 billion per annum.  Sub-Saharan Africa consequently lost 6.1 
per cent of its GDP annually during this period. 250 
• An AU/UNECA 2015 report by Thabo Mbeki estimated that US$55 billion in 
IFFs leave the continent annually.  
• The AfDB and Allies 2013 African Economic Outlook estimated that US$319 
billion in IFFs occurred between 2001 and 2010.251   
• The World Bank study of IFFs in Malawi and Namibia estimated that revenue 
lost to corruption and tax evasion accounts for between 5 and 10 per cent of 
their GDP.252 
• Zambia forewent approximately 74 per cent of taxes due to it from a copper 
mining syndicate because of aggressive tax practices.253 
• A 2018 report established that approximately US$1 billion in illegal gold sales 
occur annually in South Africa.254  
• South African Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan estimated that about 
US$8 billion was siphoned into international banks during the Zuma 
administration.255 
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While the illicit financial flows account for a large portion of Africa’s exported wealth, 
in most cases the exploitation is legal. The Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), 
War on Want showed that companies listed on the London Stock Exchange control 
over US$1 trillion worth of Africa’s resources in just five commodities – oil, gold, 
diamonds, coal and platinum. A total of 101 companies, most of them British, control 
US$305 billion worth of platinum, US$276 billion worth of oil and US$216 billion worth 
of coal at 2018 market prices. According to Curtis, “Tanzania’s gold, Zambia’s copper, 
South Africa’s platinum and coal and Botswana’s diamonds are all dominated by 
London-listed companies.”256 They have mines or mineral licences in 37 African states 
and control vast swathes of Africa’s land. Their concessions cover a staggering 
1.03million square kilometres on the continent. This is over four times the size of the 
UK and nearly one-twentieth of sub-Saharan Africa’s total land area. China’s 
resources grabs have been widely vilified while at the same time the continued Anglo-
American exploitation is not a part of the discourse. Examples of legal financial flows 
include:  
• In South Africa, Sarah Bracking and Khadija Sharife in 2016 reported that De 
Beers faked invoices worth US$2.83 billion of diamonds over six years257; 
• The Alternative Information and Development Centre in 2014 revealed that 
Lonmin’s platinum operations has spirited hundreds of millions of dollars 
offshore to Bermuda since 2000. 
• The Indian mining house Vedanta’s chief executive spent US$25 million to buy 
Zambia’s Konkola Copper Mines, which is Africa’s largest, and then reaped at 
least US$500 million profits from it annually, apparently through an accounting 
scam.258 
• Steinhoff, a South African conglomerate was busted in 2017 for fraudulent 
accounting practices resulting in losses amounting to R100 billion. 
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• The capture of the South African Revenue Services (SARS) by cronies of the 
African National Congress (ANC). 
The catalyst which sustains this rigged system is the US dollar. The case of Zimbabwe 
exemplifies how the rigged system of the US dollar works. The Mugabe government 
prints a worthless currency for its citizens to use while using the dollar to facilitate the 
extraction of the state’s wealth.  
Theoretically the Triffin dilemma captures the US dollar hegemony. The Triffin 
dilemma articulates the problems with the role of the US dollar as the reserve currency 
under the Bretton Woods system. By using its currency, the US controls world trade 
deficits as it can choose whether to supply its currency to fulfil world demand.  
Basically, its supply of dollars controls world trade in its favour. Likewise, the US 
financial markets controlled by Wall Street are also rigged to their advantage.259 
John Maynard Keynes anticipated this difficulty and advocated the use of a global 
reserve currency called “Bancor.” In the wake of the 2007 financial crisis the governor 
of the People's Bank of China explicitly named the reserve currency status of the US 
dollar as a contributing factor to global savings and investment imbalances that led to 
the crisis. States that have sought to create a currency to rival the US dollar such as 
Libya (Gold Dinar), Iran, and Venezuela (Petro-Dollar) are marked for “regime change” 
while the economic hitmen launch attacks (See 2019 Venezuelan power outages and 
role of foreign agents).   
The US dollar hegemony has now been reinforced by the 2018 Trump trade war with 
China. The trade war is one of the covert battles in the larger currency war.  The Trump 
administration has not been shy to spell out its objectives to ensure that the dollar 
remains the currency of world trade. Should Trump follow through with threats of 
US$200-$500 billion more tariffs on Chinese imports, the US and China will likely slip 
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into a currency war as China allows its currency, the Yuan, to devalue further.260 This 
devaluation is having global repercussions given the current significant decline in 
currency exchange rates already taking place throughout key emerging market 
economies (Argentina, Turkey, India, etc.). Other emerging market economies will 
have no choice but to follow China’s devaluation lead. Nor will advanced economies 
like Japan and EU states be immune from having to devalue, as they try to offset 
Trump’s tariffs in order to maintain their share of global trade that Trump’s policies are 
clearly attacking.  
In sum, the world is entering a precarious situation because of the fading US dollar 
hegemony. Currency cannot be understood without understanding this paradigm.  
When the British pound imploded in 1913, the world had to undergo 31 years of trade 
wars, currency wars and full-scale conflict before a new international currency could 
emerge.  
This global context of currency or the aggressive American dollar hegemony has 
resulted in the majority of African states being too unbalanced structurally to 
participate profitably in the international political economy; becoming victims instead 
of agents.261 Consequently, African economies are not complementary but competitive 
“producing what we do not consume and consuming what we do not produce.”262  
Within this context, a new political and social ferment is brewing.263 As Hugo Chavez 
and Fidel Castro have demonstrated, it is possible to undertake an alternative 
trajectory to neoliberalism and its antecedent policies as prescribed by the WB and 
IMF, unequal trade in favour of powerful states and imperialism’s militaristic 
hegemonism. 264 
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Hence, a “Pan-African currency” is a realistic solution to counter the soon to implode 
US dollar. It is practical because at the centre of Pan-Africanism is the ability to create 
and develop practical ideas and solutions. The rationale is that without unity, as 
Nkrumah and Nyerere believed, independent African states will remain as pawns on 
the imperialist chessboard.265  
2.5 Analysing Africa’s currency’s   
African is home to 32 currencies.   30 currencies for 30 states, 1 West African CFA 
franc for 8 states, and 1 Central African CFA France for 6 states. At the time of writing, 
the Libyan Dinar was widely regarded as Africa’s strongest currency.  What is meant 
by strong is the currencies low numerical figure against 1 USD.  According to a 2019 
Business Insider report, after the Libyan Dinar, the Tunisian Dinar, Ghanaian Cedi, 
Morrocan Dinar, Botswanan Pula and Zambian Kwacha follow making up the 
continents six strongest currencies.  
Figure 7 Africa's currency's 
Currency code Country Currency 
DZD  Algeria Algerian Dinar  
AOA  Angola Angolan Kwanza  
XOF  Benin CFA Franc  
BWP  Botswana Botswana pula  
XOF  Burkina Faso CFA Franc  
BIF  Burundi Burundi Franc  
XAF  Cameroon  CFA franc  
CVE  Cape Verde Cape Verdean Escudo  
XAF  Central African Republic CFA Franc  
XAF  Chad CFA Franc  
KMF  Comoros Comorian Franc  
XAF  Republic of the Congo CFA Franc  
CDF  Democratic Republic of the Congo Congolese Franc  
DJF  Djibouti Djiboutian Franc  
EGP  Egypt Egyptian Pound  
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XAF  Equatorial Guinea CFA Franc  
ERN  Eritrea Eritrean Nakfa  
SZL  Eswatini Lilangeni  
ETB  Ethiopia Ethiopian Birr  
XAF  Gabon CFA Franc  
GMD  Gambia Dalasi  
GHS  Ghana Ghanaian Cedi  
GNF  Guinea Guinean Franc  
XOF  Guinea-Bissau CFA Franc  
XOF  Ivory Coast CFA Franc  
KES  Kenya Kenyan Shilling  
LSL  Lesotho Lesotho Loti  
LRD  Liberia Liberian Dollar  
LYD  Libya Libyan Dinar  
MGA  Madagascar Malagasy Ariary  
XOF  Guinea-Bissau CFA Franc  
XOF  Ivory Coast CFA Franc  
KES  Kenya Kenyan Shilling  
LSL  Lesotho Lesotho Loti  
LRD  Liberia Liberian Dollar  
LYD  Libya Libyan Dinar  
MGA  Madagascar Malagasy Ariary  
MWK  Malawi Malawian Kwacha  
XOF  Mali CFA Franc  
MRO  Mauritania Ouguiya  
MUR  Mauritius Mauritian Rupee  
MAD  Morocco Moroccan Dirham  
MZN  Mozambique Mozambican Metical  
NAD  Namibia Namibian Dollar  
XOF  Niger CFA Franc  
NGN  Nigeria Nigerian Naira  
RWF  Rwanda Rwandan Franc  
STD  Sao Tome and Principe São Tomé and Príncipe dobra  
XOF  Senegal CFA Franc  
SCR  Seychelles Seychellois Rupee  
SLL  Sierra Leone Sierra Leonean Leone  
SOS  Somalia Somali Shilling  
ZAR  South Africa South African Rand  
SSP  South Sudan South Sudanese Pound  
SDG  Sudan Sudanese Pound  
TZS  Tanzania Tanzanian Shilling  
XOF  Togo CFA Franc  
TND  Tunisia Tunisian Dinar  
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UGX  Uganda Ugandan Shilling  
ZMW  Zambia Zambian Kwacha  
ZBN  Zimbabwe RTGS Dollar  
 
From here though, analysing Africa’s currency’s’ starts to get confusing. According to 
various ranking lists, the eSwatini (Swaziland) Langeni takes up 7th place. Though 
pegged to the South African Rand, it beats the Rand on virtue of its lower exchange 
rate with the dollar.  Two other states peg their currencies to the Rand, Lesotho and 
Namibia.  This pegging gives the Lesotho Maloti a strong standing amongst Africa’s 
“strongest currencies” however the Namibian dollar is not considered to be “strong.”  
Though the economies of eSwatini and Lesotho are a fraction the size of South 
Africa’s, they are still technically stronger currencies than Nigeria’s Naira or Ethiopia’s 
Birr.  The confusion of what constitutes a “strong currency” persists if we consider 
Zambia where 60% of the population live under the poverty line and 42% live in 
extreme poverty, yet its currency is considered strong. Even more so, to what extent 
the Libyan Dinar even exists in the face ongoing Western imperialism begs to question 
how ranking lists are conducted. Thus what is considered a strong African currency is 
very open to debate.   
Ranking a currency on the basis of its economy could be a better option than its ratio 
with the USD. This though poses many downsides as global booms in certain 
commodities can make weak economies to be “paper tigers.”   If we were to base a 
strong currency on the basis of a strong economy, then arguably the South African 
Rand would be the continents strongest.  According to a Business Tech report, the 
Rand is the 18th most traded currency in the world; up from 20th position three years 
ago.  South Africa’s main industries such as mining, automobile manufacturing, metal 
working, machinery, textiles, commercial ship repairs, iron and steel, chemicals and 
food stuffs reaches far into the African continent. Well known exports such as gold, 
diamonds, automobiles, agricultural products and military hardware bring in foreign 
exchange and give the rand a competitive edge.  The Rand accounted for 1.1% of the 
average daily turnover recorded in April 2019, compared to 1.0% in 2016.266 Over the 
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last 15 years, the rand has been used more in trades, despite having ranked higher in 
the 2004 and 2007 reports. In those years, South Africa’s currency ranked 16th and 
15th overall, respectively, but only accounted for 0.7% and 0.9% of the daily average 
turnover tracked over the same periods.267 The Rand’s trade share is on par with other 
emerging economies like Russia, India, Brazil and Turkey.   
Yet despite the Rand’s prestigious international standing, it still is not accepted 
everywhere on the continent.  Even the Ghanaian Cede for example will need to be 
converted into the US Dollar first before trade can take place between a Ghanaian 
company and South African one. In such a system of constant conversion and 
commission, African currencies loose what value they had.  Even more so, if we use 
a states economy’s as a tool to measure the strength of a currency, then we realize 
why African currencies are considered unfavorable.   
Since the 2008 Global Financial Crises, African economies have faced an uncertain 
future; South Africa being a prime example.  This uncertainty was further exacerbated 
by China’s 2009-2010 “imperial expansion” which saw China become an integral 
African investor.  In the years following 2009-2010, China acquired a massive 25% of 
its imports from Africa.  With the 2015 Chinese economic slowdown, Africa’s economy 
stumbled as it felt the diminishing need of its product.268  
Is there any scientific tool which can be used to weigh the strength of an African 
currency? The phenomena of “currency arbitrage” offers a method to test the strength 
of a currency.  Simply put, a currency arbitrage is a forex strategy in which a currency 
trade takes advantage of different spreads offered by brokers for a particular currency 
pair by making trades. Currency arbitrage involves buying and selling currency pairs 
from different brokers to take advantage of the mispriced rates. The tools and 
techniques which are used to analyse currency arbitrage or “the value in trading 
currencies” thus can be used to analyze the strength of an African currency.   
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Four tools or techniques becomes important here. The first, according to Olivia Tierney 
is analyzing the value in trading African currencies. African economies tend to be more 
receptive to shocks in the market and thus have more extreme and frequent reactions.  
This is because of their over-reliance on primary commodities. 269  These products are 
usually subject to volatile price fluctuations on the world market. When commodities 
are up, African currencies will boost. However, when commodities are down, African 
currencies spiral downward. Thus, many countries remain in a state of perpetual trade 
imbalance and, for that matter, current account difficulties.270 This highly volatile 
environments can yield high returns as well as high losses.271  Furthermore, there is 
also a high vulnerability to movements in developed exchange rates such as the British 
Pound, US Dollar or Euro.  For example, a change in the exchange rate of one of the 
behemoths can cause a huge change to the exchange rate of a given African currency.  
Again, big returns but high risks. Currencies then which are the most unstable could 
then be considered the most valuable!  
A second tool to measure the strength of a currency would be to ascertain the country’s 
relationship with democracy. There is any undoubtable relationship between 
democracy and the strength of a currency. The Ghanaian Cedi and Botswana Pula 
are often highlighted for their support for a strong democracy.  Botswana has been 
ranked by Transparency International as the least corrupt African state and Ghana’s 
commitment towards bettering the life of its citizens through strong and well thought 
policies has led to its current growth.  However, we should not ignore the idea which 
will be explored in detail later entitled “African democracy.” That is, sometimes less 
than autocratic leaders bring about a stable economy.   
A third tool to measure the strength of a currency is to explore Africa’s largest stock 
exchange, the Johannesburg Stock exchange (JSE). Currently only three currencies 
other than the Rand are traded on it, the Zambian Kwacha, the Nigerian Naira and the 
Kenyan Schilling.  The trades on the JSE boost trading volume for these currencies 
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making them attractive. The Kenyan Schilling for example is the most valuable 
currency in East Africa and circulates in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.272 
A fourth tool would be to examine the monetary policy framework in any given state.  
Are the resources available to aid productive policy development which leads to strong 
monetary policy.  Monetary policy requires interventions which according to Adesida 
has in most cases been disastrous.  Adesida on describing economic governance in 
Africa notes that “bureaucracy has increased with inertia, and corruption, nepotism, 
and lack of accountability have grown to ever increasing heights. These growing 
problems result in inefficiency in most of the public administrative systems. 273   
In sum, these four tools offer a method to weigh up the strength of an African currency.  
However, what this strength entails for African unity, trade and development remains 
unknown. If we explore how the Chinese Renminbi is on the rise on the continent, we 
can understand the importance of a unified currency.  Recently, the Rand Merchant 
Bank (RMB), one of South Africa’s biggest banks, has stated that though it trades in 
ten African currencies, it unofficially prefers using Chinese Renminbi.  Countries 
already dealing in Renminbi include Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Congo, Angola, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda and 
Nigeria.   Figure 8 below highlights the ease of using the Renminbi.   
Figure 8 Rise of the Chinese Renminbi in Africa (Source : Rand Merchant 
Bank)  
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Pan-Africanism and the demands for a new international order simultaneously seek 
the renegotiation of African and Western dependencies and a favourable treatment of 
Africa within the present world system.274  Western prescriptions do not provide the 
sort of transformative Pan-Africanism that is required to meet today's challenges. As 
an ideology, Pan-Africanism advocates that Africa must set its own economic, political 
and international agenda and process that will place it on a power pedestal that at the 
minimum, will make its states viable and relevant enough to compete effectively in the 
international power game.275  
According to Ackah, “political and economic unity is the precursor of the social and 
cultural unity and that is the complete African experience.”276 However, the vision of 
Pan-Africanism and the reality of Africa are two separate entities.277 A persistent 
criticism against the Pan-African movement is that it is strong in theory and ideology 
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but weak on the practicalities, the demands of governance, the intricacies of state 
institutions and international systems as well as its own institutions.278 
Therefore, as this chapter suggested, the most important thing 21st century Pan-
Africanism can do is to address the current system which is set up in a way which has 
resulted in Africans benefiting scarcely from the natural resources on the continent.279 
The paradox of Africa’s extreme wealth and extreme poverty is captured within the 
global context of currency which augments the rationality that a common African 
currency has not developed ex nihilo.   
Taking into consideration Western hegemony through its dollar and weak state of 
Africa’s currencies, the idea of a Pan-African currency then becomes the epitome of 
Pan-Africanism in action.  A Pan-African currency would speak to self-sufficiently and 
autonomy by freeing Africa from neocolonial exploitation. A key author of this theory, 
Horace Campbell notes that the advent of a common African currency, would bring 
“Africa out of a cycle of poverty.”280 Such a statement concurs with the Pan-African 
vision which states that : 
only as a unified, integrated body, either federalist or confederalist, will Africa  be able 
to transcend its long-term roles as merely a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour, 
and play a major, authentically voiced role in the evolving globalizations of trade, 
resources and politics.281  
Most importantly, the common currency would be a pivotal factor in the establishment 
of a Union Government of Africa.282  
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Chapter 3: Economic Integration and Monetary Integration for Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 ended with a conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism and its relationship to a 
common currency. This conceptualisation deduced that a Pan-African currency is a 
viable option to promote real economic growth which continues to elude the continent.  
Furthermore, within this conceptualisation it was conceived that a Pan-African 
currency could be a stimulating factor in achieving policies set out by the governing 
supranational bodies whose overall mandate is to create a united Africa. Given the 
state of the global economy which orbits around the aggressive hegemony of the US 
dollar, a Pan-African currency could be the epitome of “Pan-Africanism in action.”   
To take the Pan-African currency debate to the next level, an understanding of the 
elements of economic and monetary integration is mandatory as well as these 
concepts within the African context. Simply put, economic integration is the institutional 
combination of separate national economies into larger economic blocs or 
communities.283 Integration first took precedence when the European Economic 
Community (EEC) was commissioned under the Treaty of Rome of 1958. Led by this 
example, integration spread globally in the 1960s leading Haberler to characterise the 
era as “the age of integration.”284  
In the contemporary era, the concept of integration has “grown considerably.”285 In 
relation to Africa, the continent has experienced more economic and political 
integration attempts than the rest of the world. Thus, as this chapter construes, the 
elements of African unity then may be found in two concepts namely, “economic 
integration” and “monetary integration.” However, these two concepts in this chapter 
are positioned as two separate entities. Economic integration encompasses the 
integration of different states and policies, while monetary integration is the 
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penultimate form of economic integration which results in a common currency. The 
purpose of exploring these concepts is twofold.  First, is to provide an elementary 
analysis of the benefits of monetary union and a common currency. Second, to 
consider the costs of monetary integration.  
Any discussion of these concepts is incomplete without exploring OCA theory. OCA 
theory explores the intricacies of monetary integration and whether a common 
currency will be beneficial or not. Regarding this theory, three things must be noted 
from the onset. One, OCA is a massive field in its own right and this chapter explores 
the focal points to make the concept clear for future discussion. Two, conclusions 
concerning OCA are very much time reliant; that is, benefits and costs can take years 
to appear and hence OCA theory cannot be judged statically. Three, the seminal works 
on African OCA, such as Debrun et al (2010) and Adams (2005) make use of a limited 
amount of data from the 1990s and hence can be considered outdated. Therefore, as 
this chapter will show, OCA theory is not an ultimate rule for the creation of a monetary 
union. It, however, has excellent points of reference to understand the creation of a 
monetary union.   
The discussion on “integration” culminates to the RECs which are commonly known 
as the “building blocks” of African integration. The RECs seek to integrate states in 
order to better African economic prospects. When the RECs were first encapsulated 
in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, their premise was to meet the challenges of globalization. 
Today, they have evolved as the key drivers of African integration and according to 
Campbell, the first step of the common currency lies within the RECs.  In this analysis, 
a serious research question is asked; are African common currencies realistic?   
3.2 Economic Integration  
Milton Friedman, a Nobel prize winning economist remarked that it has become 
impossible “to produce a product anywhere, using resources from anywhere, by a 
company located anywhere, to be sold anywhere.”  Such sentiments are in line with 
what O’Brien coined “the end of geography.” That is, a healthy economy cannot exist 
as an insulated state. Where Rome or Jerusalem or Paris stood for hundreds of years 
as centres of global commerce, since the 1960s, London, New York, Frankfort, Zurich, 
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Dubai and Shanghai have all held the mantelpiece of global commerce. What could 
only be done in London or Johannesburg can now be done in the most remote village 
in the world.  From the interface of a cellphone, one can buy and sell shares on the 
New York Stock Exchange, order a cargo container from China filled with machinery 
or order Argentine beef cut to specification. The transformation of the globe into 
multipolar sites of commerce is evident in the amount of networking and cooperation 
by both state and non-state actors. The “integration” of the globe is easily described 
as “globalisation”, but in fact the basis of globalisation or building blocks of 
globalisation is “economic integration.”   
Although the globe has been heavily influenced by “economic integration”, its definition 
has not changed much since the 1960s. The “father of integration theory”, Bela 
Balassa, postulated in his magnus opus, “The theory of Economic Integration” (1967) 
that as economic integration increases, the barriers of trade between markets 
diminish. Drawing on the work of Jacob Viner and others, Balassa made a major 
contribution to our understanding of the effects of integration on trade and other 
economic activities in the 1960s and 1970s.286 To Balassa, supranational common 
markets, with their free movements of economic factors across borders would naturally 
induce further integration. This “induced” integration did not apply to the economic 
realm only but also politically and thus, economic communities would evolve into 
political ones over time. Investopedia, providing a 2019 definition, describes economic 
integration as “an arrangement between different regions that often includes the 
reduction or elimination of trade barriers, and the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies.”  
Figure 9 The different forms of regionalism ( Source : Pheko, Lebo, 2016, "The CFTA and 
TFTA : Are they the future of Afrikan Regionalism and Unity", The Thinker) 
Regional 
Cooperation 
A collaborative venture between two or more partners, with 
common interests in a given issue. Examples include policy 
harmonization, shared running of utilities and joint development of 
shared natural resources 
Market integration Includes free trade, common external tariffs, harmonization of 
monetary and fiscal policies, and unification of fiscal and monetary 
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A response to the challenges posted by market integration. It 
encourages an active state and places strong emphasis on the 
interface between economic and social integration  
Regional 
integration 
A process by which a group of nation states voluntarily and in 
various degrees access each other’s markets and establish 
mechanism and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize 
internal and external interaction. 
 
The modem definition emphasizes that “economic integration aims to reduce costs for 
both consumers and producers and to increase trade between the countries involved 
in the agreement.”287  The two definitions separated by a period of 50 years 
exaggerate the point that the integration idea has not changed much. In order to shape 
further discussion, Robson’s 1988 definition will be used to shape the research’s 
context. To Robson; 
“economic integration is the complete freedom of capital movements within a 
community, to the end that there would exist a single market for the benefit of all 
members. Economic integration concerns the promotion of efficiency in resource use 
on a regional basis.”288  
Robson further notes that for economic integration to obtain its fullest attainment, there 
are two necessary conditions. One, the elimination of all barriers for the free movement 
of goods and factors of production within the integrated area; and two, the end of 
national discrimination among group members.289 Economic integration may be 
grouped into two overall categories; negative and positive. Negative integration, 
coined by Tinbergen denotes “those aspects of regional integration that simply involve 
the removal of restrictions on movement, which arise in a process of regional trade 
liberalization.”290 This he contrasted to positive integration which concerns the 
modification of existing instruments and institutions and the creation of new ones to 
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enable the market to function effectively and to promote policy objectives in the 
union.291 The integration that the AU seeks is a combination of both negative and 
positive integration.  
Corresponding to the degree of integration, harmonization and coordination, several 
forms of integration exist.292 For analytical purposes, the principal ones to distinguish 
are the Free trade area, Custom union, Common market, Economic union and 
Monetary union. The Free trade area is the least restrictive and loosest form of 
economic integration among states. Exclusively trade focused, in a free trade area, all 
barriers to trade among member states are removed. Each member state maintains 
its own trade barriers vis-à-vis non-member states.  
The Customs union is a basic form of integration and one step further in the economic 
integration process. It is characterised by a common external tariff (CET), tariff-free 
trade among its members, and the integration of tariff policy. Formation of a customs 
union entails the elimination of all artificial barriers to trade within the region.293 This 
affects prices, the volume and composition of trade, the allocation of resources and 
with these changes, the efficiency of production.294 In the long-run, the creation of a 
large regional market may permit the extension of large-scale methods of production 
and the realisation of external economies.   
The Common market is the level where integration takes on a deeper dimension.  A 
common market has not only a common external tariff and tariff-free movement of 
goods and services, but also freedom of movement for factors of production such as 
labour, capital and enterprise. That is, it begins to involve the human experiences as 
opposed to the other forms of integration which are commodity or resource-based. 
The European Community was popularly termed a common market from its inception, 
but only began to fulfil the requirements of a fully unified market 30 years later following 
the adoption of wide-ranging proposals to complete the single market. The action 
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taken to implement these proposals in a variety of spheres was a necessary precursor 
to the inauguration of the Single European Market in 1993.  
An “economic union” then, may be considered a culmination of the last three economic 
integration processes. In addition to free movement of goods, services and production 
factors, it also requires integration of economic policies, both monetary and fiscal. 
Under an economic union, members harmonise monetary policies, standardise 
banking, financial and legal activities, taxation and government spending, and arrange 
global and regional supply chains. 295 
A step further in the direction of economic union brings us to “monetary union” which 
is the highest form of economic integration. It would entail the adoption of a single 
currency, central bank and monetary policy. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
monetary union should follow and not precede the institution of arrangements for 
market integration. Few examples exist of monetary unions among independent states 
except in Africa, although multi-country currency boards which share some of their 
qualities are found in the Caribbean and elsewhere. 
It would be possible for the member states of a customs union or a common market 
to establish the two essential characteristics of monetary union merely by agreeing 
among themselves to fix their exchange rates permanently, to maintain full 
convertibility and to back the agreement up with a promise of economic policy 
coordination. Yet they would not have to integrate their monetary policies or to 
establish a common pool of foreign exchange reserves and a single central bank.296 
Such arrangement could help to make market integration more effective, but it could 
not guarantee the immutability of the relation between the currencies of a regional bloc 
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that is essential to the concept of complete monetary integration.297 The term pseudo-
union is often applied to this degree of monetary integration.298  
As seen in the five modes of economic integration, the basis among them is “trade.” 
This infers, lowered transport costs, customs duties, and less need for balance of 
payment adjustments; hence, ensuring that trade becomes easy.299 Such effects have 
positive effects on the location of production, distribution, capital accumulation and 
growth.300  What may be surmised then is that “economic integration” consists of four 
major components.301 
• The liberalisation of exchange control (subject to variable geometry 
considerations).  
• The stabilisation of financial capital markets, in order to achieve efficient and 
stable capital and financial markets.   
• The development of financial institutions, to ensure that regional development 
is financed adequately.  Financial development could enhance the role of credit 
channels in shock-smoothing through private and public borrowing and lending. 
• The development of a tax treaty, aimed at establishing an efficient and equitable 
regional tax regime.  
 
If these components are in order, this would make way for deeper monetary 
cooperation among states. Fueled by the successes of European monetary integration 
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and the subsequent acceptance of the importance of a strong global currency, 
monetary integration is gaining prominence. To this end, several regions have been 
assessing the possibility of entering into a monetary union. What then is monetary 
integration and why is it so appealing as a 21st century governance tool?   
3.2.1 Monetary Integration  
A monetary union is the pinnacle of economic integration.302 The popularity of these 
unions has been increased by the creation of the Eurozone in January 1999 and the 
introduction of the Euro to replace national currencies in January 2002.303 Monetary 
integration involves both a common market and common currency and the integration 
or harmonisation of a range of policies.304 It further requires fiscal integration in the 
shape of a significant community budget and the coordination and convergence of 
national budgetary policies in relation to deficit financing and debt policies.305 A 
significant branch of monetary integration concerns criteria qualifications for the entry 
of new members.306 
Monetary integration has two essential characteristics. First, exchange rates in the 
integrated area must bear a permanently fixed relationship to each other, although 
they may jointly vary concerning other currencies. Second, there must be full 
convertibility in the sense that there are no exchange controls on either current or 
capital transactions within the area.307 Convertibility for  transactions related to trade 
is indispensable for the effective functioning of a monetary union. Convertibility for 
capital transactions is a principal ingredient of capital market integration which is itself 
an essential characteristic of a common market.308  
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If these two characteristics are to be adequately guaranteed and to be truly immutable, 
two other requirements would also be essential.309 First, since immutability of fixed 
exchange rates would depend on monetary policies within the area being consistent 
with that object, the use of the standard instruments of monetary policy must be 
assigned to the community and exercised solely by its monetary authority, leaving no 
autonomy for member states in this field. Inter alia, this would imply that, beyond any 
agreed amount of monetary credit to which a member might be given access, any 
member state’s budget deficit would have to be financed in the capital market.310  
Second, since any change in the rate of exchange between an external currency and 
those of the area must be uniform, responsibility for exchange rate policy with other 
currencies and for the balance of payments of the entire community with the rest of 
the world must be assigned to the community. A monetary authority would then control 
the pool of exchange reserves. Under such a system it would be difficult if not 
impossible for a member state to calculate its balance of payments with its partners 
and with the rest of the world.311  
When these requirements are satisfied, the resulting arrangement is one of complete 
monetary integration.312 In effect there would then be a single currency, although 
monially differentiated currencies might continue to coexist.313 Within the monetary 
integration matrix, there exits four common types. The first is the “formal exchange 
rate union” which has separate currencies, but rates fluctuating within narrow or zero 
margins, and a strong degree of coordination among the central banks. In Africa, the 
CMA is an example, as the currencies of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland are linked 
one for one with the South African rand. The second type is when a state adopts 
another state’s currency. In this case, there is only a single currency but no monetary 
union, since the country issuing the currency does not consider the goals of the 
dollarizing country. Examples of dollarized countries are Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Panama and Zimbabwe. A third type is the “currency board.” This is when a state pegs 
to another currency with zero margins and the link between the two currencies is 
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institutionalised through a mechanism that limits the money supply in the currency 
board country to the quantity of reserves held in the other currency. Countries 
operating currency boards include Bulgaria, Djibouti, and Estonia. Fourth and finally 
is “full monetary union” which involves a single currency and a central bank. The 
Eurozone and both CFA franc zones would be examples of full monetary union. 
The AU seeks the monetary integration of the last point which emphasises limitation 
of national autonomy in economic policy beyond that required by the membership of 
a customs union or common market.314 This type which the AU seeks, is one where 
national sovereignty erodes.   
3.2.2 What are the benefits of a monetary union and common currency?  
In relation to the different types of monetary integration levels, the benefits of a 
monetary union may be categorised into two sections; pre-common currency and post-
common currency. In a pre-common currency monetary union, savings would come 
to characterise the union. Savings on transaction costs resulting from a wider 
international circulation of a single currency, the reduced need for foreign exchange 
reserves, simplified international coordination and seigniorage.  More importantly, a 
monetary union would contribute towards reduced costs of financial management 
which entails developing more efficient financial systems and payment facilities.315 
Interconnecting of the union’s financial sectors offers an opportunity to strengthen their 
efficiency with broader avenues for investing liquidities and sharing best practices and 
financial infrastructure. In addition, internal administrative costs imposed on 
enterprises where sales within a community involve several currencies would be 
eliminated.  
Regarding the market, the sheer market size would be beneficial and encourage 
longer production runs and so reductions in costs. In the process, some high-cost firms 
may be eliminated and the demand met by imports. This, in other words, means the 
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end of “monopoly” power and oligopolistic mark-ups. Market size also has an effect on 
trade expansion, specifically production diversification and profitability.   
In terms of trade, transactions costs in trade with external parties would be reduced. 
Resource allocation gains may also be obtained from increased intra-union trade in 
securities because of a tendency for returns on different kinds of capital to come closer 
together in the member countries.316 There will be greater price transparency that will 
discourage price discrimination, decrease market segmentation, and foster 
competition. Intra-area nominal exchange rate uncertainty will disappear (and 
correspondingly intra-area exchange rate risk) leading to savings in transaction and 
hedging costs. This will strengthen the internal market for goods and services, foster 
trade, lower investment risks, and promote cross-area foreign direct investments 
(FDI).317 Removing any controls pertaining to FDI has potential to reinforce the 
allocational benefits from more rational investment decisions. In effect, the 
characteristics of a monetary union; such as openness to trade, access and size of 
market and stock of human capital have proven to attract FDI.318. 
Overall, all these factors would contribute to “macro-economic efficiency” because of 
the increased usefulness of money.  To elaborate more on the usefulness of money, 
money not the root of all evil but an indispensable friend in the grand scheme of things. 
At the individual level, money helps to eliminate poverty and create freedom; the 
freedom to move and the freedom to live. At the firm level, money dictates the flow of 
resources and the exercise of preferences by consumers and producers. Money is the 
basis of intertemporal, intergenerational and international transfer of resources. At the 
level of a nation and hence an economic community, common currency facilitates the 
competitive power of the community in trade and in the bidirectional flow of assets. 
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As these benefits become more prevalent, this would in effect demand  the 
establishment of a common currency (post-common currency).319 The liquidity 
services provided by a single currency circulating over wider areas as a unit of 
account, medium of exchange, and standard for deferred payments makes things 
simplified.  This is known as “network externality” which means the broader circulation 
of a currency. Financial market integration may improve the allocation efficiency of the 
financing process itself to the extent that it provides both borrowers and lenders with 
a broader spectrum of financial instruments, so enabling more efficient choices to be 
made in terms of duration and risk.320  
Overall, a common currency will increase macroeconomic stability characterised by 
an improved overall price stability, access to broader and more transparent financial 
markets and an increase in the availability of external financing. A common currency 
is itself a signal to a promising and prosperous economic union, bringing to fruition the 
role money plays in traditional individual economies throughout the world and 
throughout time. But the new opportunities in the expanded multistate economy bring 
added platforms for money to play an accelerated and deepening function in not just 
banking and financial development but also in the overall living of the unionizing 
peoples. The fundamental economic case for superimposing a common currency is 
that it will make markets more effective.321 Adoption of a single currency exposes 
domestic markets to foreign markets thereby increasing competition between member 
countries and enhancing the competitiveness of national industries.322 
The greatest gains from integration is that capital movements would provide a ready 
means of financing deficits or surpluses in the balances of payments, replacing the 
need for official compensatory financing, or use of a country’s gold and foreign 
exchange reserves.323 Furthermore, it is simply convenient; you do not have to keep 
changing your money every time you cross a national border any more than you have 
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to change money when you drive from Kansas to Missouri.  It may offer a more reliable 
unit of value, since the ability of a shared currency to buy goods is not likely to change 
as fast as each separate national currency's purchasing power would change. 
Therefore, nations would not need to keep large reserves, nor concern themselves 
overmuch with their variation.   
Figure 10 Benefits of a common currency Source Hunt, C, 2005, "A Fresh look at the Merits 
of a Currency Union", Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Ties domestic inflation to partner’s inflation or targeted currency area inflation rate 
– establishes an anchor for monetary policy and imports credibility 
Decreases transaction costs 
Improves microeconomic efficiency by increasing price transparency between 
partners 
Eliminate costs associated with exchange rate uncertainty vis-à-vis partner 
countries, e.g. hedging 
Can reduce the risk premium on interest rates in the home country- currency and 
inflation risk 
Can be a catalyst for further economic integration  
Protects against domestic lobbies promoting exchange rate manipulation  
Reduces risk of speculative attack on home country currency 
 
3.2.3 The Costs of Monetary Integration 
In summarizing the key costs of monetary integration it should be noted from the onset 
that the majority of the literature which critiques monetary integration focuses on the 
perspective of sovereignty loss.  The many critiques such as “states losing their 
power”, “states unable to make national policies”, “states running into sizable and 
protracted budget deficits” and “losing control over the inflation tax” are some of the 
many summarizing statements. This, however, is non-consequential as the whole 
point of monetary integration is transfer of supranational powers to authority’s better 
fit to control economics.  Overall the costs of monetary integration are quite simple.  
A state’s decision to join an existing monetary union or to create one with other states 
must primarily aim to solve one or more monetary problems; specifically, problems 
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which it cannot solve by itself.324,325 Thus, monetary integration is often viewed as the 
antidote for a poor state of economics.  While it may aid financial stability, there is 
danger in viewing it as an objective in itself as it cannot translate into a quantifiable 
target.326 This is because monetary integration is an overarching process.   
As a process, the main actioning agent of monetary integration would then be 
“monetary policy.” Where the short term is concerned, there is controversy over the 
capacity of monetary integration policy to stimulate the economy.327 This is because 
the effectiveness of monetary policy is limited by a shallow and fragmented financial 
system. Regarding the long term, monetary union benefits as well as costs can take 
time to become evident. 
Historically, the debate on the costs of monetary integration has focused principally on 
the macroeconomic implications. That is, what constraints would take effect in terms 
of the monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of the participants?328 Specifically, 
how would accepting monetary integration policy affect the national macroeconomic 
policy objectives and economic stability, growth and external balance. Given the 
uncertainties that exist regarding large economies’ behaviour and construction, this is 
not an easy issue to resolve.329  
There are some, like Sanchez who argue that “excessive monetary expansion” may 
lead to periods of significant inflation. 330 Inflation is the continuing general increase in 
the prices of goods and services over time. Inflation is known to affect interest rates, 
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exchange rates, cost of living, as well as the general political and economic confidence 
in a country. Inflation is often used as the “dipstick” to measure a state’s economy and 
hence, factors such as monetary policy which may directly affect inflation need to be 
addressed cautiously. The relationship between monetary policy and inflation led 
Sibanda et al to claim that “the success of monetary policy is largely dependent on 
how the inflation is dealt with”.331 While excess monetary policy to control the economy 
might be risky, likewise “loose” monetary policy can be the cause of financial problems, 
namely the undertaking of too much risk. For instance, a loose stance may have 
contributed to the run-up of the US credit and housing bubbles prior to the financial 
crisis.332 
Overall, the costs of monetary integration can be viewed in two components. The first 
component refers to the actual financial costs from switching to a new currency. These 
costs include administrative, legal and hardware costs such as re-denominating 
contracts and adapting vending machines. This will result in increased administrative 
costs for each member state.333 The second component and more importantly is 
ensuring that the nominal exchange rate parity from the start is correct. Too 
competitive or not competitive at all can cause detrimental persistent imbalances in 
the external accounts.334 The rate at which currencies are exchanged is known as the 
rate of exchange or exchange rate. The rate of exchange therefore represents a ratio, 
that is, the price of one currency in terms of another currency.  
Inappropriate exchange rates are regarded as one of the major causes of economic 
difficulties. Once a state adopts a common currency, adjustment to economic 
problems, external shocks and changes in competitive positions need to be made 
other than via domestically set short-term interest rates and fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.  Each state consequently must assess the likelihood of being exposed 
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to state-specific shocks namely “domestic monetary shocks” which alter the 
equilibrium relationship between money supply and money demand.  Due to the high 
variance in business cycles in African states this can prove challenging.   
This challenge also increases the risk of uneven development from state to state.335 
Harmonization of national regulations and the introduction of a single currency like 
Euro in principle create a single market from the different national economies that join 
this currency union. The creation of Euro enhances the mobility of capital and financial 
services within the Euro area. Due to external economies of scales, businesses have 
the tendency to concentrate in certain areas. This means, some peripheral areas 
within the Euro area would lose out on employment and growth. Higher unemployment 
rate and lack of growth increase deflationary costs in these peripheral areas. These 
areas may experience more social problems (e.g. crimes, suicide, broken homes, 
etc.), loss of skills and loss of irretrievable economic potential.  Although capital can 
move with ease within the Euro area, labour force does not enjoy the same mobility. 
There are still great cultural and language barriers to labour mobility within the Euro 
area. Some economists argue that the Euro area is by no means a single economy. 
National economies maintain their distinct characteristics within the Euro area and 
possess their respective business cycles. Thus, the monetary policy of ECB cannot 
address the economic need of individual member states. 336 
Currency mismatches are an important concern from a financial stability perspective, 
especially in terms of foreign currency lending. There exists a high potential that 
borrowers underestimate the risk of exchange rate changes between domestic 
currency and borrowed currency. Therefore, structural adjustment must include 
exchange rate realignment. At the same time, attempting to maintain any exchange 
rate without appropriate domestic fiscal policies is a formula for failure.337 This is 
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essential in the African context with a legacy of budget deficits and rampant inflation.338 
It is even suggested that a sound exchange rate can promote fiscal discipline.  
Overall, the success of a monetary union will depend on institutional design involving 
central banks, monetary rules and the relationship of the main central bank and its 
members. Such a desired state is not compatible within the current African landscape. 
The table below captures the main features of the costs of a common currency.  
Figure 11 Costs of a common currency (Source Hunt, C, 2005, "A Fresh look at the Merits 
of a Currency Union", Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Loss of ability to maintain an independent monetary policy 
Loss of exchange rate adjustment flexibility to terms of trade and other shocks 
Shocks to partner countries can be transmitted to home country 
Loss of national sovereignty  
Weakened accountably of policy makes to national citizenry 
Loss seigniorage (under dollarization)   
One-off changeover costs 
 
3.3 Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) – A Chronology 
The benefits and costs of monetary integration become lucid when placed within the 
theoretical framework of OCA. They key word in the OCA acronym is “optimisation” 
which infers that the existence of a common currency should not reduce the ability of 
member states to adjust to shocks or increase their vulnerability to such shocks.339 
The relationship between OCA and monetary integration was well put by Horvath who 
concluded that “OCA forms the intellectual foundation of any discussion on currency 
unions.”340 In intellectualizing or theorising about the field, the majority of OCA authors 
have largely focused on the different factors which affect optimisation and how to 
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mitigate challenges.  Who are some of these authors and what are their underlying 
assumptions?  
OCA theory was pioneered by Jonathan Mundell in 1961. OCA implies a geographical 
region which would maximise economic efficiency in a monetary union which shared 
the same currency. The theory describes the optimal characteristics for the merger of 
currencies or the creation of a new currency. The theory is often deployed as a tool to 
assess suitability for a common currency. Mundell explained how changes in 
consumption patterns can have different economic outcomes dependent on location 
and the actual monetary and exchange rate policies.341  He noted that an increase in 
demand for Country A goods compared with Country B goods, would require a system 
of flexible exchange rates to ensure that the two independent currencies maintain the 
external balance of inflation and unemployment of both countries. This would relieve 
inflation pressure in Country A and reduce unemployment in Country B.342 
Mundell’s use of the US and Canada is a good example.343 He satirises that if the 
West is characterised by the production of lumber products and the East is 
characterized by car manufacturing, then a shift in demand towards cars would result 
in a deficit in the West and a surplus in the East. The Eastern region will suffer inflation, 
the Western region unemployment. Monetary policy in both countries can be directed 
towards relieving inflation in the East at the expense of higher unemployment in the 
West or vice-versa, or the inflation-unemployment burden shared between the 
regions.344 Therefore, the optimal currency area in this case would be the regions of 
East and West. With currencies arranged along these lines, exchange rate flexibility 
will allow an external and internal balance between the two regions. It also serves to 
demonstrate that factor mobility (primarily labour mobility) can maintain internal 
balance in the presence of regional demand changes. This occurs through the 
movement of factors of production away from the deficit region as workers migrate to 
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the surplus region; simultaneously relieving unemployment and wage-inflation 
respectively.345 Indeed, then, both geographical and industrial factors can compensate 
for regional differences within a multiregional currency area and as such can replace 
a system of individual regional currencies. 
Since Mundell’s theory was first published in 1961, several authors have extended 
OCA theory. In 1962, Ingram determined that financial integration can reduce the need 
for exchange rate adjustments; noting that an increase in financial integration cushions 
temporary adverse disturbances through capital inflows.  Building on this, McKinnon 
in 1963 considered the implications of differing sizes and structures of economies on 
the optimal exchange rate regime.346 To him, when economies are relatively open, 
variable exchange rates have a significant effect on internal price levels since the ratio 
of tradables to non-tradables is high and devaluation increases the cost of tradables. 
An open economy with variable exchange rates may be able to control the former two 
but the rising cost of tradables will influence the latter aim. Thus, open economies 
have less to lose from moving from variable exchange rates to a single currency.347 
The higher the degree of openness, would in turn reduce the potential for money and/ 
or exchange rate illusion. In 1969, Kenen took the “open” debate further observing the 
importance of product diversification.348 Kenen asserts that a well-diversified economy 
will have less need to resort to exchange rate fluctuations to maintain internal stability.  
Therefore, in the first 10 years of OCA theory, the debate centered on the idea of an 
open and diversified economy. The idea was that such an area could do without the 
exchange rate instrument and thus create an optimum currency area. This is because 
the more diversified the “economic fabric is”, the less the risk of it being affected by a 
specific shock (internal or external). Hence, diversification reduces the need for 
changes in the terms of trade through the nominal exchange rate and constitutes a 
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safeguard against all sorts of disruption. Highly diversified partner countries are more 
likely to find a single currency beneficial. 
In 1970, OCA literature took a new direction with the Werner Report which sought to 
prepare a plan for European economic and monetary integration. The Werner Report 
was a result of the increased movement towards an international system of flexible 
exchange rates. The report advocated for a more rigorous theoretical dialogue, termed 
by Mongelli as the “cost-benefit phase” subsequent to the “pioneering phase” of OCA 
theory. While previous OCA work tended to give vague indications of when monetary 
integration would be most beneficial, or more accurately when the loss of exchange 
rate controls would be less detrimental, the “cost-benefit” type analysis sought to 
clarify the varying costs and expand on the benefits discussed in previous work.  
In 1972 Corden highlighted several oversights in the preceding arguments of OCA 
theory. He showed that while monetary integration increases the price stability of an 
economy, and the improvement increases with the openness of an economy, 
exchange rates can play an “insulating role.” Previous arguments assumed stable 
foreign prices and micro-orientated supply and demand shifts, but where shocks 
“originate abroad and are of a macro nature”, exchange rate fluctuations are able to 
insulate the domestic currency from foreign shocks, increasing its liquidity.349 Thus, 
the benefits to be gained from monetary integration are dependent on the assumptions 
made concerning the disturbances to the system.   
Corden’s contributions to the oversights of OCA theory, gave rise to stronger OCA 
critiques like the one Ishiyama provided in 1975. Ishiyama defended the ability of small 
states to control domestic shocks. He argued against monetary integration, 
concluding, “the theory of optimal currency areas is primarily a scholastic discussion 
which contributes little to practical problems of exchange rate policy and monetary 
reform.”350 It is possible that Ishiyama was influenced by the “the Monetarist Critique”, 
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exemplified by Lucas (1972) and Friedman (1968), which asserted that in the long 
term, monetary policies are ineffective in controlling unemployment.  
Tower and Willett (1976), deliberated the importance in determining the costs and 
benefits of the economy. They arrive at a graphical synthesis that summarizes the 
relative net benefits of a system of flexible exchange rates compared with those of a 
currency area. They show that as the degree of openness increases, the benefits of a 
currency area rise while the benefits of a flexible exchange rate fall.  
The main trend in the early development of OCA focused on reduction of losses. The 
benefits were reductions in transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty, increased 
liquidity and trade, economies of scale concerning currency reserves, and the general 
notion that monetary integration should improve allocative efficiency. In 1993, Tavas 
highlighted the importance of political factors in determining the formation and success 
of a common currency which started a new phase known as New OCA theory. New 
OCA theory, using theoretical developments from various economic branches, both 
reduced the costs into two main costs and highlighted other important benefits to be 
gained.  
In summary, OCA has been largely based on the notions of expectations formation, 
whereby rational economic agents can obtain and use information to form 
expectations of future inflation and thus negotiate. The theory was enhanced by the 
prevalent economic problems in Western countries, where inflation and 
unemployment were simultaneously and persistently high. In the short run, the major 
implication for OCA theory is that the perceived costs of monetary integration are 
reduced. OCA provides an understanding of what conditions are most favorable in 
creating a monetary union. OCA theory mostly speaks to economic phenomena based 






3.4 OCA for Africa 
A large body of literature exists which assesses the advantages and disadvantages of 
monetary unions, actual and proposed, in Africa.351 Broadly speaking, this literature 
has developed three main empirical approaches for considering the desirability of 
African monetary unions. The first approach pertains to studies comparing 
macroeconomic performance of existing monetary unions with that of non-members. 
This is influenced by the institutional structures of the two existing African monetary 
unions.352 
The second approach pertains to convergence measures. This entails the 
macroeconomic indicators among states in a region, viewed as criteria for 
membership. This approach is inspired by the convergence criteria established in 
Europe for membership into the Eurozone. It is not grounded in any specific theory 
and simply monitors indicators that African regions have themselves adopted as entry 
criteria.353 
Both these approaches are heavily reliant on data which, as noted from the onset of 
the chapter, is scare and therefore difficult to cross-analyse. As noted by Debrun et al, 
model simulations can only give a static picture of monetary unions likely to be 
sustainable given the current state of Africa’s macroeconomic and institutional 
convergence.354   
The third approach, the OCA method, analyses whether economies of members of a 
monetary union are sufficiently similar to allow a common monetary policy to fit every 
member’s needs.355 This approach in sum analyses characteristics desirable for states 
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to join a currency union.356 These “characteristics of optimality” provide a simple and 
clear way to explore the OCA-Africa link.  The OCA approach is suitable to the African 
context because, as noted by Horvath, OCA criteria provides no clear-cut guidance 
nor can it be easily translated into practical procedures.357 Thus the OCA approach 
allows for more leeway and tinkering in approaching the desirability of African 
monetary unions.   
This is not to say the OCA approach is a superior methodology. For example, OCA 
seeks to rationalise inflation, but comparing inflation rates between states can be 
somewhat imprecise because of the different ways of measuring inflation. OCA tends 
to ignore the possibility that countries can independently enact credible institutional 
reforms aimed at containing policy biases and enhancing macroeconomic stability.358 
Masson, a leading researcher in the field of African OCA, has over the years 
strengthened his argument that OCA criteria is not conclusive in determining African 
monetary optimisation. To Masson, OCA criteria is too focused on one type of 
asymmetry, that is, to shocks to the macro economy and way of dealing with it. 
Furthermore, it is premature to speak of OCA theory in Africa when only the most basic 
forms of economic integration have only recently taken off. The adequate legal 
mechanisms are not yet in place and most of integration occurring takes place outside 
the realm of official policy and regulation.359 
Nevertheless, OCA provides the best tool to explore the potential for African monetary 
unions.  OCA characteristics of optimality include mobility, openness and degree of 
product diversification, similarity in industrial structures, inflation rates, and political 
will.  What can be made of these characteristics within the African context? 
Regarding the first characteristic of mobility, on the ground level it may be considered 
high. This is exemplified by the number of African capital cities situated on borders 
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where informal trade, labour, finances and capital cross borders daily. In this sense, 
unobstructed factor mobility creates an economic community out of separate national 
economic entities.360 At the macro-level, however, there exists too many constraints 
hindering mobility of labour, trade, and services.  
Regarding the second point, economies with less diversified structures and higher 
external reliance are by nature more open. Openness refers to the amount of exported 
goods + imported goods in total production. The more countries are open to the 
outside world, the less they stand to lose by adopting a fixed exchange system. Africa 
is largely made up of less diversified economies and higher external reliance and 
hence, may be considered “more open.” African states in the form of an economic 
union will represent a more diversified economy which is then more suitable for a 
currency union than a less diversified one. Europe provides a good example of a 
“diversification.” Although it is in a recession, the European economy is still strong and 
has competitive industrial structures. Its manufacturing sector represents one out of 
every four private-sector jobs.361 
Third, economic shocks occur when states with different industries merge. In Africa, 
industrial structures are low. States that have industrial structures are better 
candidates for a currency area because they are affected in a similar way by sector- 
specific shocks.362  States with different industrial structures can still be candidates for 
a currency union because it means that they are likely to experience similar economic 
shocks.363  
The fourth characteristic of optimality is inflation, which is defined as the general 
increase in prices (when little goods are being chased by more money).364 States 
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seeking to “monetary unionise” should have similar inflation rates to maintain fixed 
exchange rates. If states have different inflation rates, it indicates that there are 
differences in the way they conduct their policies, and that there are differences in the 
structure of the economies. If countries are to be good candidates for a currency union, 
the pattern of inflation should be similar as this can make the convergence in inflation 
rates easier once they belong to a currency area.365 Modern theory has demonstrated 
that monetary integration may even be more beneficial when the divergence of 
inflation rates is high. 
The fifth and final characteristic is political will. This is essential because belonging to 
a currency union must involve agreeing to coordination of policies with members. For 
too long has “theatre regionalism” reigned where governments sign regional economic 
agreements with no intention to implement them. Despite considerable progress in 
recent years, reflected in more sustainable fiscal positions, macroeconomic policies in 
many African states remain vulnerable to institutional weaknesses that undermine the 
credibility of commitments to low inflation and sustainable public finances. Thus, 
African monetary integration will largely depend on the institutions shaped by the 
actions of policymakers.366  Likewise the issue of political union, which remains the 
long-term goal for several RECs will stumble across roadblocks where national leaders 
and the public shy away from abandoning sovereignty. Without some delegation of 
sovereignty and build-up of strong and effective community institutions, monetary 
unions are unlikely to be sustainable. 
These five characteristics give weight to the idea that Africa is an optimal currency 
area. These points in sum, when actioned, refer to “macroeconomic convergence.” 
The underlying rationale of “convergence” stems from the belief that low-income states 
might have an advantage in achieving greater worker productivity and economic 
growth in the future by working together. The convergence process helps to reduce 
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the start variances in African states as well as promoting efficiency and internal state 
development.367 This, however, requires a high level of policy predictability and 
harmonisation as well as heightened fiscal prudence by governments.368 The most 
important actor in this equation would then be a regional central bank to promote a 
credible policy stance.   
In summary, states would form a currency area in expectation that current and future 
benefits exceed costs.  The creation of a monetary union should therefore be seen as 
facilitating regional integration in other dimensions, rather than being the culmination 
of the process.369  This view concurs with Masson who believes that the prerequisites 
for a successful monetary union require strong regional solidarity based on common 
approaches to policymaking that permit the creation of effective community institutions 
across a wide array of policy areas.370 What is the nature of African regional solidarity?  
3.5 RECs as Building Blocks – A Timeline 
Campbell, the theoretical “father of the African common currency” insists that an 
African monetary union must begin at the regional level. Hence, discourse on 
continental integration may be considered premature. What can be made of the 
relationship between Africa’s regions and a common currency?  From a theoretical 
perspective, “regional bloc theory” illuminates the nature of regionalisation.  It explains 
the benefits of a “single world market” and that the growing internationalisation of trade 
and investments is a result of the growth of regional blocs. Regional bloc theory is very 
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similar to the “new regionalism” school of thought which is “regional based 
institutionalised cooperation among states.”371 
Lahteemaki and Kakoenen, provide a realist approach to regionalisation describing 
the term as “peace through cooperation.” Regionalisation weakens power politics and 
makes interstate conflict impossible. The emerging new regionalisation is part of a 
process which aims at creating order, when the old order, based on bipolarity and the 
balance of power has vanished.372 
Borzel describes regionalisation as the “diffusion or interdependence of decision-
making.”373 The main drivers for regionalisation are (material) gains states expect to 
reap from trading with each other. These include reduced transaction costs, policy 
externalities, economies of scale, technological innovation due to greater competition, 
more FDI, and greater economic and political weight in international markets and 
institutions. Regionalisation is then the instrument to promote self-reliance in regard 
to development. Regionalisation then can be considered “economic integration” in 
action.  
From an African perspective, regionalisation is the instrument to promote African self-
reliance, promote trade and development, and physically unite Africa.  The elements 
of African regionalisation are rooted in the work of Nkrumah. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
Nkrumah strongly advocated for regionalisation as the key to facilitating rapid and 
successful development.374 In 1963, Nkrumah stated:  
I have often been accused of pursuing a policy of the impossible. But I cannot believe 
in the impossibility of achieving African union any more than I could ever have thought 
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of the impossibility of attaining African freedom... Africa must unite. We have before 
us not only an opportunity but a historic duty.375   
Building on the ideas of Nkrumah, the OAU formally divided the continent into 
manageable positions in 1972.376 Five regions were created based on similarities and 
challenges in each region. The impetus was that regions would encourage viable 
economic development projects.377 It was only until twenty years later that a real shift 
began from political grandstanding towards more realistic and practical regional 
integration efforts.378 Relationships between the OAU and regional economic 
organisations were formalised and regulated by the 1991 Abuja treaty which 
established the African Economic Community (AEC).379 The Abuja Treaty instructed 
states to “strengthen existing regional economic communities and to establish new 
communities to ensure the gradual establishment of the community.”380   
The signatories to the treaty committed themselves to the principles of solidarity and 
collective self-reliance and interstate cooperation. They enjoined the AEC to use these 
principles as a guide in the fulfilment of its mandate.381 This mandate was conceived 
as a means of maintaining and enhancing economic stability, fostering cordial relations 
among member states and contributing towards economic integration.382 The Abuja 
treaty also entrusted the AEC with the coordination and harmonisation of policies 
among existing and future economic communities, with a view to fostering regional 
integration.383 
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In May 1994, the treaty became effective with six stages set out for achieving an 
integrated economic and monetary zone by 2028. The six stages are described as:  
Stage 1 is said to take five years to strengthen regional economic communities and 
establishing new ones. 
Stage 2 is said to take eight years to stabilise tariffs, customs duties and other barriers 
to intra-community trade; strengthen sectoral integration, coordinate and harmonise 
activities of the regional organisations. 
Stage 3 is said to take10 years to set up free trade areas within each regional 
community.  
Stage 4 is supposed to take two years in establishing an Africa-wide customs union, 
with common external tariff, by harmonising regional tariff and non-tariff systems.  
Stage 5 is supposed to take four years by establishing an African Common Market 
through the adoption of common policies in agriculture, industry, transport; and the 
harmonisation of monetary, financial and fiscal policies.  
Stage 6 is supposed to take five years to finalise the African Common Market through 
the consolidation of the common market structure; the establishment of an African 
Monetary Union, African Central Bank and single African currency; and creation of a 
Pan-African parliament elected by continental universal suffrage. Implementation of 
the final stage for setting up of the structure of African multi-national enterprises. All 
together a Pan-African ideal similar to the one being set up in Europe now is predicted 
to take 34 years.384 
To be fair, it may be presumed that Africa is still in stage 3. This could be that the 
responsibility entrusted to the AEC and its constitutive institutions was enormous, 
considering the physical diversity of the regions, their varied experience in economic 
cooperation, their dissimilar rates of economic growth, and their uneven capacity to 
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organise as coherent and effective regional entities.385 Numerous material and 
financial constraints persistently hindered efficiency and linkages for an effective 
network of cooperation and coordination.386 Deficiencies in issues such as defining 
and delineating areas of responsibility or streamlining of central operational organs 
persisted. This led to ineffectiveness in some regions and lethargy in others. 
Furthermore, regionalisation is about institutions and institutional agendas to foster 
cooperation and integration that have not always served the stated functions. Three 
issues have remained salient in explaining the inability of institutions in achieving the 
objectives of integration. The first issue is the structural problem of underdevelopment.   
A structural problem is a systemic problem due to issues inherent in the overall system, 
rather than due to a specific, individual, isolated factor. While development is an 
integral, multi-dimensional and dialectic process that can differ from society to society, 
Africa has similar structural problems. To name but a few are inequality, high levels of 
unemployment and the lack of employment opportunities, slow economic growth, low 
levels of education, pollution, high social problems, and a greater frequency of health 
problems. These issues contribute to the crises of development.  
The second issue is the external orientation of primarily agricultural economies.  
Agriculture in Africa has a massive social and economic footprint however, African 
economies continue to design their agricultural output with export in mind. Agriculture 
forms a significant portion of the economies of all African countries, as a sector it can 
therefore contribute towards major continental priorities, such as eradicating poverty 
and hunger, boosting intra-Africa trade and investments, rapid industrialization and 
economic diversification, sustainable resource and environmental management, and 
creating jobs, human security and shared prosperity.  More than 60 percent of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa is smallholder farmers, and about 23 percent of sub-
Saharan Africa’s GDP comes from agriculture. Yet, Africa’s full agricultural potential 
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remains untapped.387 Analysing productivity potential across 44 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa showed that nine countries make up 60 percent of the total potential, 
with three countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania—comprising half of that. 388  The 
Figure below highlights the latent potential which Africa holds in comparison to the 
other world.  
Figure 12 Africa’s agriculture 
 Ethiopia Nigeria Tanzania World average 
Level of government 
involvement in the 
agricultural system 
High Moderate Moderate No Data 
Fertilizer application 
rate, kilograms per 
hectare 
58 14 10 120 
Average distance to 
frontier score (score 
out of 100)  
43.8 50.6 60.4   
 
Currently, sub-Saharan Africa imports $15 billion in food crops (grains, edible oils, and 
sugar), primarily from regions in Asia and South America.  It is vital that Africa reassess 
how it imports and exports agriculture.   
The third issue is the inadequate infrastructure for trade and investment for trade and 
investment. Infrastructure requires investment and investment looks for infrastructure, 
the catch 22 situation is one of the reasons for stagnancy in Africa. According to Le 
Pere, small state markets, poorly developed national and continental investment 
initiatives, the high number of land-locked states, few navigable rivers into the interior 
and underdeveloped infrastructure are some of the reasons why investors look 
elsewhere. 389  The table below highlights RECs infrastructure indicators which are 
quite poor.  
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Figure 13 REC infrastructure indicators 2011 (Source : Levine, Daniel and Nagar, Dawn, 
2016, "Region-Building in Africa"390 
 ECOWAS EAC SADC ECCAS 
Paved road density 
(km/100km2 of arable land) 
38 29 92 4 
Mainline phone density (lines 
per thousand people) 
28 6 80 13 
Mobile-phone density (lines 
per thousand people) 
72 46 133 84 
Internet density (percentage 
of households with access) 
2 2 4 1 
Generation capacity 
(megawatts per million 
people) 
31 16 176 47 
Electricity coverage 
(percentage of households) 
18 6 24 21 
Improved water (percentage 
of households) 
63 71 68 53 
Improved sanitation 
(percentage of household) 
35 42 46 28 
 
With the establishment of the AU in 2002, renewed efforts at integration began.391 At 
the 2007 AU Assembly of Heads of State, the AU formally voted to use the African 
RECs model as the designated approach to achieve Pan-African unification on the 
continent.392 With that decision, the RECs were designated as the building blocks of 
African integration and unification. The REC’s priorities dovetail with those of the AU 
ensuring cooperation and coordination.393 Within the RECs framework, integration is 
conceived as an enabling tool for a more effective African bargaining in the global 
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scheme. The fallout is a more positive position for Africa in the equation of global 
economic benefits.394 
Central to ensuring closer collaboration between the AU and the RECs is the regular 
exchange of information on their respective activities; developing and implementing 
joint programmes and activities; and co-coordinating their initiatives with those of the 
UN, its agencies and other international organisations and civil society actors.395  An 
MoU signed between the AU and the RECs emphasises the need for clear division of 
labour between any union government and the RECs, so that an over-centralized 
administration does not create inefficient systems for delivering and improving 
services.396  
The collective grouping of African states in each territorial “area” would work out tariff 
relaxations, common currencies, the elimination of visa and passport requirements for 
intra-Africa travel, and the other forms of integration.397 Once those are working to 
some degree, they are to be gathered together into a set of working references for a 
federation of united African countries. Currently, there are 14 such regional groupings 
but the AU officially recognizes only eight of them.  
Figure 14 Africa's official RECs 
REC ACCRONYM FULL NAME 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
COMESA Community of East and Southern African States 
EAC East African Confederation 
UMA Arab Maghreb Union 
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought 
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States 
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In the contemporary era, and under South Africa’s initiative, the RECs have become 
the implementing agents towards a UGA.398 RECs are built around anchor 
countries/hubs or “cooperative hegemons” who in theory drive integration. States like 
South Africa and Nigeria as hubs are expected to promote the regional agenda to 
move beyond artificial colonial boundaries and to pool resources. There is no 
guarantee that this will lead to prosperity, democracy and peace, but at least this idea 
attempts to break the mould of post-independence African politics, not strengthen it.399 
REC effectiveness is largely determined by leadership dynamics, political and cultural 
cleavages, and the depth of integration. ECOWAS, SADC, and the EAC have made 
more progress in economic integration, the institutionalisation of democratic norms, 
and peace and security than others, such as the ECCAS, IGAD, the AMU, and 
COMESA. SADC in particular performs strongly against other regional integration 
blocs worldwide.400 Otherwise, the majority of African RECs perform quite poorly and 
can be found in the bottom third of the global regional blocs.401 This could be due to 
the lack of historical ties of integration as well as the absences of strong anchor states 
to lead integration efforts.402  Resolving these weaknesses largely hinges on African 
initiatives to solidify the normative foundations of regional institutions and strengthen 
their capacities to achieve outcomes.403 
In sum, an integrated continental government depends on the strength of the AU’s 
constitutive parts. This will entail the RECs being what they are supposed to be; 
“economic markets.” Regarding the specificities of “economic markets”, interstate 
bargaining to how regional objectives are framed to be conceptualised, will rank high. 
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The streamlining of different positions is necessary to prevent any conflicting policy 
advice and to remove duplication of effort. Underlying this is practicalities that shape 
the way states deal with the need for foreign capital, the management of the macro 
economy, and their responses to economic and financial crises.404  
At the state level, the focus must be on exporting products that give comparative 
advantage. Thus, the regionalisation agenda must not allow goods to reign over 
services.  Services are critical job-creating and productivity-enhancing inputs in to the 
competitive edge of almost all other activities and are of particular importance in 
allowing firms to participate in regional and global value chains. If this can be 
emphasised, then as Murithi notes, “progressive integration of the RECs would 
enhance the formation of the Union Government of Africa.”405  
3.6 Are African common currencies realistic?  
A common currency is a necessary condition for the realization of the benefits of 
integration. Adoption of a single currency exposes domestic markets to foreign 
markets thereby increasing competition between member countries and enhancing 
the competitiveness of national industries.406 A common currency is the signification 
of an economic community and a united and developed people. The importance of 
African economies in global trade is not going to be judged by the power of each 
country’s individual economy, for there is none, so far, or the stability provided by the 
benevolent hegemony of a colonial master but in the actual share of the proposed 
currency in world official foreign reserves, its liquidity in international trade and its role 
as a competitor against the exorbitant U.S. dollar. 
Africa’s experiments with common currencies are not a new phenomenon.  The 
“Colonies Francasises d’Afrique” or “French Colonies in Africa” better known as the 
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CFA has existed in West and Central Africa since 1945.  Prior to that, the French West 
African Franc as well as the British West African Pound served as the region’s official 
currencies.  Similarly, the East African Shilling was the currency for colonial Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika and even before that the Indian Rupee served as currency 
of the British East African states.  In the 1960s, East Africa was close to developing a 
regional currency but the project was destabilized by the rise of nationalistic projects 
like the one of General Idi Amin Dada. In the contemporary era the region has 
struggling to implement the “East African Shilling”, which was last delayed in 2015 and 
now expected to be released in 2021. In Southern Africa, the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), the oldest regional economic bloc in the world, pegs the 
currencies of Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia to the South African Rand. Besides the 
pegging and Common Monetary Area (CMA), SACU has not sought to make progress 
towards a real common currency. West Africa however, in the form of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is leading in terms of common currency 
progress with its “ECO.” Though first expected in 2003 and postponed a good number 
of times, the ECO is expected to be finally unveiled in 2020.407   In December 2019, 
the ECO made its strongest step with the CFA Franc (West) opting out of certain ties 
with France to align itself more with the ECO. This transformation though to many 
critics is nothing but a name change.  
At most, there has been a mix in the results of African common currencies projects. 
On one side of the coin during 2017, the best-performing African currencies were 
those of members of monetary unions. For instance, the CFA franc appreciated by 
about 12.3 per cent against the US dollar as economic recovery in the Euro area 
continued to gather momentum. Similarly, the Common Monetary Area in Southern 
Africa, which comprises Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, also saw their 
currency appreciate against the US dollar by about 9.9 per cent in 2017. These 
developments have reduced inflationary pressure and narrowed fiscal deficits.  The 
potential and steady progress though has been hampered by the lack of political will 
and unfavorable economic indicators.  For example, despite the CFA (Central and 
West) zone existing for over 70 years, its states have remained some of the poorest 
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in the world. Likewise, Swaziland and Lesotho have steadily featured on the list of the 
poorest states while Namibia is considered one of the most unequal states in the world 
with a 57.6 Gini Co-efficient in 2015 which ranks it in a grouping with the likes of Haiti 
and the Central African Republic. What is clear from both the CFA and SACU systems 
is that a higher power appears to be benefiting from the arrangements.  In the case of 
the CFA it is France and the case of SACU South Africa.   
Why are African common currency arrangements not developing their respective 
regions?  What is happening at the regional level that hampers real progress?  Using 
the CFA and SACU as case studies, the following section seeks to answer the above 
questions.   
The CFA contains a mix of the good and the bad. The CFA is used in 14 African 
countries with a combined population of about 150 million and $235 billion of gross 
domestic product. The main problem with the CFA is that it is a symbol of 
neocolonialism.  Critics such as those leading the anti-CFA movement say true 
economic development for the 14 states can only be achieved by getting rid of the 
currency.408  These critics argue that in exchange for the guarantees provided by the 
French treasury, African countries channel more money to France than they receive 
in aid. They also argue that they have no say in deciding key monetary policies agreed 
to by European countries, which are members of the Eurozone. Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s 
foreign affairs minister, backed up the anti-French view, noting “France is one of those 
countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic 
development and contributes to the fact that refugees die in the sea or arrive on our 
coasts.” 409 Chad’s long-serving President Idriss Debby in 2015 stated that the CFA 
pulls down African economies and that the “time has come to cut the cordon that 
prevent Africa to develop.” He called for a restructuring of the currency in order to 
“enable African countries which are still using it to develop.” Debates over the 
persistence of the CFA franc zone also focus on African states’ independence and 
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sovereignty. Metaphorical armies unemployed youth throughout sub-Saharan Africa—
which may reach over 350 million over the next two decades—are often the loudest 
opponents of the CFA zone. Other pro-democracy movements, like Y’en a Marre in 
Senegal and Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso, consider the dismantling of the CFA 
zone as essential to their campaigns to reform their countries’ respective 
governments. Other protests have included Kemi Seba, the Benin-born French activist 
who was charged with burning CFA notes in Senegal before being deported. 
Landry Signe, author of “Innovating Development strategies in Africa: The Role of 
International, Regional, and National Actors,” examines the political economy of the 
performance and economic development strategies of CFA Franc zone states from 
1960 to 2010.410  The empirical evidence he provides showcases the CFA as both an 
enabler and barrier to development.  For example, he notes that Guinea stands as a 
prime example of CFA supporters.  Guinea which has its own currency frequently 
experiences currency shortages and its central bank does not have sufficient policies 
to ensure stability. Thus the ever present CFA offers a serious solution to this 
conundrum. A few hundred kilometers to the East in Ivory Coast, President Alassane 
Ouattara has on numerous occasions contended that the CFA zone states are better 
off than the Anglophone states due to growth and low inflation, whereas the poor are 
disproportionately affected by unpredictable inflation in Anglophone countries. Outtara 
has stated that the CFA is solid, well-managed, and stabilizes African economies.411 
Signe’s data shows that in terms of trade, the CFA’s fixed exchange rate to the Euro 
has led to a greater facilitation of trade through the reduction of uncertainty and 
stabilization of domestic prices.  The logic of fixed exchange rates traces back to the 
Bretton Woods period when 63% of developing countries had their currency pegged 
to that of an industrial country. The potential problems with a fixed exchange rate are 
mostly offset in Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU) countries, 
due to these countries’ high levels of excess liquidity from oil revenues. However, West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries have experienced 
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declining liquidity since 2004, thus suffering from the volatility of a fixed rate amidst 
external shocks. 
Signe is of the opinion that the monetary policies in the CFA have been effective in 
achieving real exchange rate depreciation which resulted in a reduction in government 
expenditures.  As a positive effect, the unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc to the 
Euro has generally reduced the risk of foreign investment in CFA countries. According 
to Coppola, the CFA is so closely related to the Eurozone that foreign exchange risk 
can be negligible on trade between CFA economies and the Eurozone.412 Although 
the two versions of the CFA franc are not yet integrated, they are both worth exactly 
the same in Euro terms, and the hard peg to the Euro means that their external value 
is also identical, since their foreign exchange rates float up and down with the Euro. 
So for nearly all intents and purposes, the 14 countries in the CFA franc currency union 
use the same currency, and that currency can be regarded as a version of the Euro.413  
This  has helped the CFA zone states to survive recent falls in the price of oil and 
commodities without currency collapse, inflation spikes and fiscal distress. 
On the other side of the debate, and besides the already mentioned political aspects 
against the CFA, the empirical evidence provided by Signe shows that the CFA Franc 
zone as a whole has had very limited success in intra-regional trade, especially in 
Central Africa.  The CFA zone has also been highly dependent on producing and 
exporting a limited number of primary commodities and has a narrow industrial base.   
These two factors mean that the zone faces high vulnerability to external shocks.  
Some critics argue that the strength of the euro may have discouraged exports and 
encouraged imports, benefiting Eurozone economies – especially France – at the 
expense of CFA zone countries. 
The December 2019 decision to rename the West African CFA France into the ECO 
and cut “some of the financial links with Paris” was welcome by many Heads of State 
but the reliance on France remains in the details.  The new ECO will remain pegged 
to the Euro but the states in the bloc will not have to keep 50% of their reserves in the 
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French treasury and there will no longer be a French representative on the currency 
unions board. To George Ott, the transformation from CFA to ECO was largely 
symbolic and the reforms cosmetic as the as the maintenance of the Euro peg will 
continue to dictate the scope of regional monetary policy decisions.414 
The CFA’s transformation into the ECO is all but theoretical given that the ECO must 
first circulate in the other non-CFA states to be considered a true ECO. Three key 
challenges have prevented this from happening.  Firstly, is the time inconsistency in 
the decision making by the heads of governments of member states.  Over the years, 
new governments, new policies, coup’ etat’s or simple invasions in the case of Ivory 
Coast in 2011 have delayed true ECO circulation. A second challenge is that the non-
CFA zone states, that is, the WAEMU members have not satisfied the convergence 
criteria for the adoption of the new currency.  Key criteria such as maintaining a budget 
deficit of less than 3% of GDP; public debt ratio of less than 70% of GDP; annual 
inflation rate of less than 10%; and, maintaining a minimum of three months of import 
cover mean that it appears unlikely that the majority of the WAEMU countries will meet 
all these criteria by the very ambitious inception date of July 2020.415 
The third challenge and quite strange given the anti-colonial sentiments is that in the 
face of the demise of the CFA Franc (West), the benefits of it become more clear! The 
CFA is tied to fixed rates which works well with the undiversified cash crop economies 
of the CFA. Booms and busts and other fluctuations in the market mean that the 
exchange rate of the CFA is relatively unaffected.  Even in the face of political and 
election instabilities, the CFA remains unaffected. So while the colonial sentiments are 
frowned upon, the economic rationality cannot be ignored.  
Regarding SACU, the penultimate question to ask is whether SACU members really 
aspire to the next level of economic integration. Overall, SACU is about protecting 
South African interests which dominate the region.  2017 intra-SACU exports which 
accounted for $14 Billion was dominated by South Arica with 71% of the total.  Similarly 
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with the rest of the world as well, South Africa is the source of 87% of SACU’s exports 
to the world.416    
Except for Botswana with its stronger Pula, all SACU members are part of the 
Common Monetary Agreement (CMA). In a CMA, there exists an anchor currency that 
is accepted as a medium of exchange within the monetary area. This anchor currency 
is accompanied by rules that govern a CMA’s operations, such as limiting the mandate 
of local central banks within a CMA (notably the financing of fiscal deficits through 
monetary expansion, so-called quantitative easing); maintaining sound 
macroeconomic performance; and uniform guidelines for prospective and existing 
members. Other rules relate to the governance of inflation rates – both current and 
expected – and keeping a CMA’s internal exchange rates within the margins of the de 
facto currency.  In the case of the SACU CMA, the South African rand acts as the 
anchor currency, and the policies of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) are 
widely influential among the CMA states of Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
Botswana is the only member of SACU to stand outside the CMA, instead managing 
its currency based on a basket of currencies, of which the South African rand holds an 
approximate 60% weighting.417 
The “unfair weighting” is natural given that Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia combined 
provide less than 4% of the total GDP of the CMA region. At the same time, their 
financial systems lack the high level of sophistication of the South African financial 
system.418 That means South Africa’s monetary and exchange policy is transmitted 
across SACU.419  Despite the fact that the CMA is not a full monetary union because 
members do not have a single currency and single central bank, monetary integration 
in this CMA is considered high, with CMA members generally able to withstand 
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shocks. While stronger monetary cooperation within the SADC will be a slow process, 
this integration initiative will eventually create a major challenge for the CMA. It 
remains to be seen whether the CMA has a pivotal role to play in the larger SADC 
initiative. Monetary cooperation in the SADC could eventually entail an entirely 
different framework or it could come about by extension of the CMA arrangements to 
include more SADC countries as and when they are willing and able to join. Expanding 
the membership of the CMA would be more complicated than in the past, because 
new members would not share the history of the South African currency being legal 
tender. The CMA arrangements have, however, in the past proved to be very flexible 
and this could be a big advantage. 420 
SACU summarizes Africa’s ventures in common currencies.  It highlights the 
uncertainties of whether the benefits of deeper monetary integration outweigh the cost 
and the precaution of hegemonic dynamics which are common in Africa’s regions. 
Linking a local currency to an anchor currency can improve macroeconomic stability 
as opposed to operating under a flexible exchange rate. Under a flexible exchange 
rate regime, commodity prices often become unstable, and can in turn create 
disturbances in smaller economies, particularly if their currencies are depreciating; 
thereby resulting in general price-level volatility. However, although a CMA would have 
a better capacity to cope with these disturbances, it would have less capacity to deal 
with the idiosyncratic shocks and development challenges that might only occur in 
certain member states, which would have lost their capacity to tailor monetary policy 
to their needs through the centralization of monetary control. Individual countries could 
face the effects of differentiated external shocks due to differences in their production, 
consumption and expenditure patterns; market characteristics 
(monopolistic/competitive); and level of openness, among others. Asymmetric shocks 
could cause havoc to individual economies under independent currencies. 421 
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The institutionalized framework of trade, financial and other non-economic links, for 
example, infrastructure, binds SACU states ever closer to South Africa and, in doing 
so, limits their scope for independent action.422 The progress in SACU is slow due to 
the lack of authority within these forums and the overlapping membership and political 
turmoil in some countries.423 This creates an ideal platform for South Africa to push its 
agenda. It is of paramount importance that the BNLS states be stable in all facets, 
socially, politically and economically, so as not to impede on the South African 
economy. While this dependency can to an extent be taxing on South Africa it also 
works to its benefit because it provides viable opportunities for investment, trade and 
migrant labour in and from those states.   
According to Van Zyl, in view of the progress already realized by the CMA under 
SACU, it could be worthwhile for countries to move towards a full monetary union by 
using a single currency. South Africa, particularly SARB, could then continue to play 
the leading role in this process, capitalizing on the experience of the CMA.424 Nene 
and Patroba also back up this view, noting that it would be beneficial for SACU to 
establish a monetary union. In such a case, the South African Reserve Bank could 
continue formulating a monetary policy for a possible SACU monetary union. A key 
challenge in obtaining this goal is the disparity across SACU member states and their 
poor macroeconomic performance over the years.425 
Another important of contention is the Maghreb region consisting of Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Though this region has some of Africa’s most 
developed states (see Figure below), it has not made any more progress in created a 
common currency that other parts of the Africa.  This is even more so shocking given 
that there are many commonalities in the region like religion, culture, language and 
demographic stock.  According to Layachi, the Maghrebi states have faced similar 
                                                          
422 Mingst, Karen, 2008, “Essentials of International Relations”, W.W. Norton & Company, p 109  
423 Cox, Robert, 1996, “Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: An essay in method”, In:  
Cox, Robert & Sinclair, Timothy (eds.), 1996, “Approaches to world order” Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p245 
424 Van Zyl, Lambertus, Date Unknown, “South Africa’s experience of regional currency areas and the 
use of foreign currencies “, BIS papers No. 17, Available at: 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap17o.pdf (Accessed 27 January 2020) 
425 Morisho Nene, Morisho and Patroba, Hilary, 2013, "Is SACU Ready for a Monetary Union", South 
African Institute of International Affairs, SAIIA Occasional Paper no 143, April 2013, Available at: 
https://saiia.org.za/research/is-sacu-ready-for-a-monetary-union/ (Accessed January 17th 2019)  
133 
 
challenges as the rest of Africa such as underdevelopment, external imperatives of 
neoliberal economic reforms, society challenges to governance, environmental 
problems and regional security concerns.426 Overall there are many similar factors 
which inhibit regional integration most especially the post-colonial rivalry between 
Morocco and Algeria.  Layachi notes that “uneasy unions and alliances have led to 
nowhere.”  It appears that national interests have overridden regional interests and 
that the AMU states have favoured global integration over regional integration.  









In sum there is potential for African common currencies. According to Oladele, a 
common currency can be created with a lot less difficulty than our African leaders have 
made it look so far.427 In an empirical study by Karras it was concluded that African 
states like Uganda, Ghana and Guinea have a lot to gain from a monetary Union but 
also a lot to lose from it.  Economies like Morocco, Ivory Coast and Gabon have little 
to lose by adopting a common currency but also have little to gain from it.  Nigeria is 
a more promising candidate membership in an African monetary union than Kenya, 
and Zambia is an unambiguously better candidate than either Benin or Mauritius.428  
This mix of benefits and constraints is visible in both the CFA and SACU.  Overall both 
these unions have shown incredible durability in highly unstable or unequal regions. 
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This seems to validate many of the benefits of such a union, with the regions showing 
consistently low and stable inflation rates. 
In surveying the literature around African common currencies and their dynamics, the 
most important details to success are well coordinated monetary and fiscal policies.  
The co-ordination of such policies is a necessary foundation.  A strong emphasis 
needs to be put on reducing the fiscal deficit of states seeking to join a monetary union. 
Reducing inflation and debt levels and increasing reserve holdings will also ensure 
that the benefits of monetary integration outweigh the costs.  Okafor suggest that to 
benefit from economic and monetary integration, regions need to deal with the sources 
of fiscal policy distortion through better management of their economies.429 
Using the CFA and SACU as a yardstick, an African Monetary Union would be most 
challenging to implement and require countries to adhere to strict fiscal rules similar 
to the CFA zone until stability was achieved. This strategy requires significant 
investment and capital mobility to ensure a strong exchange rate union and currency 
convertibility. Movement of labor and capital are necessary to spur economic growth 
and stabilize relatively different economies. The appeal of an integrated African 
Monetary Union is the tremendous potential to increase intra-regional trade and 
encourage domestic production capabilities. However, another monetary union may 
lead to similar problems of dependence as the CFA franc zone. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The various terms of “economic integration”, “monetary integration” and 
“regionalisation” all in some shape or form epitomise the Pan-African ideal of unity. 
The crux of integration theory is that states would form a currency area in expectation 
that the current and future benefits exceed costs. The “gain model” emphasises the 
potential for mutual, chiefly economic, benefits to be gained from integration.430 To this 
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school of thought, integration is the rational choice if states wish to benefit from large-
scale production and enlarged markets for interregional trade.431 Failure to integrate 
may be explained by lack of rationality on the part of the states, as there exists plenty 
of scope for all to gain in a win-win arrangement.432  
Besides the above three terms encompassing the Pan-African agenda, they also 
shadow the “REC” agenda which has over the last five decades been recognised as 
a major imperative in Africa’s policy and political narrative. The “REC” is largely viewed 
as an effective means of tackling a chief problem that has confronted African states; 
the inability of the existing system to provide for adequate growth.  
The challenge, however, is that while integration theories are brilliant theoretically, in 
reality, there are many shortcomings. First and foremost is that “states are not really 
withering away” as perceived in regionalisation theorem. States continue to be an 
elementary part of the international system, with much scope for affecting decisions 
and regulating their own affairs. Implementation at the regional level “only” takes place 
when in line with key “national interests” as defined by the ruling elites. Hence, 
regionalisation benefits are often perceived as long-term issues with many policy 
documents mentioning 2028 and 2050. This does not create a sense of urgency.  
Second, and from an economic perspective, the challenge of regionalisation has 
remained as is. For example, writing (prophesying?) in 1964, Ellsworth concluded that 
unions in the developing world would tend to fail because of the nature of their exports 
(primary products) and imports of capital goods. Indeed, since the 1960s, African 
imports have grown more rapidly than their exports and the nature of their exports 
remains the same. This has resulted in the African state being obliged to accept the 
infamous SAPs. With the accruing interest charges, the “underlying problem of lack of 
exports to pay for needed imports” remains unsolved some 60 years later.  





A question worth asking is whether the concept of “African integration” truly exists or 
is the term “regional cooperation” more appropriate? Table 3 highlights the difference 
between “real” integration as Europe has shown and just plain “regional cooperation.”  
Figure 16 Difference between regional integration in Europe and Regional cooperation on 
other continents (Source : Christiansen, Thomas, European and Regional Integration) 433 
Parameters Regional cooperation European integration 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Reliance on purely 
intergovernmental forms of 
decision-making 
Presence of autonomous 
supranational institutions that initiate 
and enforce common policies 
Forms of decision-
making 
Consensual decision-making (i.e. 
state has veto over decision)  
Extensive use of qualified majority 
voting (i.e. states have no veto over 
decisions) 
Degree of legal 
integration 
Arbitration and dispute 
settlement of individual cases 
Permanent court system developing a 
supranational legal order  
Extent of political 
integration 
Concentration on economic co-
operation among states 
Development of a political union with 
a system of economic, social and 
political rights for citizens 
Range of issues 
covered 
Emphasis on trade, investment 
and related economic issues 
Expansion of competences into much 
wider areas (single currency 




Minimal, if any, involvement of 
parliaments 
Establishment of a democratic 




Coordination of external relations 
limited to participation ion 
multilateral trade negotiations 
Development of a common foreign, 
security and defence policy  
 
With reference to the Table, African regionalism has remained at the same level of 
cooperation and has barely advanced towards supranationalism. Even though 
institutions such as ECOWAS have proposed more coordination of economic and 
security issues to foster shared sovereignty, the dominant pattern of African 
regionalism is cooperation in limited areas that can command consensus. The 
disproportionate power accorded to heads of state underscores Africa’s desire to 
retain a significant measure of sovereignty concerning questions of integration.   
The challenges of regionalisation suggest that new thinking about integration is 
required. This will involve new investment and disinvestment. Any such longer term 
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changes will hinge crucially on investors’ perceptions of the credibility of any market 
unity that is established.434 More progress is required, especially in the field of tariff 
reductions and the opening of borders for factor mobility. FTAs, common markets and 
customs unions which facilitate trade are the first steps towards full-scale monetary 
integration. 
The strongest argument for integration remains the strength it provides for Africa to 
bargain. It is imperative that common African positions arise to reinforce Africa’s 
negotiating power in the age of globalisation. From a Pan-African perspective, the 
African model of integration needs to promote Pan-Africanism, technology and socio-
economic development; all of which are concepts and initiatives discouraged by 
colonialism. Regional integration offers opportunities to move beyond artificial colonial 
boundaries and to pool resources to develop. Such an idea follows the thoughts of 
Walter Rodney, who in “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”, proclaimed, “African 
development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international 
capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa 
over the last five centuries.”435 Therefore, regionalisation offers the strongest 
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Chapter 4: A Common African Currency: Why and Implementation Challenges  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the theoretical background of a common currency and 
concluded that to kick-start an African currency, regional integration must take 
precedence. This chapter explores the idea of a common currency, specifically why 
there should be one and the main challenges hindering implementation progress. 
Globally, the value of having a common currency, the optimal size of currency unions, 
and the cost of forming such remains an unresolved debate. Africa’s quest for a 
common currency is motivated by the desire to counteract self-made, and external 
political and economic weaknesses.436  As a pillar of the AU’s plan for unity, a common 
currency is perceived as an accelerant towards continental integration. This 
perception, while a silent goal of the OAU, has become a major goal in the AU’s quest 
for political and economic unity in the context of globalisation.437 According to Murithi, 
the transition now from AU to UGA would be the realisation of the ideas and objectives 
of a common currency.438 
In 2003, the Association of African Central Bank Governors announced that it would 
work for a single currency and common central bank by 2021.439  In 2014 the AU 
proclaimed that a continental currency, to be called the Afro or Afriq, would be in 
circulation by 2025.440  Writing in 2020, both of these target dates are unrealistic given 
that no “real” regional currency exists as yet.   
What are the challenges hindering progress and what is the reason behind a common 
currency? To answer both these questions analytically, this chapter is split into two 
sections. The first section examines “the idea” of a common currency, the rationality 
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behind such an idea, as well as the opposing literature which slates the idea. The 
second section examines four key challenges which hinder the implementation of a 
common currency. These four persistent challenges have been chosen given their 
widespread synonymy with African actors. The challenges include hegemony and 
political will, state sovereignty and globalisation, lack of democratic governance and 
corruption, and a weak policy environment. As this chapter will show, there is a golden 
thread which runs through these four factors.   
The examination of these challenges provides the rationality for the ensuing chapter, 
which is, why the AU must transform from a political to an economic institution.   
4.2 A Common Currency − Why?   
The previous chapters made the economic case for a common currency.  Regarding 
the political aspects, the impetus or rationale for a common currency is that it will fulfill 
the vision of Pan-Africanism. The direct links between “common currency” and “Pan-
Africanism” are clear in the literature.  To Aloa, for a new and united Africa to exist, a 
common currency is imperative.441 Likewise Onyuma notes that a critical look at 
regional economic blocs reveals the potential for a continental common currency.442  
A common currency is not only a Pan-African vision but corresponds with global 
initiatives where almost every economic bloc has sought to adopt a common currency 
for economic, monetary and political union. From Latin America to the Middle East and 
East Asia, a common currency is seen as a tool for reinforcing regional cohesion and 
demonstrating commitment to regional solidarity. Common currency quests are largely 
the result of globalisation and the demise of defunct theories of state sovereignty 
stemming from Westphalian politics. Simply put, a common currency implies no 
national control over the value of a currency or over inflation. The aim of a common 
currency is to transcend the conventional economic aims of higher growth and lower 
inflation.  An African currency, whether regional or continental, is intended to contribute 
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to integration and solidarity, which viewed as one, is necessary to counteract the small 
economic size and lack of clout of individual states.443 From the Pan-Africanist 
perspective, there are four main reasons for the common currency enthusiasm.    
The first reason is the empirical success of the EU. The reinforcement of European 
economic and monetary integration has set a trend for deeper integration in many 
regions of the globe.444 The EU’s success at severing the link between the state and 
money has cracked down on numerous fiscal problems and central bank credibility 
issues. These problems and issues which a common currency has managed to 
alleviate are perceived by many as a viable path to tackling many of Africa’s fiscal 
problems.   
Despite troubles arising from the global financial crises, the EU’s successes will not 
be easily uprooted. The UK’s re-thinking of Brexit highlights the unequivocal benefits 
of integration as well as the financial cost and political implications of leaving a union 
with which it was heavily enmeshed with.  Since the 2016 Brexit vote, Downing Street 
has been occupied with how to reap integration benefits while undoing decades of 
integration. The “secession” has let off alarm bells in every sphere of British society. 
In October 2018, British academics expressed dismay over the potential cuts in EU 
research grants as a result of Brexit. British Universities were on the receiving end of 
approximately US$358 million per annum in EU grants between 2009 and 2013.445 
Likewise, the English Premier League, a multibillion-dollar industry, expressed fears 
of how Brexit would affect the football economy.446 Both these cases underline the 
importance of economic integration and more importantly the EU’s integration 
progress. An EU-like approach to Africa’s quest for a “Union Government” is therefore 
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a valued and sought-after tool to alleviate shared state challenges. According to 
Adams, Euro-like effects could be positively mimicked in Africa.447  
A second reason for a common currency stems from the field of OCA theory. OCA 
theory elaborates on an enhanced political solidarity through a shared vision of 
prosperity. This in turn creates an improved and stable macroeconomic environment 
largely derived from budgetary discipline and the conduct of monetary policy by a 
supranational and independent central bank. As seen in the previous chapter, a 
common currency can make regions more credible, provide greater growth potential, 
and provide numerous savings. A stable currency increases investor confidence which 
concatenates thereby creating jobs and attracting capital. The business world itself 
has not only the advantage of having a more stable currency but also has less 
transaction costs when buying or selling to a neighbouring country. Furthermore, as 
research by Rose et al. shows, sharing a common currency could increase trade by a 
factor of 3 or more.448 Literature on OCA further elaborates on the benefits of a 
common currency which include:  
• Deeper and broader financial markets that strengthen the monetary 
transmission mechanism and reduce the costs of borrowing. 
• Savings in foreign exchange reserves since not all imports will require foreign 
currencies. 
• Gains from trade creation, by increasing cross-border trade and investment 
flows. 
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• Wider access to markets as industries with economies of scale may be able to 
produce at efficiently higher levels due to integrated goods and services 
markets. 
• Asymmetry of shocks due in large part to differences in commodity exports of 
member states could be minimised, due to the integration of their economies. 
• Share in the distribution of the surpluses of the Common Central Bank. 
• Gains from pooling of resources in the provision of economic, social and 
physical infrastructure. 
• Elimination of exchange rate volatility and associated risks. 
The last point is significant as most African currencies are non-convertible, regionally 
and continentally. Convertibility is defined as the possibility to freely exchange a 
country’s currency for foreign currencies, thereby fostering better integration in the 
world economy. In West Africa for example, most of the eight currencies used in the 
15 states are not convertible.449 With numerous restrictions regarding the exchange 
of currencies, currency black markets grow which can devalue the currency thereby 
affecting international trade and growth. In sum, a common currency would alleviate 
issues of multiple currencies and exchange rate fluctuations that harm intra-regional 
trade.450 
The third reason for a common currency is driven by the desire to counteract economic 
and political weaknesses. Africa is suffering on a permanent basis from the triple 
disadvantage of low economic density, long distance to markets and deep divisions.451 
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The African state is thus individually and collectively weak.452 The “global imperial 
designs” paradigm explains that the problems confronting African states and the 
developing world in general are mainly attributable to the current international 
monetary system which does not effectively guarantee a reasonable system.453 The 
present African system is grossly import/consumer. It produces primary products and 
consumes finished products from Europe, America and Asia.454 Africa’s reliance on 
primary commodities as a source of export earnings leaves the continent vulnerable 
to volatility in commodity prices, market vagaries and changing weather patterns. 455 
Chisanga summarises this noting: 
The problems associated with an over-dependence on exports of primary commodities 
are well known. Due to falling global prices of commodities, all top African exporters 
of minerals and fuels experienced declining export revenue in 2015: Angola down from 
about US$60 billion in 2014 to US$34 billion in 2015, Equatorial Guinea from US$12 
to US$6 billion, Nigeria from US$100 to US$51 billion, South Africa from US$50 to 
US$38 billion, and Zambia from US$8 to US$6 billion.456 
Even worse, the demand and prices of Africa’s few primary goods are externally 
determined.  Basically, Africa is not in control of its resources. Nigeria for example 
does not refine its oil and Angola exports 90 per cent of its crude oil to Europe. Gems 
and diamonds discovered in Africa are auctioned off in Singapore or London. Zambia 
has some 80 per cent of the world’s copper, but it is Switzerland who is the world’s 
biggest exporter of copper.   
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A common currency then epitomises the suggestion that “Africa needs a different 
system.”457 Elaborating on this “system”, Gatsheni-Ndlovu cautions, “the solution to 
the problems cannot be more capitalism.”458 Early radical views of African integration 
made the case that the nature of Africa’s incorporation into the global capitalist system 
was largely a dependent one and thus detrimental to continental integration.459 Radical 
thinking by some scholars during this period proposed that Africa could only achieve 
integration by disentangling itself from pre-independence geopolitical ties or colonially 
derived economic links.460 Stephen Ouma puts forward the notion of “Africapitalism” 
which has a primary goal of greater economic prosperity and social wealth, driven by 
Africa’s private sector; its domestic economies, markets, and businesses.461 While it 
might sound puzzling that Africa should embrace capitalism which has “brutally made 
Africa suffer”, Africapitalism posits as an “ideology-cum economic system to take 
Africa into the future.” The outcome of this new system would be a “new currency.”  
Fourth and finally, the currency project is a desire for stronger regional ties which go 
beyond pure economic self-interest. In exploring the problems of political philosophy 
in Africa, the chief culprit of the existing systems is the imposed colonial borders. 
Phrases such as the “partition of Africa”, “colonial boundaries”, “sanctity of borders” 
462, and “Bismarckian borders” are often blamed as the source of Africa’s problems. 
Some have even claimed that partition has resulted in a third of African states 
experiencing large scale violence or war. A common currency would render this 
justification obsolete as borders would cease to exist. A common currency would be 
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the epitome of Pan-Africanism in action and would accelerate the transition from AU 
to UGA.    
Despite these four reasons, a substantial school of thought has slated the African 
currency project. Masson, one of the prominent scholars of this school describes the 
project as “sanctified almost to the same extent as motherhood.”463 To Milkiewicz, a 
common currency “can address very few of Africa’s fundamentals ills” and cannot 
guarantee growth but would rather distract attention from essential issues.464 To 
Bakoup, lessons from the Euro crises “seems to recommend that ongoing monetary 
integration processes in East and West Africa should be halted.”465 Bakoup elaborates 
that even regional hegemons would find it very challenging to fix monetary problems 
in neighbouring states. Masson’s assessment is that currency unions in Africa will not 
address development challenges and that it is unlikely that common currencies will 
“stimulate regional integration.” Masson suggests that even if currency unions were to 
“hypothetically” double bilateral trade among member states, the trade would still be 
so low, and unlikely to offset the welfare losses resulting from creating a currency. 
Moreover, large states with very different terms of trade shocks would affect the 
union’s monetary policy in ways that would be undesirable for some of the others.466 
Masson and Pattillo, also emphasise the enormous difficulties in moving from REC 
currency to continental currency.467 These critical conclusions, when put into the 
context that many African economies are financially undisciplined, further exacerbates 
the situation. 
In summary, a common currency will remain an elusive concept if research and theory 
overrule action. Since many African states have not used their monetary policy wisely, 
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giving up a failed currency in favor of creating a new one might not be as detrimental 
as perceived. While the school of thought which slates an African currency has valid 
reference points, the four reasons provided earlier tilt the scale in favour for a common 
currency. The question of why Africa needs a common currency becomes clear in 
exploring the implementation challenges.     
4.3 Implementation Challenges 
The state, the regional body and the continental body all contribute to what will be 
described in this section as “Africa’s challenges.”  The epicenter of Africa’s challenges 
is in the building blocks of African unity. While the blame game often shifts between 
the state and the AU, in this section, the idea of the REC as the main obstacle to a 
common currency will be shown.   
The REC experience has been characterised by multiple overlapping memberships 
resulting in confusion through duplication, conflicted commitments, divided loyalties, 
unwieldly institutional configurations, and inefficient operations. For example, of the 
54 AU members, 46 are members of at least two RECs, 20 are members of three, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a member of four, and seven states are 
members of one REC.468 This results in organisational disharmony among states and 
ambiguous legal frameworks far removed from the reality of citizen welfare. Thus, 
immense difficulties remain in harnessing regional institutions to tackle poverty, 
unemployment, and inequality.469 Mwanasali aptly describes the REC ensemble as 
“communities bound together solely by virtue of treaties signed under the OAU, which 
they rarely seek to implement.”470   
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Figure 17 The Spaghetti Bowl Effect 
 
The REC framework is further hampered by the “state.” On one hand RECs consist of 
states with a recognisable physical base, an institutional expression of legitimacy and 
authority, and on the other, states with no recognisable feature but a name, a flag, and 
a national anthem.471 More  often than not, RECs form under the strength of one state 
and then over-rely on this one state. Consequently, what we describe as RECs is in 
fact “sub-continental regionalism.” Sub-continental regionalism is defined as the 
banding together of smaller states to establish common markets for greater bargaining 
power.  
A REC in name only cannot accelerate integration. Overall, there are four main 
challenges which characterise the relationship between the states, REC’s and AU and 
which equivocate to lack of progress in the common currency project. In the following 
section, these challenges are explored so that a way forward for the currency project 
may be revealed.  




4.3.1 Hegemony and Political Will  
Ideational politics is an often overlooked but very important factor in international 
affairs. While many IR analysts will tend to reflect on the power of economics as a 
trump all factor, the concepts of “hegemony” and “political will” for example play 
important roles in providing the rationality for states interaction with each other. These 
concepts further provide states with the impetus to “act” in international relations or in 
other words, the “rules of engagement” which to operate.  
The concept of hegemony has played an important role in describing state relations, 
based on ideology and the idea of an all-encompassing dominant ideology the scope 
of which extends thorough social, cultural and economic spheres of society.472 
Hegemony developed as a Marxist term to “describe a world-view whose effect is to 
congeal dominance of one economic class over another into cultural permanence.”473 
Today, the concept forms a “central part of a wider problematic which marks a new 
departure in social theory for the contemporary period. In summary, it can be said that 
in the contemporary era hegemony means moral and philosophical leadership.”474 
Hegemony, according to Gilpin, “truly rest on economic and military power.”475 
Ferguson contends that “hegemony is more concerned with economic power,”476 and 
arguably the hegemonic stability theory (HST) is the most cited body of research 
relating to hegemony as an economic power. Patrick defines hegemony as “legitimate 
single-power domination and co-ordination of the foreign security, political and 
economic relations of sovereign states in international society,477 whilst for Mansfield 
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it is “the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in a regional subsystem, 
so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which regional 
political and economic relations are conducted.”478 To Babongile Mandela, 
“hegemonic status rests on the ability to wield power in non-coercive ways with the 
consent of other states and the ability to pay military and economic costs the critical 
factors in exercising hegemony.”479 
Gramscian hegemony, while an analysis of “class”, may be magnified to the global 
scale which surmises that a state or states exercise political, intellectual, and ethical 
roles of leadership.  These leadership roles thus influence a “common world view” to 
which states subscribe.  As a dynamic process, hegemony does not just passively 
exist as a form of dominance. It must be continually renewed, recreated, defended, 
and modified. In this process, hegemony is constantly limited, altered, and challenged 
by pressures not all its own.  
The concept of “African hegemony” was a topic of interest which reached its peak as 
an issue of prominence from 1994-2013.  Between 1994 and 2013, based on their 
hard power, soft power and their “benevolent hegemony”, South Africa and Nigeria 
long dueled to be described as Africa’s hegemon.  At times the dueling resulted in 
diplomatic scuffles and embargos such Mandela’s banning SAA from direct flights in 
in the aftermath of the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa. Today however it is difficult to 
speak of African “hegemony” given rapid changes on the continent by both internal 
and external forces.  
Have Nigeria and South Africa renewed or recreated their hegemony or driven the 
currency project? Do they champion the necessary political will and leverage to 
maintain the legitimacy and reliability of integration projects? Have they shown a 
willingness to invest resources to engage in various strategies? Hegemony is about 
projection, perceptions and provisions. As Tjemolane notes, hegemonic leadership 
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depends heavily on the consensus amongst states.480 Are South Africa and Nigeria 
projecting a hegemony which is perceived by the other African states? In terms of 
provision, are both these states providing the necessary provisions by altering the 
substantive beliefs of the elites in foreign nations?   
In short, no. Poor leadership, unprecedented mismanagement of state resources, 
cronyism, neo-patrimonialism and clientelism have led to their stagnation and 
retrogression. While there are countless examples of this, two stand out which magnify 
their respective situations. In 2018, the South African Auditor General reported that 
R300 billion had been stolen, misappropriated and wasted by the government between 
2013 and 2017.  R300 billion or US$25 billion in perspective is the combined GDP of 
the last 28 states on the 2017 IMF GDP ranking list. Nigeria on the other hand, in the 
words of Muchie, has not exploited its potential power, wealth and influence in building 
itself and the continent.481 A 2016 World Bank report482 noted that since independence 
in 1960 up until 2012, US$400 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenues had been stolen or 
misappropriated.   
For a common currency or just mere integration to take place will require strong 
institutions. “Institutional innovation” then, the process of creating and building 
institutions; requires hegemons with a vision.483 At the peak of its hegemony, South 
Africa was instrumental in the transformation of the OAU to the AU and the creation of 
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM).  Similarly, it was Nigeria that introduced the African unity agenda 
in 1991. Today, however, the ideology of Pan-Africanism which South Africa and 
Nigeria piloted to promote their hegemony is absent.  For example, while 44 states 
signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in 2017, South Africa 
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and Nigeria did not. The success of the integration project is dependent on the 
willingness of hegemons to accept responsibility for organising and consequently 
reaping the benefits of integration.   Without renewing or recreating their hegemony, 
the Seychelles, Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Morocco and Botswana have 
stepped out of the hegemons’ shadows. These states are benefiting from 
regionalisation and integration. Pan-African projects include:  
• Clean-up days in Rwanda 
• Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway 
• Mega port and economic zone of Bagamoyo 
• Algeria-Morocco A1 Highway 
• Pan-African Universities in Mauritius, Tanzania, and Senegal 
• Mombasa-Kigali railway 
• Visa free entry to African passport holders (Seychelles, Rwanda, Ethiopia)  
Hegemony is about “political will” and neither Nigeria or South Africa have promoted 
this concept. Political will is the ghost in the machine of politics, the motive force that 
generates political action. It is a combination of fundamental judicial, political and 
social preconditions. Where strong, it may overcome vested power concentrations 
synonymous with the African state. Political will is therefore vital for the integration 
project.  
The lack of political will is exemplified in the manner in which states have allowed their 
national agendas to override the regional one. The success of any strategy for 
collective self-reliance hinges on the nurturing of common political will by national 
governments.484  A good example which characterizes the deficiency in political will 
                                                          
484 Adebajo, Adekeye and Rashid, Ismail O.D., (Eds), 2004, “West Africa's Security Challenges: Building 
Peace in a Troubled Region”, p 65 
152 
 
across the continent is state contributions to the AU. By December 2016, only 25 out 
of 54 members had paid their contributions in full while another 14 members paid more 
than half and 15 did not pay at all. This is despite well publicized consensus that the 
AU is underfinanced. This example is evidence that some states regard supranational 
institutions as distant and alien, hence denuding it of legitimacy and hampering its 
effectiveness. Supranational institutions will be powerless if states refuse to transfer 
political and economic interests into them.   
A further example which exacerbates the lack of political will is the unequal distribution 
of gains among REC members.485 On numerous occasions, UNECA cautioned that 
for integration to succeed, the benefits and costs of integration must be equitably 
distributed among members. Yet, REC proliferation has resulted in unequal 
transaction benefits and payoffs in agreements.486  There has been no solution to the 
inadequate mechanisms available for the equitable sharing of the costs and benefits 
of regional arrangements.487 Payoffs or benefits are important, especially where there 
are different sized regional players. Uncertainty in the sharing of benefits breeds lack 
of commitment to the provisions in transactional agreements and thus some members 
will either be slow in signing and ratifying agreements or look to other favorable 
transaction alternatives.488   
In sum, hegemony and political will must be rediscovered if common currency projects 
are to be revitalized. It is important that Pan-Africanism be thought of as a “public 
regional good.” Though Nigeria and South Africa have met numerous roadblocks to 
development in recent times, Africa still needs them to lead the continent.   
South African in particular needs to understand the crude realpolitik of hegemony. In 
relation to the South Africa today, it is difficult to understand the brilliance of South 
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African hegemony twenty years ago. In championing the NEPAD, APRM and the 
African Renaissance Fund (AFR) South Africa was able to capture the attention of 
other nations and was very clear on the promise of reward for consent to its projects.  
Taylor and Williams noted that “Pretoria has regularly attempted to nudge and cajole 
the rest of the South into accepting the ‘realities’ of the so-called new world order, 
particularly within various multilateral organizations.”489 Some of the rewards outlined 
by Mbeki himself were, “a concerted international effort to provide debt relief for 
Africa”, “the introduction of measures to encourage larger flows of capital into the 
continent”, “reasonable trade policies” and “to provide market access for African 
products.”490 
As one of the lowest growing African economies (GDP growth projected at only 1.4% 
in 2020) it must understand that its “co-operative or benevolent” hegemony must at 
times disguise its self-interest in Africa.  Landsberg and Kondlo had previously 
highlighted Pretoria’s excellence at projecting influence through multilateral institutions 
which reflect a strategy of co-operative hegemony.”491 South Africa urgently requires  
a refresher course in hegemony which it designed!  In sum, Muchie captures this frame 
of reference:  
Africa’s agency cannot flower without building a counter-hegemonic Pan-African ideal. 
Pan-Africanism is not a territorial aggregation of a pot-pourri of post-colonial states, it 
is above all  a movement and ideal projection that drives home the need to evolve 
Africa’s own  resources and  the  necessity and desirability to acquire the power of  
self-definition, discourse, ideology, narrative, myth and metaphysics to deal with and 
overcome the imperialist-colonial domination.492  
                                                          
489 Taylor, Ian and Williams, Paul, 2001, “South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Region: 
The African Renaissance meets Vagabond Politik?”, African Affairs (2001),100, 256-286, Royal African 
Society. Available at: http://www.standrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Taylor_Williams_African_affairs.pdf 
(Accessed: 12 March 2016). 
490 Ibid 
491 Landsberg, Chris, and Kondlo, Kwandi, 2007, “South Africa and the ‘African Agenda”, Policy: issues 
& actors Vol 20 no 13 Centre for Policy Studies Johannesburg South Africa April 2007 
492 Muchie, Mammo, 2004, “A Theory of a Pan-African Unification-Nation for the Structural 
Transformation of Africa”, Civil Society & African Integration, School of Development Studies and 
Centre for Civil Society, University of Natal, Durban, RSA 
154 
 
4.3.2 State Sovereignty and Globalisation  
A serious challenge to the African unity agenda is a matrix termed the “state 
sovereignty vs globalisation” complex. The relationship between these two terms is 
best described in the following sentence:   
While assuming and protecting its sovereignty at all times, the state must grapple with 
a bombardment of factors dubbed as “globalization” which seek to tear down walls of 
the past. 
The reference to “walls of the past” emphasises the entrenchment or solidification of 
state structures in IR. The “complex” does not denote that globalisation is the cure to 
the challenge of “state sovereignty” but rather has potential to alleviate some aspects 
of state sovereignty while serving as an obstacle to African unity itself. To understand 
this complex, we may start with the challenge of state sovereignty. From an African 
perspective, the notion of “state sovereignty” has made the African state “reluctant” in 
its approach to integration.493 While often accused of being weak, where the African 
state excels the most, is in protecting at all costs its sovereignty. The reluctance to 
part with even portions of its sovereignty is a by-product of Africa’s leaders’ failure to 
emphasise the unity agenda while neglecting efforts at real integration. Sovereignty 
then becomes “an important prerogative to resist claims and encroachments coming 
from outside national boundaries; that is, the right to say no.”494 According to Tendi, 
Africa’s perverse relationship with “sovereignty” has resulted in an “inversion of 
colonialism.” 495 This is because the tendency to adhere to “sovereignty” based on 
colonial borders conflicts with moves towards greater unity to overcome the colonial 
derived territorial divisions.496 That is, the colonial state remains. 
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Visualizing the remnants of the colonial state becomes clear when we consider that 
the economic designs imposed by the colonial powers were never intended to promote 
genuine national economies. Instead, the colonial powers created economies that 
functioned as appendages of their economies, and heavily laden with preferences for 
their economic groups and interests. In some cases, the colonialists such as France, 
for example, saw its colonies like Algeria as “extensions of mainland France.” Thus at 
the time of independence, African states inherited economies that were fragmented 
and dominated by the former colonialists in tandem with a new elite that were not 
committed to the economic prosperity of the country concerned, and who, therefore, 
lacked interest and a stake in building successful national economies.497 Such a 
paradigm continues to this day with many African states relying on their “former” 
colonial masters to purchase their exports. Ivory Coast sells almost all of its cocoa to 
France, Zambia all its copper to Switzerland and Egypt most of its oil and gas to BP.  
Even the design of Southern Africa with South Africa as the export-gateway to the 
West remains, which is exemplified in the lack of development in its “surrogate states.”   
This set-up remains unchallenged because sovereignty gives a relatively small 
number of people control of state positions and power which confer enormous 
palpable advantages and privileges. Nzewi describes this, noting, “the elites or ruling 
class’s reluctance to delegate sovereignty is driven by the need to protect state 
control.”498 The “haute bourgeoise” literally live off sovereignty and most live very well 
indeed, in fact, for as long as they live they fight tooth and nail to keep it.499 Mugabe, 
Museveni, Bashir, Bouteflika, Kabila, the Kenyatta dynasty and Buhari (Military and 
civilian) attest to this. In this sense, the elite’s idea of sovereignty is less about 
protecting the state and its inhabitants’ sovereignty but more about protecting the 
sovereignty that affords them.500 Fanon in the Wretched of the Earth, chapter 4 “The 
Pitfalls of National Consciousness”, extensively deals with this issue. He notes: As 
                                                          
497 Author Unknown, 2002,"The challenges of globalization in Africa: What role for civil society and 
other stakeholders", Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Available at: 
http://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/327/Academic-
programme/Undergraduate-Courses/UNPAN008264.PDF (Accessed 26 April 2019) 
498 Nzewi, Ogochukwi, 2009, "The Challenges of post-1990 regional integration in Africa: Pan-African 
Parliament", Centre for Policy Studies, Policy brief 57, RSA, p. 6 
499 Tendi, Blessing M., 2008, “Talk of Mugabe end is premature”, Pambazuka News, April 8, 2008, 
Available at: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47178 (Accessed 12 March 2019) 
500 Miles Tendi, 2013, “Sovereignty and Militaries: Enduring challenges for the Africa Union, The 
Thinker, May 2013, Volume 51, Available at: 
http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/Thinker%2051%20full.pdf (Accessed 29 April 2019) 
156 
 
regards internal affairs and in the sphere of institutions, the national bourgeoisie will 
give equal proof of its incapacity. In a number of under-developed countries, the 
parliamentary game is faked. Powerless economically, unable to bring about the 
existence of coherent social relations and standing on the principle of its domination 
as a class, the bourgeoise chooses the solution that seems to it the easiest, that of 
single party. It does not create a state that reassures the ordinary citizen, but rather 
one that rouses his anxiety.501 
When the priority of the government is to protect state control or to “capture the state”, 
then supranational institutions will have no real power.502,503,504 Such a notion is 
manifested at the regional organisational level which remains reticent about directly 
interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. State sovereignty then protects the 
status quo.  
The latter factor in the “state sovereignty vs globalisation complex” undermines state 
sovereignty by challenging the so-called “post-colonial state” and its negative 
sovereignty. Defined, globalisation is the compression of space and time, so that 
people from distant areas are able and obliged to interact with one another intensively 
and in a wide range of areas. As a result, the world becomes one, and interactions 
among diverse people begin to look like those within a village. Thus, terms such as 
“One World” and “Villagisation” are sometimes used as synonyms for globalisation.505   
A common method of globalisation is encapsulated in the “spill-over effect.” Defined, 
the “spill-over effect” refers to the impact that seemingly unrelated events in one nation 
can have on the economies of other nations. The value of the spill-over effect in 
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relation to combating sovereignty is seen in the case of the EU. The very nature of the 
EU has been about challenging the principle of national sovereignty.506 To Hass, the 
“spill-over effect” has had major successes in “eroding European sovereignty.”507 To 
Nugent, sovereignty attitudes adjusted with the empowering of EU institutions, which 
in itself is a “spill-over effect.”508 The EU integration process is then “nations delegating 
sovereignty” to a supranational body to achieve the benefits of effectiveness and 
efficiency.509   
From an African perspective, there are three major channels for the spill-over effect to 
combat the “perverse sovereignty.” The first one is the “domino effect” which is when 
states in one region club together in order to pursue common economic interests which 
results in other regions following suit. This dynamic, results not only from the need to 
counter the anticipated negative impact on the trade with other regions, but above all 
in order to maintain a strong voice in multilateral and global trade negotiations. It may 
be referred to as a “stimulation” which entices states to join the integration process to 
take advantage of the new economic opportunities generated. Morocco’s application 
for ECOWAS membership which was followed by Tunisia’s application confirms the 
relevance of such domino effect.510 A second channel refers to the “distribution effect” 
which arises from the trade in goods and services and cross-border labour and capital 
flows.511 Such an effect will directly impact on the livelihoods of citizens who will see 
first-hand the benefits of integration. As entrepreneurs and citizens make use of cross- 
border services, the rationality behind borders will increasingly be questioned. A third 
channel is the “demonstration effect.” This is the process of sub-groups deepening 
their regional integration process to take advantage of coordinated FDI. This would 
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require and be more effective with hegemonic initiative. The question then becomes 
whether “globalisation” is truly “eroding African state sovereignty” or is it entrenching 
the status quo?  
From an outlier level, it may be surmised that the effects of globalisation on Africa 
have been “enormous.”512  Africa’s position within the context of a globalising world 
economy exhibits lopsided aid and trade relationships.513 In this sense, globalisation 
means increasing vertical and horizontal integration of world economic and social 
formations into the world capitalist economy.514 This drive towards increasing global 
economic integration is driven by the dominant economic powers of the West for their 
ultimate benefit.515 This neoliberal economic order has driven the process of 
globalisation and has been facilitated by international multilateral institutions such as 
the WB, World Trade organisation (WTO) and the  IMF.516 While globalisation and 
liberalisation provided a potential source of growth, they also threatened to increase 
the marginalisation of developing states.517 Chinewe notes that the super economic 
powers proclaim and promote “free trade” in the knowledge that free trade benefits the 
stronger economies.518 Thus, globalisation strengthens the strong and weakens the 
weak.519 The weak remain structurally poor, both concrete and ideological, which 
functions to ensure the status quo. 
This puts Africa at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other regions in marshalling its energies 
and resources to deal effectively with the process of globalisation.520 African states 
are still heavily dependent on economic and development ties with the developed 
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world for survival.521 Africa’s position in the international system has been 
considerably weakened by the fact that it has been losing the race for economic 
development in general, and human development in particular, to other regions.  A 
2016 World Bank report on development policies and institutions in 38 African states 
showed that while some states have increased support for growth and poverty 
reduction, most saw no change or a decline in their Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) scores.522 The average 2015 CPIA score for sub-Saharan Africa 
was 3.2 out of 6, which was the same as in 2014.523  In this context, 13 African states 
saw their scores measuring economic management policies decrease.524  Other stats 
to back up Africa’s losing position in globalisation are seen in the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) index. In 2009 32 of the world’s 38 HIPCs were African. A decade 
later, 33 of the world’s 39 HIPCs are African. These stats corroborate a 2017 WB 
“Ease of doing business report”, which listed 40 African states in the last 115-190 
states.525 In 2019, Africa’s GDP was expected to be 2.8% compared to Asia’s 5.5%. 
This performance is a sign of the weakening ability of African countries to deal 
effectively with globalisation. 
In sum, the “state sovereignty-globalisation” complex reveals a double threat to African 
unity but they both confer the same thing; the complex protects the status quo. On one 
hand globalisation declares the state irrelevant and redundant. This is a positive factor 
because traditional state-centric approaches to dealing with important developments 
have become obsolete.526 Globalisation exploits the weakness and incapacity of 
states to operate on a national basis. On the other hand, however, globalisation as 
seen in the stats, has not benefited the “individual African state.”   
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Therefore, regional integration is the coherent solution. If globalisation destroys the 
state, then it is the impetus on RECs to take charge. There seems to be no convincing 
empirical basis on which to base the argument that globalisation is detrimental to or 
incompatible with regional self-reliance or intra-regional trade relationships.527 In other 
words, the inescapability of globalisation and its dictates cannot be used as an excuse 
for the slow pace of regional integration and hence poor economic development.528 
4.3.3 African Democracy and Corruption 
A conducive environment is essential to African unity. The overall African political 
landscape may be described in the following equation;  
“African democracy” + “corruption” = x.   
The obstacle referred to as “x” is then a key impediment hindering African unity. How 
can “x” be described?  
In describing “x”, analysis begins at the first variable in the equation, that is, “African 
democracy.”  Before “African democracy” can be explained it is essential to 
understand the two key concepts of “democracy” and “governance.” Democracy refers 
to a government of the people or government of the majority.529 Governance is the 
exercise of a power or of an authority, with the objective of managing the affairs of a 
state.  
The combination of “democracy” and “governance” becomes “good governance” 
which is based on the enforcement of the fundamental values of democracy in the 
power exercise.530 The fundamental “democratic values” are “liberty, equality and 
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justice.” Good governance then is "the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources for development."531 
Joseph Schumpeter one of the 20th century’s foremost intellectuals on democracy 
portrayed good governance as an institutional arrangement, a means of filling public 
choice by a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.532 In the Western enforced 
worldview, the claim put forward is that strong states are democratic ones.533 
Africa’s interpretation of “good governance” is well captured in the phrase “African 
democracy.” Determining what constitutes “African democracy” is not an easy task.  
Any sort of qualitative analysis of this relationship is arguably “unscientific.” For 
example, “African democracy” which is often associated with a “lack of democracy” is 
a damning proposition and therefore judging a massive configuration like Africa as 
such is purely unfair. The argument that all of Africa has practised bad governance is 
not an accurate statement. Blundo, Sardan and Bierschenk emphasise this point 
criticising political scientists for being quick to apply labels to “the African state” without 
empirically exploring its daily functioning and the changes under way in its 
bureaucratic system.534 
For the sake of analysis, African democracy may be analysed in four lenses; its 
uniqueness, as a historicity, as an economic-based system, and its relation to 
elections.   
Regarding the first lens, “African democracy” is “democratic” in its own shape and 
form, that is, it is unique.  It may exhibit traits of autocracy, feudalism, and commit 
grave human rights abuse yet experience globally high growth rates, high levels of 
education, low food poverty rates and very low crime rates. On the first label of 
“autocracy”, this naturally conflicts with the label of “democracy.” The Economist 
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Intelligence Unit’s 2017 Democracy Index, indicates that many African states remain 
under authoritarian and hybrid regimes. However, they are democratic in their own 
way. Africa’s own brand of democracy thus works different from the West’s monopoly 
of the term. Just to elaborate on this, for example, Benjamin Netanyahu has been the 
14th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Prime Minister of Israel but this feat will never be 
associated with “dictatorship.” Likewise, the Social Democrats, a Swedish political 
party, has won the majority of elections since 1936 but this neither has been 
questioned as a breach of democracy. Likewise, the façade of “Democratic vs 
Republican” camps in the USA are essentially the same party.  Meanwhile African 
governments have been described as “socialist, rent-seeking, vampiristic, centralised, 
clientelist, neo-patrimonial, predatory, crony, klepotcratic or failed”.535 In its 
“uniqueness” we may even question democracy indexes as empirical tests to 
measuring democracy.536 Democracy indexes like “Freedom House” or “Amnesty 
International” rarely question the state of democracy in their founding nations. 
In terms of the second lens; the history of “African democracy” is largely a legacy of 
the past, shaped by both colonialism and as a policy product of the Cold War. On the 
former, Mamdani considers “bad governance” shaped by global history rather than on 
local culture. Indirect colonial governance often destroyed established systems of 
political checks and balances, and therefore created what he calls “decentralized 
despotism.” Mamdani argues that noteworthy relics of this order survived 
independence, and were later reinstitutionalised in renewed form.537 On the latter, in 
this “Cold War”, foreign governments did not insist on good governance and even 
when domestic policies failed, the assistance kept on coming.538 Essentially this “neo-
liberal” democracy required non-democratic forms of repression to sustain itself.539 
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The conflict between the past and the present is summarised by old parties’ failure to 
bring reform.  In Zimbabwe, for example, the government that replaced Mugabe 
continues to use heavy-handed measures to squash dissent. A serious difficulty exists 
for new regimes in extricating themselves from the past.540 
In terms of the third lens, “African democracy” is different in the sense that Africans 
tend to view democracy as government’s capacity at delivering economic goods.541 
According to Bratton, “Africans do not separate political democracy from economic 
democracy or for that matter from economic well-being.” In their eyes democratic 
reforms must be accompanied by growth resulting in employment and redistribution.  
A system then based on “wealth” or “economic rationalities” leads to “African 
democracy” harbouring many negative connotations. A resulting key economic system 
is the “patronage network” which sustains those in power.  In this system, government 
revenue is diverted to serve the primary objective of keeping the government in power, 
resulting in a “patrimonial state.”542 These diverted funds serve the private objectives 
of the government in power, which tolerates corruption as a system of patronage.543 
The system of patronage is above all based on inequity and a patron’s arbitrary control 
of the distribution of political resources.544 
Regarding the fourth lens, “as a relation to elections”, it is often purported that elections 
are the fundamental yardsticks to determine the nature of democracy.  Schumpeter 
identified democracy with elections, specifically competitive elections.545 Yet a 2016 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) report documented the “relative absence of 
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competitive electoral systems” as well as “rigged elections” across the continent.546 
The African Charter on Democracy attempts to set a standard for normal elections. 
Article 23.5, prohibits “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal 
instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of 
government.”547 However, this policy has been flouted on many occasions in the past 
decade with leaders removing term and age limits from their state’s constitutions. 
Successful constitutional amendments in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Republic of 
Congo, Gabon, Chad, Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea have paved the way for 
strongmen to be re-elected. Gadjanova notes that "elections in African states are 
manipulated, the opposition suppressed and demonstrations violently dissolved." She 
notes that a “tyranny of low expectations” prevail, that is, lower standards are tolerated 
because of fears of political instability. Foreign election observers frequently overlook 
irregularities and rubber-stamp contests in Africa that would not be tolerated 
elsewhere because of the perennial expectation of violence and political unrest. This 
allows incumbents to subtly manipulate the vote and is deeply subversive to efforts to 
hold elected officials fully accountable.548 In 2017, Uhuru Kenyatta won 98 per cent of 
the vote which puts him in the rather dubious club of Paul Kagame of Rwanda, re-
elected with 98.8 per cent of the vote, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan (95 per cent), Salva 
Kiir of South Sudan (93 per cent), and Teodoro Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea (94 per 
cent).549 In most of these states the political situation remains tense as leaders and 
their patronage networks struggle to maintain popular support.550 A report by the 
African Centre for Strategic Studies on term limits shows that the 18 states that do not 
observe two-term limits are more unstable than those with two-term limits; a third of 
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these 18 states are facing armed conflict. In contrast, just two of the 21 states with 
term limits are in conflict.’551 
The four lenses supplement the second variable in the equation; corruption. That is, 
those four variables create an environment where corruption may thrive. Corruption’s 
impact on the state’s well-being is well documented. Political and economic 
development is stifled, and budgets for public goods such as health care are 
decimated. Civil society, independent media, and other accountability mechanisms 
are subdued. The activists who remain are far out-matched in terms of resources and 
access to information. Corruption has a direct link between growth and development. 
Lack of trust, reduced legitimacy and lack of confidence in public institutions can be 
both a cause and an effect of corruption. It can affect domestic investment and tax 
revenues and at the micro-level, imposes additional costs for company growth, 
especially in terms of their performance and productivity.  
Corruption on the continent is characterised by leaders plundering state treasuries, 
haphazard commissioning of extravagant pet projects, establishing inappropriate 
priorities, and implementing dishonest economic reform. In fact, the relationship is 
inverse, as according to Schuster, “corruption prevents Africa from developing 
democratic structures.”552 Many African governments can be described as extractive, 
withdrawing social wealth from the population and exploiting the country’s social and 
mineral endowment for the benefit of the elite and foreign corporations. Such a 
statement is not an unprecedented reflection. In the 2017 Transparency International 
corruption perceptions index, for example, most African states took up the last 80 
spots.   
Corruption in government institutions threatens the democracy and economic 
steadiness of the country. Even the most developed and advanced African states are 
prone to the disease. A South African 2011 National Planning Commission report 
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suggested that South Africa’s high levels of corruption “undermine the rule of law and 
hinder the state’s ability to effect development and socio-economic transformation.”553 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index indicates that South Africa 
has fallen from a respectable 34th place in world rankings in 2000, to 64th place in 2011 
to 72nd in 2018. If a state as “democratic” and wealthy as South Africa can be so 
blatantly corrupt, then little is left to the imagination of what could possibly happen in 
less advanced states.   
Two factors have facilitated corruption; globalisation and the abundance of resources.  
Globalisation has given corruption a new dynamic as seen in one study which found 
the correlation between aid flows and corruption levels.554 Since aid is a type of 
windfall, this causes groups and individuals to vie for a portion of it, resulting in 
increased rent-seeking activities. It is not surprising then that some of the most corrupt 
states are those that receive the most aid. Haiti, South-Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Angola, for example, often feature on both high aid recipients 
and most corrupt lists. It is also interesting to note that South Africa is in the world’s 
top 15 aid recipients but manages to lose approximately 50 billion rand (US$4 billion) 
a year through corruption.  
Second, the abundance of resources, has been a (if not the) leading factor in 
undermining accountability, disarticulating the link between state and society and 
enabling those who rule to command vast patronage networks while remaining 
indifferent towards the population at large. Just to elaborate on Africa’s vast resource 
wealth, in 2012, the mining company Glencore achieved an income of US$214 billion, 
while Zambia where it operates had a GDP of US$20 billion.555 As Carlos Lopes, the 
ECA’s executive secretary notes, “corruption is not Africa’s problem alone.” 
Assessments of corruption in Africa should also include information on the activities of 
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international players involved in assets repatriation and money laundering.556  In 2020, 
the “Angola Leaks” showed how the “big four” Western accounting firms, top 
consulting companies and banks helped Isabel dos Santos siphon off billions of 
Angola’s oil revenue.557 
In sum, “x” is therefore a haphazard environment which will continue to block the 
African unity agenda. Democracy is in decline across the continent or not spreading.558 
As for corruption, its continued persistence is grounded in systems of patronage which 
in turn is integrated into weak state institutions and ubiquitous forms of informal 
economic activity which feeds networks of clientelism.559  
As a potential antidote, the democratisation processes related to society as a whole 
−rather than for even more imports of governance from abroad − is required.560 For its 
part, the AU Commission has failed in setting benchmarks and evaluating the 
compliance of states to the African Charter on Democracy. Whether the lack of action 
is because of resource constraints or the political considerations of the AU 
Commission officials is unclear.561  
4.3.4 Weak Policy Environment  
The fourth and final challenge standing in the way of a common African currency is 
“weak policy environment.” Without empowered institutions, integration projects will 
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not succeed.562 The question of why there is such persistent variance between policy 
commitments and effective implementation has increasingly preoccupied 
development practitioners.563 Development strategies and policies followed by African 
states are increasingly those formulated by outsiders, which are then uncritically 
imposed as a condition for aid, investments, trade access, and political and military 
support. Numerous governments with the support of Western donors and institutions, 
time and again restructure their bloated bureaucracies, not to scrap them but to save 
their regimes.564 As economic conditions improve, these governments would abandon 
restructuring and reinstate it only when a crisis re-emerged. At a University of Nairobi 
conference in 2017, a discussant lamented on why governments bring in Western 
consultants to draft policies in relative isolation. These governments would then take 
on this advice without critical interrogation. This, he noted, was one of the factors why 
policy implementation fails.565 
The predicament of weak policy is a combination of poor efforts by the AU, RECs and 
states to formulate policy that speaks to economics.566 Policy frameworks are largely 
marked by disparity in the processes and levels of democratization. This results in 
public policy being disassociated with developmental relevance, wasted resources, 
lack of policy implementation and weak governance.567  The latter is seen in the cases 
of Ivory Coast, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia.  Policy frameworks are often 
implemented perfunctorily, without conviction, commitment, or the dedication needed 
to carry them through. In many cases, public confidence in the state polices was 
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wrecked by governmental dishonesty and incompetence.568 Governments advocated 
one policy and practised precisely the opposite.   
Ghana is a good example of this policy flip-flopping over the long-term. The military 
government invited private sector participation in the economy after decades of 
socialist mismanagement but then nationalised and seized commercial properties 
soon afterwards.569  Fast forward 40 years later and the nationalisation policy, usually 
along ethnic lines, appears to be the most common policy initiative in Africa. In South 
Africa, the government advocates nationalisation as a policy domestically to win votes 
while externally wooing FDI by assuring investors that the environment is stable.  In 
Nigeria, the market-oriented economic reforms of the Obasanjo years were completely 
reversed by the Yar’ Adua regime. Such policy vacillation and reversals in the 
implementation of reforms is not consistent with a successful integration project. 
Likewise, in Zimbabwe, policy flip-flops have culminated in an environment unsafe to 
invest in.  Poor policy is evident in other de facto military dictatorships such as Uganda, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Gabon, the Gambia, DRC, CAR, Cameroon and Somalia. 
Uganda, for example, has recently announced a trade deal to supply Germany with 
US$100 million worth of cannabis flowers yet marijuana use remains illegal in Uganda. 
Furthermore, the military which plays an important role in many African state, begs to 
ask the question, is the military qualified in forming and actioning economic and 
developmental policy? Literature emphasises the military’s inherent inability to govern 
states with modern economies or to handle the negotiation among groups needed to 
maintain a stable government.570 In one study, researchers implied that operating in 
the national interests as defined by the military, economic institutions and economic 
activities simply serve to ensure domination by the group to continue unity and efficacy 
of the state.571 
Policy suffering from insufficient technical and analytical support combined with a lack 
of central authority makes operationalisation difficult. The lack of monitoring and 
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evaluation protocols further exacerbates bureaucratic malaise. Certain policy 
hindrances include: 572   
• A lack of clarity on the division of labour and responsibilities between the AU 
and the RECs. Paralysis in decision-making. 
• Staffing and financial constraints.  
• Unclear legal framework for cooperation.  
• The lack of agreement over − and commitment to the definition of an 
appropriate institutional arrangement for political and security matters. 
• No cohesion in goals. 
• Inefficient bureaucracy, cumbersome and costly over-regulation, and too high 
barriers to trade and investment.573 
• The often inadequate, resources for policy implementation, and the little 
involvement of policy implementers and citizens in policy formulation. 
• Insufficient data. Policy implementation is complex and so data and evidence 
could play a role in improving the process.574 
• Non-inclusion of civil society. The ‘triple helix’ (government, private sector, 
university) is important for decision-making.   
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In summary, much of the literature on policy implementation has been dedicated to 
the reasons why implementation fails and not enough on when and why it succeeds.  
Generally, policies do not work in isolation, especially when they involve the 
government as the actor to carry out the implementation. In government, there are 
various ministries and departments, and they often have cross-cutting mandates and 
interests that might go unacknowledged in a policy’s implementation plan. For a policy 
to be implemented effectively, it should build in provisions that specify the actors that 
need to be involved in its implementation, and describe each actor’s roles and level of 
involvement, considering both their unique and related mandates and interests.575 
Rather than just let policies drift into full or even partial failure, governments must take 
an interest in ways in which the policy process – especially the implementation phase 
– can be strengthened and supported.576 Regarding the debate on the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches, there is need for hybrids of these models.577   
 
4.4 Conclusion  
Robert Mundell, “father” of OCA theory and eventual winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize 
in economics stated, “it is great countries that make great currencies.”  Considering 
this statement, the chapter began by exploring “a common African currency” and why 
Africa needs one. The implementation, however, of a common currency is fraught with 
challenges.  Does Africa have the “great countries” as mentioned by Mundell?  
As seen in the latter half of this chapter, “great countries” are few and far between. 
Common challenges synonymous with the African state were placed into four matrices 
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as; “Hegemony and Political Will”, “State Sovereignty and Globalisation”, “African 
Democracy and Corruption”, and “Weak Policy Environment.”  
There is an interlinking thread between the four matrices.  Without hegemons 
articulating and projecting shared frameworks, integration will remain ineffective.  
Hegemons are characterized by a lack of political will as seen in the cases of Nigeria 
and South Africa. In the second matrix, state sovereignty and globalization render 
African states as peripheral actors in the world economy and this creates a delinked 
continent.578 A continent which is open for exploitation by outsiders in tandem with the 
elites. The challenge is to reconfigure both concepts in juxtaposition to each other. 
Both concepts on their own allows for the sustenance of the “artificial state.”579 In the 
third matrix we found that African democracy rather than the West’s notion of 
democracy is a better frame of reference to understand the lack of good governance 
in Africa. This variable combined with “corruption” is arguably the biggest obstacle 
facing African integration. The last matrix, “a weak policy environment” allows matrices 
1,2, and 3 to fester.  Attempts to move the policy research agenda beyond the 
explanation of political will, elites, democracy, or corruption have proven futile. 
Improving the policy environment does not lie with political gestures and grand 
schemes but requires understanding, less political interference from states and more 
resources.580  Heyer, Gorringe, and Ochieng make the point that if the state cannot 
enforce development policy that it may accept on paper then the politics of markets, 
the politics of social status, of social movements, of identity and social accountability 
call for reinterpretation as development policy.581 
The four matrices result in what may be described as the “post-colonial state” which 
has “a certain level of political instability embedded in its anatomy and structure.” This 
predicament is characterised by limited opportunities flowing from underdeveloped 
economies devoid of strong private sectors and institutionalised civil societies. 
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Furthermore, the post-colonial state suffers from severe supply-side constraints such 
as physical infrastructure, development finance, technology, and human capital.  
What then is needed is for the post-colonial state to be dissolved.  This could happen 
by emphasizing the economic aspects of integration. This rationality is the basis of the 

















Chapter 5: Shifting the AU from a Political to an Economic Institution  
5.1 Introduction 
Institutions are the formal and informal rules that govern human behaviour. In 
providing the “rules of the game”, institutions facilitate political and economic outcomes 
through their influence. As states cannot operate in isolation and need broadly 
accepted rules to function in a predictable manner, authorised bodies adopt institutions 
to run their affairs.582 Thus, institutions will reflect cultural values and norms that a 
given society values.583  Asides from governance and leadership, institutions 
ultimately determine how states fare in the quest for double-digit growth. The link 
between institutions and economic growth was relayed by Robson, who noted that, 
institutions are required to give effect to the “integrating force of the market.”584 
Aspects of this “integrating force” includes the harmonisation of policy, standardisation 
of fiscal activities, adoption of trade agreements, and the arrangement of supply chain 
within a worldwide production structure. Crucially then, institutions will either restrict or 
flow economic development. 
In terms of Pan-Africanism as a force of economic unity and development, do African 
institutions really reflect the “cultural values and norms” of Pan-Africanism? When the 
institution of Pan-Africanism, the AU was established in 2002, targets were set with 
20-year deadlines. Two decades later, criticism of the organisation has amplified given 
African unity’s lack of progress. Agenda 2063, released in 2014 to commemorate the 
OAU at 50 years, was not enough to stifle the criticism which culminated in the 2017 
Kagame report. The report highlighted a deficiency of AU institutional quality and the 
need to transform the union through institutional reforms. At the heart of the report was 
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the AU’s admission that chronic structural deficiencies and dysfunctionalities hinder 
union progress.   
Building on the Kagame report, this chapter asks two questions.  First, what is the 
state of the AU? It must be noted that this analysis is not a reflection of the current 
state, but rather a culminative description of the AU and its main challenges, hence 
the sub-title inference of an “ideological battle.” Answering this brings forth the second 
question, what remedy is required especially concerning the common currency quest?  
Answering both these questions may offer an account of everything, but runs the risk 
of explaining nothing. Hence, this chapter suggests that institutional innovation is 
required to shift the AU from a political to an economic institution. Such institutional 
innovation is encapsulated in the SI approach which allows for multiple and alternative 
ways of exploring the general political economy. The theory allows for institutions to 
be viewed as evolving organisms with an emphasis on history.585 
The SI approach frames the rationality of the second half of the chapter.  In the second 
half, seven key issues are explored.  The exploration of these seven key issues have 
two main purposes. First, the seven issues indirectly address the challenges seen in 
the previous chapter. Second, the seven key issues were chosen for their potential to 
transform the AU from a political institution which has the “values” and “cultures” of 
Pan-Africanism to an actual governing body with economic imperatives as its main 
agenda.  
This notion is valid and worthy of being tested because a strong relationship exists 
between political ideology and economic systems.586 Therefore, Pan-Africanism must 
be translated into economic outcomes.   
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5.2 The State of the AU – an institution in the midst of an ideological battle?  
The 2013 AU budget was US$278 million with 56 per cent of that funded by donors. 
The ratio for the following years was: 2014: US$308m:50 per cent, 2015: US$393m:63 
per cent, 2016: US$417m:60 per cent, and 2017: US$439m:74 per cent. This trend 
underscores a deep fallacy in the AU’s vision; that is, to be an independent Pan-African 
body. This predicament is best captured by Ngwodo, who states that “if decades after 
independence the AU is still receiving outside funding, it is difficult to think of the AU 
as a serious coalition of member nations.”587 
This dependencia and the dictates that accompany it result in a deficiency of internally 
developed policy and compromises the ownership of the AU agenda as well as 
constrains its freedom of action. Without financial autonomy it is unlikely that stronger 
supranational governance will develop as a divided Africa has always been the 
prerogative of external forces. For example, both the WTO and US government have 
questioned if not been diametrically opposed to the AU’s attempts at creating 
alternative funding mechanisms.588  
Overall, the lack of self-funding results in not only the AU but a number of African 
agencies being characterised as “weak.”.589,590,591  For example, 25 per cent of 
Uganda’s 2017/2018 budget was doled out by foreign donors. Swaziland, between 
2011 and 2015 received half a billion US$ in external assistance yet had a GDP of 4 
billion US$ in 2012. Even wealthy states like Nigeria and the DRC were in the top five 
African Overseas Development Aid receipts in 2017. On describing African institutions, 
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Chabal and Daloz argued that they are no more than “décor, a pseudo-Western façade 
and state structures largely devoid of authority”. The lack of funding underscores this 
reference.  
Indeed, literature indicates that “strong” states are those where property rights are 
defined and protected, law is established and enforced, citizens have political and civil 
liberties and policymakers adopt sound monetary and fiscal policies.592 These 
distinguishing characteristics are at the core of institutional arrangements or in other 
words “the nature of governance.”593   
“The nature of governance” or what we previously described as “African democracy”, 
has in fact deflected some of its attributes/qualities on to the AU. This notion was the 
crux of the Kagame report, that is, the AU’s institutional quality is questionable. This 
notion is manifested in various stats, for example, of the 1,500 AU resolutions, some 
65 per cent have not been implemented as yet. According to Mengisteab, the AU has 
remained ineffective, especially in coordinating policy and resources, preventing 
conflict, promoting synergy in state-society relations and facilitating the process of 
state building.594   Such sentiments were echoed in 2017 by former AU Commission 
Chairperson Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who acknowledged that the continent’s 
modest gains were outweighed by persistent governance deficits.595 The governance 
deficits were strongly affected by the Western orchestrated assassination of Gadhafi 
in 2011, whose political engineering of the AU is sorely missed.596     
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Therefore, it is a feasible conception that a disjunction exists between implementation 
of AU goals and African unity nostalgia. Describing this nostalgia, Mistry notes; 
“African integration ideals have been based on lofty trans-continental ambitions, 
evocative political slogans, a plethora of treaties and regional institutions, high-minded 
principles, and protectionist proclivities.”597 Although Mistry stated this in 2000, the 
statement is still applicable today.  Key institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament 
and African Court of Justice have been held up by bureaucratic bottlenecks. More 
effective working methods for supranational governance have been debated about by 
the UN but are yet to be incorporated into the AU. 
With the “state of the AU” being so poor, this has allowed others to shape the pace 
and trajectory of African unity.  Even worse, the African unity agenda has been 
hijacked by the West’s one dimensional discourse of neoliberalism which reigns as a 
“one-size-fits-all” policy.598 This discourse emphasises a specific set of policies 
designed to establish “its own rules, norms, culture and values” regardless of the 
historical, institutional and political context of individual states.599 John Pilger saw 
through this “doublethink” when he noted:  
“Democracy” is now the free market; a concept bereft of freedom. “Reform” is now the 
denial of reform. “Economics” is the relegation of the most human endeavour to 
material value, a bottom line. “Foreign policy” is service to dominant power. Conquest 
is “humanitarian intervention.” Invasion is “nation building.” Every day, we breathe the 
hot air of these pseudo ideas with their pseudo truths and pseudo experts.600 
Building on this “doublethink” notion, Hudson described: 
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“Democracy” (is) supporting U.S. foreign policy, pursuing neoliberal privatization of 
public infrastructure, dismantling government regulation and following the direction of 
U.S.-dominated global institutions, from the IMF and World Bank to NATO. For 
decades, the resulting foreign wars, domestic austerity programs and military 
interventions have brought more violence, not democracy.601 
The AU then, the institution of Pan-Africanism, is at odds with itself due to the neo-
liberal agenda which has encapsulated its operationalisation via funding. The AU is 
then effectively a “bifurcated institution” suffering what is termed “institutional duality.”  
Institutional duality is characterised by institutions at odds with each other and the 
socio-economic realities and if personified would be schizophrenic. 602 This articulation 
concurs with Mengisteab’s thesis that “imported institutions have blocked 
development.” 603  
The task, however, of institutional reform is not easy as institutions reflect culture and 
as Fukuyama indicates, while culture in ideological development can be quick, in 
institutions on the other hand, “culture tends to change the most slowly of all.”604 He 
notes that culture is largely “beyond the reach of institutional solutions, and hence of 
public policy”.605 Coyne and Russel concur with Fukuyama, noting that changes to 
institutions can take generations to be implemented.606 Goran as well agrees that 
“institutions are rules that are upheld by society over a long enough time to make a 
difference to individual actors.”607 Further elaborating on the importance of “time” 
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Sangmpam illustrated  that institutions  “mature over time” and are most effective at 
critical junctures, that is, times when society is open to new influences.  
Given the resistance of “time”, a viable solution to AU reform then will require more 
interaction with “informal institutions” which are “the unwritten rules that are not 
enforced by formal agencies.” These include habits, customs, cultures and values.608 
The potentially of this transformation is brilliantly captured by Kimanuka who 
concludes, “it is time for the AU to redefine new identities in terms of modern needs 
and realities as well for the future.”609 
 
By focusing solely on political desires, the economic imperatives in the form of policies, 
resources, and synergy have remained un-harmonised. Under such conditions, 
integration under the AU has moved slowly. Therefore, Pan-Africanism must be 
translated into institutional terms with an emphasis on economics. The task of 
institution building and creating transparent processes for economic activity is 
crucial.610 Notably, the implementation of policies and projects for growth must be 
monitorable, measurable, and underpinned by reliable data. Reformers must address 
issues of prioritisation, sequencing and selectivity as economic reforms are highly 
context-specific.611 This is not because economics works differently in different 
settings, but because the environment differs in terms of the opportunities and 
constraints they present.612 In general, when it comes to reform, economists know 
what institutions and policies are necessary to ignite economic growth but not exactly 
how to get the institutions and policies to follow suit. Closing the gap between “know 
                                                          
608 North, Douglass C., 1991, "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 5. No. 1, Winter 
1991, Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1942704?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents 
(Accessed 30 April 2019) p 97-112 
609 Kimanuka, Oscar, 2018, “AU reforms require political will to bear fruits”, Newtimes, June 21, 2018, 
Available at: https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/au-reforms-require-political-will-bear-fruits 
(Accessed 24 April 219) 
610Landsberg, Chris, 2011, “South Africa’s “African Agenda”: Challenges of Policy and Implementation”, 
Prepared for the Presidency Fifteen Year Review Project, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 
RSA, p. 9 
611 Sobel, Russel S. and Coyne, Christopher J., 2011, "Co-integrating Institutions: The Time-Series 
properties of Country Institutional Measures", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 54, February 2011, 
Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ee93/489becc13ab9c79c63c0288bd5c119b7741d.pdf 




what” and “know how” in institutional reform is critical for achieving sustained 
growth.613  Does the concept of “institutional innovation” provide the tool to close this 
gap?  
5.3 Institutional Innovation 
Institutions can determine either economic development or stagnation.614 The link 
between institutions and a healthy economy was well described by Dawson who noted 
that “institutions characterized with less freedom can exacerbate macroeconomic 
volatility”.615  As seen in the previous section, African institutions are notoriously weak 
and for them and more especially the AU to transform will require multiple logic in the 
triangle between the AU, the AU’s interaction with member states, and the African 
macro-economy.  Understanding and reshaping this triangle is key to AU reform.  The 
Systems of Innovation (SI) theory addresses this triangle.  
The SI approach emphasises the identification in any given economic setting of the 
interactions of the significant socio-economic variables, and the dynamic co-evolution 
of institutions and technologies. This results in imparting key development features 
and dynamics to an institution. In the African context, there is a need to engage in the 
dynamics of acquiring existing knowledge and make new knowledge at the Pan-
African level. It is not only about either acquiring or making new knowledge but 
understanding the production of knowledge as a continuous process.  
“Reshaping knowledge” then results in an “innovation culture.” An innovation culture 
enables a system of creation to produce what Africa consumes and to consume what 
Africa produces. This is done by creating African-wide producers and user interactions 
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and by embedding knowledge creation, innovation and learning in Africa’s institutions 
with a total learning and innovation culture. 
The SI approach is suitable for understanding why African institutions and more 
especially, the AU, needs to shift from a political to an economic institution. Three 
reasons back up this claim. First, a key attribute of the SI concept is the way it frames 
problems and the value it signifies to the domain of reality that mainstream economics 
neglects or under-emphasises. Anyone seeking to penetrate beneath the surface of 
complex economic events requires a frame of reference within which the flux of 
economic life can be reduced to manageable proportions. Only with the aid of such an 
organising framework can the world we observe be made intelligible. Thus, the SI 
concept has evolved by putting innovation and learning at the heart of the economics 
of development.616 This is important because we often seek an economic theory to 
conceptualise and understand yet there exists so much conflicting economic theory. 
For example, Adam Smith’s laissez faire view held that markets are more capable of 
maintaining stability than government planners. As an opponent of the “mercantile 
system”, Smith spoke out against the apparatus of privilege and the state protection 
which supported it. The Marxist approach maintains that capitalist systems are 
inherently incapable of order and stability. In Das Kapital, Marx explains that capitalism 
inevitably collapses in the most violent of fashions.617 John Maynard Keynes’ neo-
classical approach countered Smith’s view, suggesting that in fact activist government 
policy is necessary to stabilise the market.618  More recent theorists such as Friedman 
in 1982 argued that market capitalism disperses economic power rather than 
concentrating it.619 To the Pan-Africanist, neoclassical economic theory is 
inappropriate for economic modernisation. Therefore, the brilliance of the SI approach 
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is that is allows for all theoretical paradigms to be extracted from.  Basically, it allows 
for 19th and 20th century work to be interpreted with 21st century theories.   
Second, within economic governance is the transformation of institutions that govern 
economic activity by focusing on the emergence and rearrangement of several forms 
of governance. One such approach is found in evolutionary economics and the 
adoption of a version of the SI approach to economies.620 This approach according to 
Scerri incorporates a broader definition of innovation which includes institutional and 
organisational change to incorporate increasingly wider aspects of the political 
economy. Therefore, the SI approach explains that a distinct model of economic 
governance and institutional arrangement prevails in African states which allows for 
similar prescriptive presumptions. The colonial subjugation (whether British or French) 
left comparable legacies where the ingredients required for development are 
absent.621 This institutional economic arrangement is “superimposed to facilitate 
profitable export for imperialists.”  
Third and finally, the SI approach allows for experimentation. A 2018 study by 
Tsinghua University’s Academic Centre for Chinese Economic Practice and Thinking, 
demonstrated that China’s long economic boom is attributed to constant 
experimentation and not ideology. When policies worked well in one place, they were 
copied. When they did not, they were discarded. That does not make for a grand new 
economic theory. But it has made for good economics in practice.622 Africa’s economic 
future depends on such prudence.  
In sum, the SI framework underscores the importance of transforming the AU into an 
economic organisation. Key issues such as improving fiscal discipline, economic co-
operation, industrialisation policy, economic governance and financial institutions, 
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infrastructure development, central bank creation and the merging of unions; 
encompass the transformation agenda.  Choosing these factors and their 
interpretation is motivated by the quantity of literature already reviewed. While 
standard economic indicators may yield encouraging signs of economic development, 
a political economy perspective enables us to understand better.  What are these key 
issues and how are they vital to the transformation process?  
5.3.1 Improving Fiscal Policy   
Every government spends money and raises taxes to finance its expenditure. On a 
regular basis, governments decide how much to spend, what to spend it on and how 
to finance this expenditure. The policy which guides this process is referred to as the 
“fiscal policy.”623 Fiscal policy, “in an ideal situation” contributes to maintaining the 
environment for macroeconomic stability.624 The onus then is to establish fiscal policy 
at the regional level. This is, however, extremely difficult for two reasons. First, taking 
into consideration the internal political, economic, social and cultural diversity among 
states, the optimal degree of “fiscal centralisation” will be challenging. Second, bearing 
in mind the huge productivity differences across states, centralisation of policy in 
general may lead to excessive regulation. According to Dearden, the absence of 
appropriate fiscal policies is a formula for failure.625  The answer to this malaise would 
be to establish “fiscal discipline.” 
Fiscal discipline is the effectiveness of fiscal policy and is essential to the well-being 
of a state’s economy. Fiscal discipline is evaluated by measures of institutional 
development and the absence of corruption.  As seen in the previous chapter, this 
means Africa is largely characterised with a legacy of budget deficits and rampant 
inflation.626 Masson notes that African states tend to suffer from higher inflation 
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because of the constant diversion of spending and taxes which do not reflect societal 
needs.627 This situation is compounded negatively by the limited observance of the 
deficit criterion. In ECOWAS for example, problems related with the common currency 
project relate primarily to inadequate fiscal discipline of some of the potential 
members, particularly Nigeria. In SADC, “more” fiscally disciplined states like South 
Africa and Botswana are reluctant to admit countries into a monetary union that are 
not. Similarly, at the continent-wide level, fiscal differences among regions would likely 
make an African currency unappealing for some potential members.  
According to Coulibaly, establishing monetary unions in Africa could either strengthen 
or weaken fiscal discipline in member states.628 Using the case of the Central African 
Franc zone (CFA) zone, Coulibaly notes that fiscal discipline has not been promoted 
despite regional fiscal policy. This he attributes to institutional design. Furthermore, he 
notes that France’s political interests have failed to promote fiscal discipline. In sum, 
African fiscal policy faces the dilemma of being the main policy tool to respond to 
shocks while being constrained by the need to preserve fiscal and external stability of 
each country.629 
As poor fiscal policy will not disappear with the emergence of monetary unions, the 
goal then is to create Pan-African fiscal discipline consisting of three tools. The first 
tool is simplified rules. International best practice suggests that fiscal rules should be 
simple, easy to understand and consistent. Having too many criteria overstretches the 
authorities’ focus as the critical focal points of fiscal discipline are watered down. 
According to Mollentze, on developing fiscal policy for monetary unions, “objectives 
and instruments must be assigned efficiently and a clear division of responsibilities is 
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needed.”630 If responsibilities are blurred, this will ultimately reduce the incentives.631 
Furthermore, fiscal policy is heavily reliant on time, as by the time measures become 
effective, circumstances may have changed to such an extent that the measures may 
even have perverse effects. This has caused certain economists to recommend that 
the government should not attempt to achieve too much through fiscal policy. Their 
recommendation is that fiscal policy should be as neutral as possible.632  From this 
perspective, consideration could be given to keeping only two or three criteria. These 
criteria could relate to the stock of public debt and the flows contributing to debt 
accumulation. This is crucial to secure a broad consensus on the objectives they seek 
to achieve.  
The second tool is enforcement mechanisms. Financial sanctions, the main 
compliance instrument, when not applied gives poor credibility to the whole process. 
In the West African Economic and Monetary Zone (WAEMU) for example, the lack of 
compliance with fiscal rules has led to some states increasing their debt ratios post 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. In South Africa, the King IV report, which is used as 
a governance tool to monitor corporations, has no legal sanctions for non-compliance. 
Without enforcement mechanisms, massive state corruption is allowed to run rampant 
under the watch of elite auditors such as KPMG, internationally renowned 
management consulting firm McKinsey and even South Africa’s biggest banks such 
as Standard Bank, Barclays Africa Group, and the Nedbank Group.633  Fiscal policy is 
pointless without enforcement mechanisms. Fiscal transparency and communication 
must be central to the strategy of improving compliance. Within this framework is the 
release of data. The publication of annual reports on implementation could provide 
incentives for member countries to enact the directives.634 
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The third tool is a revision of the macroeconomic policy framework in terms of how 
policy is sequenced. Old prescriptions of pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical policies are 
no longer an appropriate remedy. Institutions must learn to “run and chew”; manage 
debt and growth while supporting markets and protecting the vulnerable. Many states 
have never moved out of a permanent state of pro-cyclical policies with high spending 
and limited or no increased taxation combined with passive monetary policy. The 
African tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is about 15 per cent which is lower than in emerging 
Europe, developing Asia, and Latin America. A few countries, however, like Algeria, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Morocco, Namibia, and South Africa have recorded tax revenues 
to GDP of more than 25 per cent, comparable to several in fast-growing Asia. As in 
the case of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the harmonisation of taxation policy 
was a key feature of promoting fiscal austerity among states.  In sum, African states 
need to revise their taxation policy to make fiscal policy workable.   
These three tools, however, are not enough to guarantee fiscal discipline; institutions 
with a supranational nature must be created such as fiscal councils. Fiscal councils 
are independent public institutions that oversee governments’ promises to sustainable 
public finances. This is achieved through various functions including public 
assessments of fiscal plans and performance, and the evaluation or provision of 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. By fostering transparency and promoting a 
culture of stability, they can raise the reputational and electoral costs of undesirable 
policies and broken commitments.635  
Their effectiveness comes from the provision of unbiased budgetary execution 
assessments as well as active participation in public debate, including in the 
monitoring of fiscal policy rules. Although the evidence is subject to the usual caveats 
regarding the existence of a causal link between institutions and policy outcomes, case 
studies broadly support that fiscal councils are only successful with guarantees of 
independence from politics. 
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In Europe, fiscal councils are often attached to parliament or an existing institution. In 
the case of Africa, they should be independent of parliament. Furthermore, they should 
focus on reporting and alerting the public on compliance/non-compliance. Such 
councils would complement the regional surveillance and, in time, could also build 
from their experience to assess budget projections.636 
In summary, there exists no clear-cut definition of how to go about establishing fiscal 
discipline, in economic literature. What can be ascertained, though, is that regional 
governance offers a conducive environment where revenues and expenditures may 
be balanced, in other words a higher degree of decentralisation of fiscal resources. 
The building up of fiscal discipline at the regional level, however, should not neglect 
the national levels. 
From this perspective, fiscal and monetary policies combined with political imperatives 
become the supporting policy tools for this long-term process.637 The idea that the 
existing rules are viewed as a constraint to sustainable growth must be built upon via 
the exploration of new modes of innovation. All of these proposals constitute elements 
of fiscal union, which can be defined, in very broad terms, as transfer of part of fiscal 
resources and competences in the area of fiscal policy and fiscal management from 
the national to supranational level. 
5.3.2 Revising economic cooperation 
A decade ago, the perceived key to African development was FDI. Regularly 
referenced reports such as the 2010 McKinney Global Institute report, The Investment 
Climate report638and the FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa report639 shaped the context 
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behind the rationale of Africa’s growth. However, FDI has never been an incredible 
figure, for in 2014, FDI reached US$60 billion which is the GDP of Luxembourg or 
similar to the amount of remittances Africans send home annually. Over the past few 
years FDI has reduced significantly; in 2017 it slumped to US$42 billion, a 21 per cent 
decline from 2016.640   Diminishing FDI has resulted in a new catchphrase for African 
development; “intra-Africa trade.” This term has essentially revised the “essence of 
economic cooperation” and thus needs to be reframed as the dominant agenda by all.   
Intra-African trade encompasses an enabling environment built on removing barriers 
and the construction of efficient infrastructure. It is perceived that intra-African trade 
will drive the industrialization of economies. It further entails the harmonization of 
macroeconomic policies and monetary policies in the attainment of macroeconomic 
stability, growth and development.641 The phrase corresponds with the long-standing 
and wide consensus on the need for greater economic connectedness.642 Trade 
emphasised in the AU Minimum Integration Programme (2009) and Agenda 2063 
(2015) calls for the free movement of goods and services which incorporate intra-
African trade.643 UN research predicts that single markets could boost intra-African 
trade by up to 52 per cent by 2022. 
As it stands, intra-African trade consists of a paltry 17 per cent of Africa’s exports. In 
comparison, in Europe, 70 per cent of exports are “intra” while higher figures for Asia 
(58 per cent), North America (48 per cent) and Latin America (20 per cent) exist.644 In 
regional groupings, intra-trade is low as well.  In the ECOWAS, which consists of 15 
states, a mere 10 per cent of formal trade is intra while informal trade accounts for 15 
                                                          
Saharan_Africa_A_longitudinal_perspective_on_location-specific_factors_2003-2010 (Accessed 29 
April 2019) 
640 UNCTAD, 2018, "UNCTAD World Investment Report 2018", Pres Release, Available at: 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/Public%20Information/Media%20Centre/PressConferences/Press-
Conferences-WIR.aspx (Accessed 26 April 2019) 
641 Huni, Munyaradzi, 2010, "SADC Single Currency by 2018 Doubtful”, Pan-African News Wire, 
October 03, 2010, Available at: http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2010/10/single-currency-by-2018-
doubtful.html (Accessed 24 April 2019) 
642 Vanheukelom, Jan and Byiers, Bruce, 2014, “Political drivers of Africa’s regional economic 
integration Lessons from the Maputo and North-South Corridors”, in Pisani, A. et al, 2014. “Monitoring 
regional integration.” (Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa - Yearbook 2013/2014), pp. 
164-200. Stellenbosch: TRALAC, p. 164-200 
643 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, "Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 
VII: Innovation, Competitiveness and Regional Integration", Available at: 
http://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23013 (Accessed 26 April 2019) p. 15 
644 Oramah, Benedict, 2018, "African Trade Report 2018", Afreximbank, Cairo, Egypt 
190 
 
per cent.645  In the AMU, which has a combined GDP of US$414bn, and whose 
members share a cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage, only 5 per cent is intra-
regional trade.646  
Statistics show growth and dips in intra-African exports over the past few years which 
fell steeply in absolute value from US$85 billion in 2014 to US$69 billion in 2015. Intra-
African trade as a share of the continent’s GDP also declined, from around 3.4 per 
cent to around 2.9 per cent over the period. As a share of Africa’s total imports, intra-
African imports stood at 14 per cent in 2015.   
Since 2016 there has been a revitalisation in intra-African trade. As a share of Africa’s 
total exports, intra-African exports stood at 18 per cent in 2016. Africa’s total 
merchandise trade gathered momentum, growing by 10.6 per cent in 2017, to 
US$907.63 billion, up from US$820.76 billion in 2016. The recovery and expansion of 
African trade was in line with global trade and reflected continued tightening of trade 
links between the Global South and Africa.  
The recovery and momentum are further illustrated in the African Regional Trade 
Index (2016) which tracks states’ progress in implementing their regional integration 
commitments to one another. The highest scores in regional integration were in trade 
integration with an average REC score of 0.540. The research showed that most intra-
African trade occurs between states that are members of the same regional groupings. 
For instance, the average country in the EAC sources 86 per cent of its African imports 
from other EAC countries. For ECOWAS, the comparable figure is 64 per cent, for 
SADC 90 per cent, and for COMESA 78 per cent. The index revealed that the lowest 
scores were in the financial and macroeconomic sector with an average score of 
0.381. This sector has been limited across all regional groupings, more especially in 
terms of ensuring the convertibility of currencies or coordination of macroeconomic 
policies.   
                                                          
645 Nagar, Dawn and Daniel Rosaline, 2014, “Regional Integration is the key to Africa’s prosperity”, 
Business Day, 15 December 2014 No. 320: Available at:  
http://www.ccr.org.za/index.php/media-release/in-the-media/newspaper-articles/item/1270-regional-




The emphasis on and revival of intra-African trade means that Africa is in its strongest 
position to integrate to get more of the global distribution of resources than any time 
during the last 30 years.647  When trade grows, markets open, economies diversify 
and become more cost-effective while business and consumers in the regions benefit.  
As countries align their interests in comprehensive agreements, gains can be 
maximised and shared equitably. A salient physical feature that provides a strong 
stimulus for enhanced intra-African trade is the number of landlocked states.  Of the 
55 states 16 are landlocked, relying to some degree on their coastal neighbours for 
extra-African trade using ports and shipping lines.  
This scenario has been manifested in the rise of the Free Trade Agreements. There 
are currently four functioning free trade areas recognised by the AU; COMESA, 
ECOWAS, EAC and SADC. Further intra-African trade is liberalised through 
mechanisms beyond the AU-recognised RECs, including the Pan-Arab free trade 
area, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  
From 2017-2018, 45 states signed the AfCFTA making it the largest free trade 
agreement since the creation of the WTO. AfCFTA seeks to create a single market for 
goods and services and by 2030 is expected to cover 1.7 billion people with an 
estimated US$6.7 trillion in cumulative consumer and business spending.  That is of 
course if all states sign up. According to Pheko, the AfCFTA is attempts to “reboot the 
Pan-Afrikan vision in the 21st century.648  The AfCFTA speaks to Africa’s unhappiness 
with many of the developing countries and their WTO processes. Research indicates 
that the AfCFTA will lead to dynamic growth and trade cohesions. The same studies 
insist there be will positive growth and trade benefits between African states and that 
these will result in industrialization, production, competitiveness and infrastructure 
connectivity.   
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The AfCFTA moves away from commodity-driven exports and will help to secure a 
more sustainable and inclusive trade that is less dependent on commodity price 
fluctuations. It also has the potential to address Africa’s prevalent non-tariff barriers, 
like border delay and burdensome customs procedures.649 Customs processing is 
hampered by lack of information on customs laws, complex regulations, excessive 
discretion in classifying and valuing goods, unnecessary inspection of cargo, and 
mandatory warehousing.650 This “grey-zone” helps to facilitate widespread 
corruption.651 The volume of trade is also reduced if the passage of goods through 
customs is onerous and time consuming.652 According to Anabel Gonzalez of the WB 
group on trade and global competitiveness, a truck serving supermarkets in southern 
Africa needs to carry as many as 1,600 documents including permits and license in 
order to cross borders.653 It was estimated that in 1995 (at a time when intra-regional 
trade was just starting to pick up) unnecessary delays of 60 hours per truck at the 
Beitbridge border post alone incurred costs of more than US$75 million a year. A 2015 
report from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) uncovered that 
the average delay was then 72 hours per day. If 400 trucks cross daily at a delayed 
cost of US$400 per day per truck equals US$175 million a year.654 The situation is no 
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better at ports.  At the Port of Maputo corruption has resulted in a 129 per cent increase 
in total port costs and in Durban, by 32 per cent.655  
These examples increase the price of the transported product. This is why Africa tends 
to source the most absurd items from abroad. For example, 40 per cent of Africa’s rice 
requirements come from the East at the cost of US$1.1 billion. At present only 5 per 
cent of Africa’s imported cereals come from other African countries.656 Zambia, which 
has over 80 per cent of the world’s copper reserves does not produce electronics, 
cables, or aircraft parts. In a joint report by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
the AfDB and the AU Commission entitled “Bringing the AfCFTA About”, the main 
challenge foreseen is matching ambition with implementation. Implementing the 
AfCFTA will involve tackling vested interests that benefit from the status quo and 
making difficult decisions over import taxes and trade openness. Issues such as trade 
policy, capacity, infrastructure, finance must be addressed early.    
To conclude, the true basis of economic cooperation which is often overlooked is the 
free movement of people.657 Informal cross-border trade is higher than formal trade. If 
the residents of San Francisco faced the same charges in crossing the Bay Bridge to 
Oakland as do residents crossing the Congo River between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, 
a similar distance, they would pay more than US$1,200 for a return trip. As a result, 
passenger traffic at this obvious focal point for cross-border exchanges between the 
two Congos is around five times smaller than that between East and West Berlin in 
1988 – which was of course well before the dismantling of the Berlin Wall!658 Free 
movement of people protocols have been signed but their application on the ground 
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has faced challenges in different regions. This concept can act as a game changer in 
terms of opening up opportunities for entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the idea of the 
“one-stop border post” could help expedite procedures at border crossings.   
5.3.3 Industrialisation policy 
Industrialisation refers to an economy’s transformation from producing primarily 
agricultural products to heavy manufacturing. Manufacturing itself is the 
transformation of materials into greater value. To a significant degree, the history of 
civilization is a human’s ability to make things; better tools allowed people to live better 
and better weapons allowed people to conquer.  Industrialisation is characterised by 
economic growth, more efficient division of labour, and the use of technological 
innovation to solve problems as opposed to dependency on conditions outside human 
control.659  
A consensus prevails that industrial sector development must be guided by credible 
industrial policy (IP). The AfDB has continuously reiterated that low manufacturing and 
processing capacity is a major limiting factor for trade among African countries. Intra-
African trade in manufacturing declined from 18 per cent in 2005 to about 15 per cent 
between 2010 and 2015. Most economic rationalisations stemming from Africa insist 
that the decisive move would be a shift from raw mineral resources to high-value semi-
processed and processed exports through a commodity-based industrialisation 
process by adding value to domestic products.660 
This consensus is influenced by the widespread failures of free market development 
strategies that have been pursued since post-independence when states applied it 
primarily in the form of state-led import substitution industrialisation strategies. This 
continued until the 1980s, when the SAPs came to dominate African development 
policy. SAPs discouraged industrial policy in favour of free market policies supported 
by the WB and the IMF. Governments were even asked to withdraw considerably from 
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the industrialisation process to enable market forces to shape development 
trajectories.661 Vickers notes that international trade rules enshrined in the WTO 
created a hostile environment for replicating the successful development trajectory of 
wealthy and industrialised states.662 Mkandawire referred to this as the “era of de-
industrialization.”663 Several African scholars have viewed SAPs as the cancer that 
continues to plague African development.664 SAPs have now been rebranded under 
the label Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) but their basis as Western 
prescriptions remains.   
The lack of industrialisation is not the sole responsibility of the West. African developed 
industrialisation has largely been in “plan-mode” style. This is where efforts focus on 
deciding how to allocate what was conceived as essentially complementary activities 
in order to exploit economies of scale rather than in creating an internally competitive 
market.665  Past industrialisation strategies failed for a number of reasons:  
• Strategies either overlooked the importance of comparative advantages or 
failed to give the right incentives to entrepreneurs. Trade protection led to an 
increase in the price of imports and import-substituting goods relative to world 
prices. Markets became fragmented, and competition from foreign firms 
decreased. Overvalued exchange rates reduced the competiveness of local 
entrepreneurs in domestic and export markets.666  
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• Poorly performing institutions exacerbated corruption, burdensome 
bureaucracy, lack of formal property rights and a weak rule of law. The 
mismanagement of resource rents in many natural resources-based countries 
weakened already fragile institutions. This led to a risky business environment 
that discouraged productive investment and entrepreneurship.  
• Africa’s attempts to industrialise also suffered from East Asian exports to 
African and international markets at prices defying global competition. 
Consumption rather than domestic investment led to rising imports, while 
growth remained low. 667 
• Small domestic markets of many African countries prevented economies of 
scale, particularly in the smaller or landlocked countries. Slow regional 
integration led to multiple constraints related to different standards, protection 
measures and other policies reducing the market size for industrialisation. 668 
Africa’s industrialisation strategies need to learn from past successes and failures.669 
Only a few African countries have succeeded in their industrialisation strategies. For 
example, Mauritius and Tunisia created special economic zones and attracted FDI for 
exporting industries. These strategies lifted Mauritius and Tunisia to middle-income 
countries’ status.  
A market-oriented industrial policy which balances state and private enterprise is 
required.670 Like intra-African trade, IP is experiencing a revival and centring itself as 
an essential component of development strategies. Governments in both the 
industrialised and developing world now see the strategic necessity of IP to sustain 
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growth through structural change.671 Regional groupings as well have begun to 
introduce IPs as an essential integration strategy.672 Several states in North and 
southern Africa are developing IP to upgrade their manufacturing sector  to compete 
globally in more technology-intensive, high-value added activities. Such initiatives 
correspond with AfCFTA policies of unlocking the manufacturing industry. 
Manufacturing represents approximately 10 per cent of total African GDP on average 
which falls well below other developing regions. A manufacturing economy would 
transform the continent from commodity-based exports to economic diversification and 
high-value exports (heterogeneity).    
African IP must be built around the concept of heterogeneity. Diversity results in 
sophistication of products and services. It also stimulates economic agents to 
specialise, creating rivalries, while simultaneously learning from each other. This 
ensures that manufactured products are competitively traded on the continent and 
abroad. The emphasis, however, should be on intercontinental trade where 
competitive edge and cost advantage can develop. The idea that only products that 
are exported to the West are of value should end. Less heterogeneity ups the chances 
of conflicts as interest groups may have similar preferences for particular rival goods.   
Overall, the success of any IP will depend on the fundamentals; sufficient support to 
and from the private sector, dialogue between the triple helix, highly competent 
technocrats, political and financial support, and fiscal discipline.673 In developing IP, 
four key points stand out. The first one is human capital, as a strong manufacturing 
sector needs skilled workers. Vocational skills, soft skills, self-employment and 
entrepreneurship must be emphasised in Higher Education curricula. Entrepreneurs 
create jobs, drive and shape innovation and contribute indirectly to national 
productivity. Entrepreneurship is thus a catalyst for economic growth. Entrepreneurs 
who introduce products or services that exhibit a range of innovativeness should be 
encouraged as they have the potential to significantly impact the employment growth 
and increase economic and social health. Likewise, the basics of taxation, accounting 
and banking should be implanted at secondary level. Transformation of the African 
                                                          





resource-based economy is thus more than the availability or abundance of physical 
and financial capital. In fact, wealth in the form of financial and physical capital without 
strong human and mental capital can be a burden, even a curse.674   
The second point is domestic demand, that is, governments must invest in small firms 
and provide tax incentives to unlock job creation.  Smaller firms in particular face more 
severe financial obstacles.675  Of African firms, 90 per cent consist of small, medium 
and micro enterprises (SMMEs), most which have little or no access to finance.676 In 
South Africa, SMMEs contribute over 40 per cent towards the total GDP and provide 
more than 50 per cent of the employment in the labour force. A firm that is constrained 
in accessing finance has a low probability of investing to grow in extent and depth of 
activity. Such a firm has a high probability of failure.677 
The third point is that of resources, namely, capital and materials. Manufacturing 
requires resources in large quantities. In articulating a new approach to economic 
development, the question of the nature, ownership, management, allocation, 
utilisation and distribution of resources should be emphasised. In addition, modalities 
should be put in place to monitor and evaluate the implementation of development 
strategies and programmes in order to make sure that the resources are effectively 
utilised.678 Very importantly, Africans must learn to create their own resources.  To 
think that German coal is in the hands of Germans or Texan oil in the hands of 
Americans is preposterous. For example, it is said that the USA gets more than half 
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of its economic growth from industries that barely existed a decade ago. Africans must 
stop relying on mineral wealth alone as the key to development.  
The fourth and final point refers to the fact that 70 per cent of Africa’s population is 
below the age of 30. This population of over 700 million youth represents a dynamic 
market for manufactured goods. IP must speak to the youth and innovation. 
In summary, Africa is the least industrialised continent today, whether this is measured 
by the share of industry in GDP or by industrial value added per capita. Consequently, 
any integration scheme which neglects industrialisation risks the chance of failing. A 
new approach is required that puts the spotlight squarely on efficient industrial policy 
that can boost industrial growth, export performance and competitiveness and which 
ensures the optimum allocation of resources. Industrial policy should provide special 
incentives for crowding in SMMEs as a major focus of policy and as a driver of 
employment creation. This presupposes African ownership of industry through 
creative public-private partnerships and carefully calibrated joint ventures between 
local and foreign companies. Equally importantly, African governments have to claim 
back the lost space created by the external pressures of market liberalisation which 
would allow governments to make the necessary and appropriate interventions to 
govern markets in support of industrialisation. An important element in this mix is the 
development of appropriate regional mechanisms to promote trade, development 
finance, and infrastructure. Liberalisation should focus internally to unlock intra-
regional trade complementarities.679 
5.3.4 Economic Governance and Financial Institutions  
Economic governance is the political and economic process that coordinates activities 
among economic actors. From an integration perspective, economic governance 
entails the transformation of institutions that govern economic activity by focusing on 
the emergence and rearrangement of several forms of governance.680   
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Economic governance is conducted via “financial institutions.” Financial institutions 
negotiate resolving the problems caused by market imperfections under the belief that 
market forces alone cannot induce economic growth.681 Financial institutions affect an 
economy’s ability to adjust to shocks from government policy, advances in technology, 
exchange rates, resource supply, and commodity prices. They are able to adjust and 
reallocate resources to avoid collapses in output and employment.682 Without them, 
the information and transaction costs of financial markets would be excessive.683 
Therefore, the improvement of financial infrastructure correlates with states’ 
engagements in intra-regional trade and their ability to reap the benefits of 
globalisation.   
Economies flourish when financing is secured and tailored to the needs of the market. 
The importance of finance in growth and economic development cannot be over-
emphasised following Schumpeter’s exposition on the role which finance plays in 
stimulating industrial activity and economic development. A fully-fledged financing 
infrastructure would include commercial banks and export credit agencies, private-
sector credit insurance agencies, and microfinance institutions targeted at the informal 
sector. Several authors have shown that financial infrastructure stimulates growth and 
development by providing firms with opportunities for new investment and growth 
plans.684,685,686 Hence, governments are increasingly turning to financial institutions 
for solutions. That said, the models for structuring financing under public-private 
partnerships remain limited. According to Adjasi, economic transformation and 
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development requires innovative ways of financing projects.687 What can be made of 
Africa’s response to economic governance and financial institutions? 
Two financial institutions stand out in this regard; the ECA and the AfDB. The ECA is 
tasked with creating growth-enhancing policies and making sure they are adopted with 
the urgency and resolve required for success. The ECA has supported the APRM and 
worked on individual country development plans. The primary purpose of the APRM 
is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political 
stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated subregional 
and continental integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of 
successful and best practice.688 As populations grow, more decentralised and more 
representative governance systems will be vital to ensure speedy results. The ECA 
proposes a push to design new and innovative financing mechanisms to unlock capital 
to finance Africa’s infrastructure, particularly energy, water, logistics, education, and 
health.689 
The AfDB has been described as Africa’s premier financial and development 
institution. Its objective is to support the economic development and social progress 
of states individually and collectively, by promoting investment of public and private 
capital in projects and programmes.690 In general, development banks fill the gaps left 
by private financial institutions, which are mostly geared towards commercial activities. 
The long-term  trends  emphasised  by  the  AfDB  are  consistent  with  those 
articulated by the AU in the Agenda 2063: The Future We Want for Africa.691 Agenda 
2063 is a “a global strategy to optimize use of Africa’s resources for the benefits of all 
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Africans.” The Agenda 2063 strategy calls for African governments to “speed-up” 
action to, among others, “transform, grow and industrialize [their] economies through 
beneficiation and value addition of natural resources.”  
Like the AU, the bank has been strongly influenced by those who provide the capital 
and set policies in the WB. 692 In 2003 Ndika claimed that the AfDB has not developed 
viable Africa-relevant alternatives and more often abides by WB prescriptions, 
remaining silent on the negative aspects of the privatisation of public services and 
assets.693 In 2013, Serem claimed that despite the AfDB‘s strengths, legitimacy, and 
specialised knowledge of African developmental issues, it is falling short of its potential 
to catalyse economic improvements.694 Currently, it still is possible for the AfDB to fill 
in the many gaps that have not been filled by private financial institutions.”695   
In summary, integration will depend on the dexterity of financial institutions. Economic 
transformation requires long-term finance for projects with long maturation periods, 
which ultimately translates into risks that other institutions are unwilling to undertake 
and would rather avoid.696 A revamping of how FIs work in order to overcome their 
ineffectiveness requires a combination of political factors, leadership, commitments, 
shared sovereignty and integration schemes. Critical to this agenda is the need to 
rethink and redesign modes of intervention in financing economic activities. This will 
require and result in the upskilling and training of expertise and human capital in 
financial institutions.697 Integration necessitates a financing mechanism that involves 
innovative ways of financing individuals, firms, infrastructure projects and the public 
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sector. African states, regional and international organisations, and the private sector, 
need experts to find ways of securing appropriate and predictable sources of 
finance.698 
5.4.5 Infrastructure  
Accelerating Africa’s infrastructural development is pivotal to connect African people, 
states and economies as well as to help drive social, cultural and economic 
development. The challenge of infrastructure is a “catch-22” dilemma; building 21st 
century infrastructure without a 20th century infrastructure base has proved a daunting 
task. For example, in 2008, Africa’s total infrastructure financing needs amounted to 
US$93 billion yet only US$45 billion was financed.699 Estimates for the period 2013-
2015 similarly show a gap of US$45 billion annually. Non-existent or poor 
infrastructure reduces national economic growth by 2 per cent annually and reduces 
productivity by 40 per cent. In the last two decades, Africa has lost a cumulative 25 
per cent in forgone growth because of poor infrastructure. 
The greatest impact that the lack of infrastructure has is on trade.  It is widely 
acknowledged that the demand for infrastructure in the sectors of water, electricity, 
industry and mining, transport networks, housing, and communications is paramount 
to trade.  According to the World Bank, poor infrastructure as a “cost” is 50 per cent 
higher than in East Asia.  Evaluation assessments on Africa’s infrastructure reveals 
that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 per cent of transport costs for coastal states 
and 60 per cent for landlocked ones.   
To counter the infrastructure challenge, the AU Commission’s Programme for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) based in the AfDB was created with the 
aim of developing a long-term strategic framework for regional and continental 
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infrastructure. Although it received its initial funding in 2010, PIDA has some 316 
projects across the continent in various stages of development. Its website lists an 
impressive matrix detailing project locations and projection completion percentages. 
Of the 316 projects in 2018, 57 are in operation. Key projects include the One Stop 
Border Post, Single African Air Transport Market and 5 per cent Agenda which seeks 
to guarantee institutional investment in Africa’s infrastructure projects. The last two 
projects seek to build a higher tax base and attract FDI by addressing poor risk 
perception.   
Critical to the infrastructure debate is new thinking around the concept.  Infrastructure 
is often viewed as well spread out phenomena. However, in the era of urbanisation, 
infrastructure may be pocketed in strategic positions. The success of Shenzhen 
exemplifies this. In 1980, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping started development of the 
fishing village of 30,000. By 2005, the population had grown to 11 million and likewise 
its economy grew from US$32.5 million in 1980 to US$41 billion in 2005.700 In 2018, 
Shenzhen had a GDP of US$332 billion. This is the idea behind South Africa’s 
Saldanha Bay Industrial Zone which will be a hub for serving the oil and gas sector.  
Overall, the emphasis on creating infrastructure may be summarised in the three 
points of “develop”, “implement” and “promote.” 
There is a need to develop and maintain sustainable, environmentally friendly and 
affordable infrastructure in both rural and urban areas with a focus on land, water and 
air transport and storage facilities, clean water and sanitation, energy, waste 
management and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).  In combating 
poverty and the various problems in the field of human development, economic growth 
cannot be durable unless accompanied by investments in human and social 
infrastructure, particularly in the areas of technical training, education and health.701 
This will be possible with the “implementation” of infrastructure projects that facilitate 
intra-African trade and regional and continental integration including, with the 
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assistance of the international community, enhancing research and technological 
development and the provision of adequate financial resources.  
Lastly, in promoting the delivery of infrastructure programmes, this will generate 
employment, strengthen skills and enterprise development as well as enhance 
technological capability. Africa is desperately lacking critical skills in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).  For the first 10-year plan of 
Agenda 2063, 2.4 million engineers and 1.3 million agricultural scientists are needed. 
Furthermore, producing highly skilled public sector economists and managers are 
needed. Many African countries have great development plans, yet the 
implementation skills are low, so we have been actively supporting countries, in 
particular, those affected by conflict or crisis to acquire the right skills and build or 
strengthen key institutions in order to steer such plans into action.702 
5.4.6 The Central Bank  
The success of a monetary union depends on the acumen of a central bank. The 
African Central Bank (ACB) when implemented will be one of the three financial 
institutions of the AU. The blueprints of the ACB project can be found in the 1991 Abuja 
Treaty and 2000 Lomé Constitutive Act. The First Ordinary Meeting of the Bureau of 
the African Central Bank Association (ACCB) was held in 2018.   
On its implementation, the ACB will become the banker of the Union Government, to 
Africa's private and public banking institutions and will regulate and supervise the 
African banking industry and guide monetary policy. Most importantly, it will set the 
official interest and exchange rates as well as issue the common currency. Sustainable 
growth depends on the financial strength and stability of a central bank.   
A supranational central bank essentially prohibits national states from devaluing their 
currency. As an independent institution, it can exert greater discipline over fiscal 
policies than one at national level. In general, central banks ease financing bottlenecks 
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by overcoming critical limitations in credit provision to catalyse expansion in trade 
financing. This includes providing loans directly to firms and underwriting political risks 
to support and encourage trade and outward investment.   
An ACB does not mean the end of the national central banks, but a reduction in their 
executive mandates. An ACB will enforce financial regulation for the financial sectors 
of member states. In a monetary union, the central bank is assumed to maximise a 
weighted average of the member countries’ objective functions (where weights reflect 
relative GDP), while each government chooses its own fiscal policy. In each case, 
governments satisfy a one-period budget constraint that forces spending to be 
financed either by taxes or by the country’s share of monetary financing. Such 
cooperation is referred to as “harmonisation” or simply put, the building up of habits of 
cooperation.  
Harmonisation of existing central banks can be brought about by developing integrated 
banking services and increasing interbank transactions. The South African First 
National Bank (FNB), is moving in this direction, allowing customers to make deposits 
via ATMs into Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibian bank accounts. Harmonisation is 
further strengthened by a single regulatory system, supervisory mechanism, and 
creating a single resolution mechanism and financing regime in the case of bank 
failures. In the SADC region, harmonisation of fiscal policy is on course.  All the central 
banks have committed themselves to cooperate within the regional integration agenda 
under the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP). In pursuit of regional integration, a 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was developed, specifying 
milestones, targets and action plans to be undertaken by member states to achieve 
macroeconomic convergence.   
Despite their essentiality to monetary unions, central banks have their flaws as seen 
in the Eurozone financial crises. As the European Central Bank (ECB) did not have 
compete mandate to interfere, several negative spill-overs occurred. This was largely 
because the ECB does not have a central supervision mandate or a central or federal 
deposit insurance mechanism. EMU members still have full control over their national 
structural policies and while agreeing to harmonise them, no actual agreements or 
treaties have been ratified. National institutional heterogeneity makes agreements 
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very difficult. Considerations for national regulatory action and separate international 
level cooperation merit consideration if social, cultural and economic diversity is 
seriously considered. But despite this, the financial crises did have the least effect on 
the Eurozone compared to other important currencies.   
In summary, the creation of a central bank should be seen as facilitating integration in 
other dimensions, rather than being the culmination of the process.  There is need for 
the ACB to be remodelled into new standards, not just a copy of what has acted as 
“Central Bank.” For example, the ACB could explore the notion of “innovative 
financing." To promote and enhance the efficiency of innovative financing 
mechanisms, there is a need to develop mechanisms to harness and invest 
remittances; reduce remittance transfer costs and enhance their effective 
management; and strengthen long-term, non-traditional financing mechanisms.  
The utmost value of a central bank is seen in the case of the Central African Franc 
zone (CFA) zone, where France has opposed an ACB for the reason that such will 
contest its domination. France’s elaborate system of post-colonial ties, dubbed “La 
Francafrique” are arrangements which ensure that African autocrats protect French 
interests in exchange for Paris allowing massive sums obtained through graft and 
kickbacks to pass through French banks, energy firms, and mining companies.703 
For an ACB to be successful, its autonomy must be unquestionable as this can affect 
credibility and hence the effectiveness of monetary policy and its impact on the 
economy.704 Learning from the Eurozone crises, there are three important factors for 
consideration. First, a common resolution mechanism to increase transparency and 
limit political interference is needed. Second, a set timeline for banks to spend in 
receivership should be introduced to limit the presence of “zombie banks.” Third and 
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finally, the creation of a deposit insurance scheme would reduce fiscal risk during 
episodes of banking crises by providing options to share the costs of the crisis 
resolutions. 
5.3.7 Merging of Institutions  
Institutions can become obsolete. The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) group, is an 
example of this, having been overrun by the BRICS block. To some, IBSA has been 
incorporated in BRICS, but that would involve a complete phase out of IBSA which 
has not happened. Another example is the SACU, one of the oldest customs unions 
in the world. Its relevance in the midst of SADC’s efforts at monetary union and even 
the new AfCFTA is confusing.  Such disorder is common at the international level.   
If African integration is to be realistic, then regional groupings will have to merge. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the “REC” experience has been characterised by 
numerous duplication efforts and inconsistent integration aims. It therefore would be 
beneficial to clamp down on the operations of a number of these bodies and focus on 
building real institutions.   
To understand why institutions should merge, it is important to understand why so 
many exist. The main reason for the proliferation of the “so-called RECs” is exemplified 
in the case of Kenya. Kenya’s membership of nine regional organisations reflects the 
different benefits that different regional communities can offer. COMESA allows Kenya 
protection from dumping which cannot be done under the EAC. This has been used 
to protect its sugar and wheat sectors. Kenya’s interests in the IGAD is related to 
peace and security in the Horn of Africa, rather than an economic agenda. Similarly, 
when Rwanda rejoined the ECCAS in 2013 after leaving in 2007 to focus on integration 
with the EAC, it was less about economic integration and more about politics, peace 
and security. 
Observers also point to the incentives created by external financing of regional 
organisations; most are far more reliant on external funding than on member 
contributions. Multiple membership multiplies the opportunities for projects and 
finance to be accessed, as well as personal benefits and patronage opportunities. 
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Therefore, REC proliferation is about financing. The question, however, is; would 
Kenya have to pay nine membership fees? Would not faulting on membership 
payments make the exercise fruitless? Does Kenya’s foreign minister have to attend 
nine annual summits as well?  Former  Reserve Bank Governor of South Africa, Tito 
Mboweni, mentioned the problem of “juniorisation” at the supranational level.705 This 
is when foreign ministers unable to attend important meetings send juniors with no 
authority as replacements.  In short, the amount of resources spent on these two 
examples would run into millions of dollars annually. Being a member of a regional 
organisation is one thing but progressing on regional commitments can be quite 
another. Implementing as well can be tricky. How would the foreign ministers go about 
convincing the national agenda to take on nine initiatives?  
The application of Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania to join ECOWAS is an opportunity 
for regional groupings to see the benefits of merging. These three states are 3/5th of 
the AMU.  As noted earlier in this chapter, only 5 per cent of AMU trade is intra-
regional. Similarly, in West Africa, ECOWAS intra-trade accounts for only 10 per cent 
(2016).  Nigeria, the largest economy, exported only 2.3 per cent and imported less 
than 0.5 per cent from other ECOWAS states in 2010.706 These statistics prove that 
both the AMU and ECOWAS have failed in terms of trading dynamics. If Tunisia’s, 
Morocco’s, and Mauritania’s applications to the ECOWAS are accepted this would 
create a larger trading partnership and the need for AMU would be pointless. It would 
also put pressure on Nigeria’s lackluster hegemony to speed up integration. 
Furthermore, it would tilt the balance of power in West Africa. France’s neocolonial 
Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) sub-group has always 
been a club within a club. The demise of UEMOA would be welcome.      
The process of rationalizing African regional institutions, however, is beginning to 
occur with mounting pressures from the EU for EPAs that reflect economic 
convergence more than political motives.    Moreover, the experiment of a potential 
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merger involving the EAC, SADC, and COMESA presents interesting vistas in Africa’s 
collective efforts to build more sound institutions anchored on economic logic. The 
contemplated merger has the potential of transforming the pattern of regionalism in 
Africa in the direction that architects of the Pan-Africanist continental economic 
community have always articulated.  
In summary, if complicated institutions can merge, then largely defunct institutions can 
follow suit. The idea of merging has been the basis of African unity. The evolutionary 
process from the OAU to the AU to the UGA is the core of integrating and developing 
the continent.   
5.4 More institutions or stronger institutions?  
The link between institutions and economic development is undeniable. According to 
Drzeniek-Hanouz, “if you want to predict the prosperity of a country, look at its 
institutions.” Together, with their legality and administrative aspects, institutions will 
determine what economists call “an enabling environment” for the creation of wealth.   
When they fail, trust is eroded and economies can become damaged.707 
Institutions spearhead growth and according to Nigeria’s former Finance Minister 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, “building institutions that can accelerate growth is the bedrock 
of making this continent work.”708 Institutions act strategically and faced with a 
favorable environment they may well take advantage of it.  But in a more hostile 
environment, they avoid putting forward proposals that stand little chance of success.  
According to World Bank Data, development policies and institutions improved in very 
few African states in 2016.709 
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A pertinent question to ask is whether new institutions need be set up to encourage 
and govern a common currency and tackle the underlying matters associated with 
such as were underlined in this chapter. That is, why should the AU stop coordinating 
other issues areas as opposed to a new organization being set up to focus on 
monetary integration? Critics argue that the African Monetary Fund, AfDB or even the 
African Central Bank would be better institutions to run the day-to-day affairs of the 
Pan-African currency.  
The problem with this line of thought is that and as already seen earlier in this chapter, 
there are just too many institutions which have created a spaghetti bowl effect on the 
continent. The tendency to join many institutions is driven by the past legacy in which 
heads of state sought to enhance their image and stature through forays in foreign 
affairs, including membership in regional institutions. When institutions proliferate, 
instead of getting things done, they hamper progress with overlapping mandates, 
jurisdictions and jostling for funds. Too many institutions result in "institutional 
variation" which refers to the big differences in economic and political dynamics that 
each institutions holds.710  This requires the time consuming “calibration” of intuitions’ 
agendas to make them achievable. Pheko aptly describes the RECs as “far from being 
unifying configurations on which to build a consolidated and integrated platform, the 
RECs have possibly fragmented the Pan-Afrikan process and vision further.”711 
A Pan-African currency requires executive decisions at the highest level. A Pan-
African currency and its attributes require actioning which will happen from the highest 
level possible. While the AMF, AfDB and ACB will be vital in play their part in insuring 
that the currency becomes tangible, they however should remain as independent 
guardians of the project making sure that the best possible currency is created. 
Thus what Africa needs is stronger institutions which reflect economic convergence 
more than political motives.  Given the institutional crises faced by African states, the 
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AU should serve as the guiding development path for the Pan-African currency serves 
as the guiding developmental path. 712  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter emphasised the importance of the AU transformation from a political 
organisation to an economic institution. The transformation to economic governance 
will have positive effects on integration and unity. This is important for the Pan-African 
agenda for two reasons.  First, without strong institutions, the post-colonial clientelist 
system will be perpetuated thereby undermining the rule of law, state capacity to 
generate revenue, enforce contracts, and ensure property rights. These inadequacies 
pose grave risks especially since domestic and foreign investors expect consistency 
in government policies and clarity in laws and regulations. Second, without African 
institutions, then the designs from the global imperialist will remain. These designs in 
the form of standardised models either in state building or policies have often 
disadvantaged Africa’s particular needs.713 Institutions such as the WB and others 
have generated their own form of discourse that constructed those places identified 
as needing development into particular kinds of objects of knowledge, in the process 
“depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, 
all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of 
expanding bureaucratic state power.”714 Eventually what is commonly marketed as a 
humanitarian attempt at overcoming poverty reveals its true meaning as “an important 
instrument of imperial and class-based control.”715 Development becomes an 
apparatus within the arsenal of global imperial designs and a technology of 
subjectivation within the “development industry.”  
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In theorising about the required transformation, it was concluded that “institutional 
innovation” offers a reprieve from the past. According to Muchie, instead of using the 
systems of innovation at a “meta-level and trying to draw or adapt it to addresses the 
dilemmas of underdevelopment, a new conceptual framework and approach can be 
proposed which refines the existing conceptual frames and theories.”716 The 
combination of “development economics” with the systems of innovation requires 
suggesting a contextualised and specific re-articulation of Africa’s economic 
dynamics. Taking Muchie’s advice, this chapter proposed seven factors to facilitate 
the transformation. The seven factors explored a combination of social, political, 
economic and environmental issues because “innovation is validated by not only 
markets and commerce.”717   
• Improving Fiscal Discipline  
• Economic Cooperation 
• Industrialization Policy 
• Economic Governance and Financial Institutions 
• Infrastructure Development 
• The Central Bank  
• Merging of Institutions  
These seven points provide an “innovation synergy” which redefine Africa’s ability to 
promote deeper integration. This re-conceptualisation can link clearly development 
economics and systems of innovation by advancing research that combines the 
challenges that each on its own may not fully capture. It enriches both development 
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economics and the economics of innovation that the innovation system approach has 
promoted. It does so by strengthening the focusing device for exploring and examining 
the problems of development and underdevelopment with a new refined synthesis that 
addresses real challenges.718 
The “innovation synergy” between the seven factors becomes clear in the following 
passage.  
Fiscal discipline would guide the correct policies and structural changes to enhance 
economic co-operation. Without fiscal discipline, a legacy summarized by fragmented 
regulations, high trade tariffs, complicated customs procedures, and disjointed 
infrastructure, will remain. Indeed, this is what the AfCFTA seeks to overcome, 
bringing economies closer and improving coherency, operational efficiency and 
opportunities for intra-African trade. This spurs higher domestic production and 
investment into different sectors of the economy.  Such heterogeneity of the economy 
enhances growth in exports across sectors and boosts value addition in production 
and exports, further deepening intra-industry trade across the continent. 
AfCFTA opens the door to industrialization as materials could be sourced more 
efficiently and cheaply allowing entrepreneurs to capitalize. Sustaining 
industrialization requires advances in economic governance. That is, improving 
financial institutions to build an investment friendly climate which would allow Africa to 
move away from Western dependencia and reposition itself in global markets. The 
development of financial institutions is key to creating larger and integrated markets 
that will increase productive capacities and foster sustainable economic growth and 
development.719   
This financial infrastructure will help support physical infrastructure especially in the 
fields of transport networks. State led initiatives to acquire funding along with Africa’s 
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credit market is crucial to reduce reliance on external sources of finance. Dwindling 
donor funds and donor fatigue have been amplified by the global economic downturn, 
and is the reason why Africa lacks $45 billion annually for infrastructure projects. 
Therefore, there must be increased efforts geared towards mobilizing local resources 
by increasing the national savings rate, expanding the revenue base, improving the 
efficiency of tax collection, and eradicating corruption. An ACB is required to support 
these efforts by targeted and focused interventions.720 Lastly, the move towards a 
higher degree of innovation must coincide with the both the demise of national systems 
as well as defunct regional systems. Therefor the merging of unions is mandatory for 
the future of integration. 
In summary, Muchie puts forward the idea that the “new Pan-Africanist” must: 
push forward the agenda of Pan-Africanism to the level of translation of the ideology 
and its claims into practical political and economic policies as well as the creation of 
living continental institutions capable of repositioning Africa within global governance 
structures as a voice to be heard rather than a problem to the solved.721  
This chapter has attempted to do this. Overall though, as seen, it is vital that the African 
Union lead the agenda. In the same way the EU is mostly thought about in this day 
and age as an economic system, the AU must follow suit.   What can then be learnt 
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Chapter 6: What Can Be Learnt from the Euro and the East?  
6.1 Introduction 
Analysis of a single African currency would be incomplete without exploring Europe’s 
own single currency journey. While this statement might be construed as the anti-
thesis of Pan-Africanism, lessons of continental integration cannot be ignored. The 
European sui generis prototype has given approximately half a billion people the 
freedom to live, study, and work anywhere in its bloc. Resultantly, the ease of doing 
business has vastly improved allowing the EU to become one of the biggest single 
markets in the world. As a whole, EU members account for a massive 16 per cent of 
world imports and exports. Today, the EU is the top trading partner for 80 states. By 
comparison the US is the top trading partner for a little over 20 states.  
Besides the overwhelming economic stats, the EU’s commitment to peace and 
reconciliation, democracy, and human rights have bolstered its role as the most 
sought-after model in governance.  Its dedication to creating law and abiding by it saw 
many former dictatorships and ailing economies make peaceful transitions to 
“developed states.”  Such advances in governance is one reason why the Nobel 
Committee awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the EU. For the single African 
currency project to accelerate, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel, but rather 
copy, discard, and build upon what has been already done, that is, innovate. 
How did Europe’s quest for a single currency begin and develop? What were the key 
issues which shaped the course? Answering these questions is key to understanding 
what should be expected by those tasked with Africa’s own common currency quest.     
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explores the origins and growth of 
European integration in the aftermath of World War II (WWII). This chronological 
history details the first speech calling for a union to the establishment of the Euro half 
a century later.  Therein, an understanding of why the Euro was set up in the hope of 
achieving European unity and the key factors contributing to this are explored. 
Furthermore, the decisive implementing agents of Euro success are uncovered.   
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The latter half of the chapter examines seven key issues, namely;  
• Supranational Governance 
• Trade Not Aid  
• The ERM  
• Convergence 
• Defeating Nationalism 
• Visa Free Passage  
• Lessons from the Euro Crises  
 
These issues were chosen on their relevance towards implementing the Euro as well 
as areas in which the AU strongly lacks. In fact, the seven issues speak to resolving 
the challenges seen in chapter 4 as well as building upon the proposed solutions seen 
in chapter 5.  Overall, the purpose of the chapter is to show how the Euro’s grand 
scheme panned out and what actors, policies and actions were fundamental to this. 
The chapter also looks to the East to see what lessons can be learnt from Asia’s 
integration experience.  Although Africa and Asia started off at similar economic levels 
and have a shared history of colonial oppression and subjugation, 60 years later the 
continents have occupied different spaces on the globe. This could be related to the 
different types of colonialism exploited as wa Thiong’o notes “the real aim of 
colonialism was to control the people’s wealth: what they produced, how they 
produced it, and how it was distributed.” Hence, this section touches upon the 
“entrepreneurship-industrialisation” nexus. In totality, however, what can the Asian 
paradigm of integration and development reveal to African policy planners?  
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Surprisingly the Asian success route of integration and development has similarities 
to what has been highlighted already in this study.   
6.2 Origins – From Idea to Currency  
The first call for a united Europe was proposed on 19 September 1946 by Sir Winston 
Churchill in a speech at Zurich University where he called for a "kind of United States 
of Europe." On 17 December 1946, the European Federalists Union was set in place 
in Paris and a year later the United Europe Movement was created and propagated 
for intergovernmental cooperation.   
In the aftermath of WWII, the key question was how to restore Europe’s economy.722 
The most industrialised European states, Germany, France and the UK, suffered from 
extreme inflation and trade was compressed into narrow bilateral channels. Imports of 
badly needed supplies of all kinds far exceeded the region’s ability to pay for them.723  
Fearing the “red tide” from the East, the US rolled out the Marshall Plan in 1948 to 
direct as well as capitalise on Western Europe’s recovery. In the first two years, US$50 
billion was dispersed.  By 1950, Western Europe preceded pre-war production by a 
significant margin.724 In the same year France, Italy, West Germany and the three 
Benelux countries (Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg) agreed to pool their coal and steel 
resources and in September, the European Union of Payments was established. A 
year later, these states signed the Treaty of Paris and formally established the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The treaty was a breakthrough in diplomatic 
relations as well as creating economic stability as former enemies were now sharing 
key conflict resources. Per capita incomes in several countries began to rise at a 
gratifying rate.725   
As the Cold War gained momentum, integration efforts accelerated on the pretext of 
defence. In 1952, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux, signed the European 
Defence Community Treaty in Paris. East vs West antagonisms and the desire of 
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nations to redress their economic situation in relation to the industrialised world 
provided states with strong ideological reasons to come together in defence of their 
common interests.726  This era saw the rise of military unions such as the Warsaw pact 
and NATO alliance. This cooperation in defence paved the way for economic co-
operation. With economic considerations taking precedence, the rationale for a 
stronger supranational institution emerged, primarily to define, legislate and administer 
the parameters of a union.   
This prosperity furnished a favourable environment for the discussion and later for the 
realisation of a concept that had attracted a wide following; a permanent strength of 
Western Europe through some form of economic and political union.727 In 1957, 
Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux, signed a treaty to form a customs union, 
with no tariffs on trade among members and with a single tariff against the outside 
world.728 The states agreed to eliminate barriers to the movement of labour and capital 
within the community and to cooperate closely in the determination of national 
monetary and fiscal policies.729  
In 1958, the Treaty of Rome established the EEC.730 Abolishing tariff and quota 
barriers to their mutual trade and creating a common external tariff, the EEC sought 
to achieve custom union status.731  Spurred by this action, seven other European 
nations, unwilling or unable to move so far or so fast, formed the European Free Trade 
Association.732 Its goal was limited to the elimination of tariffs among members on 
industrial products, but it did not provide for the establishment of a common tariff on 
trade with non-members.733   
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In 1961, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux voiced support to set up a political 
union and the UK and Denmark formally applied to join the EEC. As the decade 
progressed, the tangible benefits of integration became more apparent. Industry 
responded positively and trade across borders grew rapidly, more than doubling during 
the decade.734  
Taking heed of such development, the EEC in 1964 began to provide stimulus 
packages to states in order to increase productivity and for more lively competition. 
This resulted in an increase in the specialisation of industrial plans and expanding 
markets.735 Consequently, the speed of financial integration both in depth and in terms 
of market liquidity quickened. Market liquidity describes cash moving freely in the 
economy. Such prime conditions enhanced the resilience of the European financial 
system, offering greater scope for geographical risk diversification, promoting 
consumption and income risk sharing.736   
The integration benefits of the 1960s culminated in 1969 with political agreements on 
the next step of stronger integration; an economic and monetary union. The EMU 
which was to be laid out in three phases, provided the groundwork for a common 
currency. The prerequisite for the first stage was to obtain coherent and tangible 
integration which would eventually lead to a single market. The idea of a single market 
had a dynamic that endured throughout the decades as it reflected the growing reality 
of economic interdependence.737 As technologies developed, and with them 
economies of scale, more firms of all sizes needed access to large secure markets; 
and for the health of the economy and the benefit of the consumers, the market had 
to be big enough to provide scope for competition, even among the largest firms.738 
This could not be achieved without institutions and hence the 1970s saw the 
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institutionalisation of EU mandates; the European Council (1974), European Court of 
Auditors (1975), and the EU parliament (1979).   
With the focus on stronger integration of financial markets, a war was declared on 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs).739 The removal of NTBs, implicit in the Treaty of Rome, 
prohibited “all measures having equivalent effect” to import quotas.740 Bureaucratic 
red tape such as frontier formalities and discrimination in standards and regulations 
as well as anomalies in taxation were eradicated.741 The Commission published a 
White Paper in 1985, specifying some 300 measures to be enacted and proposed in 
eliminating NTBs.742    
The outcome of this “war” was the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) which set the EC 
an objective of establishing a single market by 1992.743 The rationale was that the 
private sector lacked the necessary flexibility to cope with economic shocks and only 
economic policy defined and developed by a supranational body would have the 
means to prevent or to counteract unsatisfactory conditions and to react to unexpected 
situations. By 1989, further supranational powers were given to the Commission to 
control mergers and acquisitions big enough to pose a threat to competition in the 
Community.744  
The SEA boosted economic regeneration of the Community by generating positive 
views of business prospects as well as stimulating trade, together with structural 
reform exemplified by a spate of cross-border mergers.745 To close the gap between 
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the less industrialised states, the European Regional Development Fund doubled 
structural funds to Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland in this period.746  
With the SEA enacted, the first stage of the EMU took off between July 1990 and 1993 
with the focus on completing the single market. This would be achieved by reducing 
disparities between member states’ economic policies, and removing obstacles to 
financial integration and intensifying monetary cooperation. This period was the 
beginning of the second phase of economic and monetary union to be known as 
“convergence” which culminated in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty specified the 
legal and institutional framework for EMU, the means and procedures for its 
achievements, and the commitments made by the EU member states in this respect. 
In November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty came into force following ratification by all 
EU members. In that same year, stage 2 of the EMU kicked off with the establishment 
of the European Monetary Institute (EMI).  
In June 1996, the European Central Bank (ECB) was formed, with 19 National Central 
Banks transferring portions of their sovereignty to the former. The ECB officially 
opened in 1998, replacing the EMI. This led to the start of stage 3 of economic and 
monetary union, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).  Of the 16 EU member states 
11 irrevocably fixed their conversion rates and the conduct of a single monetary policy 
was developed along with the introduction of the Euro for monetary and financial 
purposes. 
Throughout half a century of integration, the idea that a single currency could help 
facilitate trade gained prominence as each decade passed. This idea came together 
on 1 January 1999 with the launching of the Euro. Originally, the Euro was an 
overarching currency used for exchange between countries within the union, while 
citizens of each nation continued to use their own national currencies. The 11 member 
countries of the Eurozone irrevocably fixed their parities against the new currency and 
the ECB took responsibility for the determination of Eurozone monetary policy, 
including the setting of interest rates. The Euro replaced national currencies in 
transactions between financial institutions, including the banks through the European 
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Central Bank Clearing System (TARGET) and trades on the major Eurozone equity 
markets. In 2002 the Euro replaced national currencies in everyday circulation.747 
Although the Euro is still not universally adopted by all the EU members as the main 
currency, most of the holdouts peg their currency in some way against it.748 
Today, the EU consists of 28 members and is the world’s largest single market with a 
GDP of US$16.5 trillion according to the IMF, representing 22.8 per cent of the world’s 
total. The Euro is the world’s second most traded currency and in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crises of the world major currencies, the Euro was least affected. These 
achievements, however, were the result of 70 years of integration. From building 
institutes to giving up sovereignty, European integration saw immediate benefits at 
each stage of implementation.  
6.3 The Key Factors  
European integration started off as a political programme and ended in an economic 
union with a single currency.  For over half a century, European states worked in 
tandem to develop various institutional frameworks which encouraged their co-
operation on monetary and financial matters.  A certain feature of European integration 
was the emphasis that no single institution would be responsible for economic policy. 
749  The clear delineation of power and authority has resulted in a number of strong 
institutions where member states and institutions interact. Examples of institutions 
include:  
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• The EMU tasked with coordinating economic policymaking between states, 
fiscal policies and independent monetary policy.750 
• The European Council – sets the main policy orientations. 
• The Council of the EU (the 'Council') – coordinates EU economic policymaking 
and decides whether a member state may adopt the Euro. 
• The 'Eurogroup' – coordinates policies of common interest for the Eurozone 
member states. 
• The member states – set their national budgets within agreed limits for deficit 
and debt, and determine their own structural policies involving labour, pensions 
and capital markets. 
• The European Commission – monitors performance and compliance. 
• The ECB – sets monetary policy, with price stability as the primary objective 
and acts as central supervisor of financial institutions in the Eurozone. 
• The European Parliament − shares the job of formulating legislation with the 
Council, and subject’s economic governance to democratic scrutiny, in 
particular through the new Economic Dialogue. 
European integration is thus “instructive” and “gradual.” Taking lessons from European 
integration, what are the most relevant to African planners in their own integration/ 
common currency quest? In the following half of the chapter, seven issues are 
examined which enhanced European integration to an extent that a common currency 
was the only logical way forward. The seven issues have been chosen for their 
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recurring prominence in the literature, relevance concerning “innovation synergy” 
required in the previous chapter, overall efficiency and simplicity that they offer.   
In terms of methodology, the provided issues are analyzed from a lens of how it worked 
in Europe and then compared to the current state of development in Africa.  
6.3.1 Supranational Governance 
Supranationality is a legal concept referring to issues of superiority and direct 
applicability. Supranationality replaces the traditional view of sovereignty in favour of 
inter-independence. It is defined as the “development of authoritative institutions of 
governance, and network of policy-making activity above the nation-state.”751 
Institutions of governance obtain supranationality when states transfer significant parts 
of their constitutional legislative, executive and judicial powers to “a higher power.” 
Supranationality does not infer the demise of the state but rather a change in the way 
it operates, functions and cooperates.752  
The effective functioning of a supranational government is dependent on its ability to 
exercise sovereign powers in relation to common interests. Supranational institutes 
can balance the needs of all the member nations and are more insulated from political 
pressure to, for example, manipulate the currency to meet any one state’s needs.  
Illustratively, such a supranational government should be able to exercise jurisdiction 
nationally within member states over specific areas of common interests and also 
represent member states in the international arena.753 Supranationality makes “inter-
governmentalism” effective. Regarding international obligations and contracts, 
supranationality ensures effectiveness and uniform application of the law. It prevents 
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member states from enacting laws and other acts which would be incompatible with 
the obligations of the state within the Union.   
The EU is the world’s only supranational government. This implies that the EU can 
make binding decisions not only for the member states, but also for legal entities and 
individuals within the member states.754 Supranational regulations are directly 
applicable to all member states; that is, there is no need for national implementing 
measures to be taken in order for regulations to have binding force. 
To Fagbayibo the AU has yet to even reach levels of intergovernmentalism.755 Such 
is particularly manifest in the areas of foreign policy and judicial matters. The latter is 
seen in the poor progress in merging the Court of Justice of the AU with the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. African states have been reluctant to transfer 
sovereignty to the AU for two reasons. One, is that of incomplete nation building. For 
example, many states do not have complete territorial jurisdiction as many areas 
swabs of society are yet to be incorporated into the state. Boko Haram-controlled 
territories in Nigeria and Cameroon, northern parts of Uganda or even rural parts of 
South Africa are examples of the modern state’s inability to define what constitutes a 
state. Hence political power remains exclusive and over-centralised. A state cannot 
hand over sovereignty it does not have. Two, the sovereignty transfer is an exchange; 
states must get something in return. Economic growth and security, two appealing 
factors, are not guaranteed by the AU. Economic growth relies heavily on regional 
infrastructure and in terms of security, AU peace missions have scaled back in recent 
years due to funding constraints.  
For the AU to obtain sovereign attributes can be described as a complex task. It 
demands cautious and calculated steps, tactful negotiations, constant assurances and 
compromises, and the skillful management of national egos. Theorists have proposed 
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ways of negotiating this task but most are just deflections such as Abrahams’ “parallel 
structure of integration.”756 Without supranational powers the AU will not be able to 
fulfil its present functions.757 Supranationality can only be achieved by reduction of 
power on behalf of the state.  
In summary, EU institutions are vested with various competencies to ensure effective 
functioning, and the same would be required of the AU. Former AU Chair Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, has previously noted that “solidarity and supranational 
institutional instruments” rank high in what Africa can learn from Europe’s economic 
success.   
6.3.2 Trade in Euros   
The basis behind EU integration has always been trade. From the sharing of 
resources, to the elimination of tariffs and NTBs, to the institutionalisation of economic 
governance; trade and the Euro were two consecutive steps for closer integration. 
Data over a 30-year period underscores the extent and impact of this integration. For 
example, in 1999, intra-European trade stood at around 27 per cent of the GDP.  By 
2006 it jumped to 32 per cent.758 Today, approximately 70 per cent of European trade 
is intra.  Likewise, intra-Euro area FDI stocks have grown considerably, doubling from 
14 per cent of Euro area GDP in 1999 to around 28 per cent in 2006.759 In 2016, the 
value of export trade in goods within the EU ranged from over EUR700 billion for 
Germany (22.7 per cent of total intra-EU exports) to just over EUR1 billion for Cyprus 
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and Malta (0.04 per cent of total intra-EU exports).760 In 2017, the GDP of the Euro 
area was worth US$12,589.50 billion which represents 20.31 per cent of the world 
economy.  Four fifths of total exports of goods within the EU in 2017 were 
manufactured products.761 
As a currency to rival the Dollar and Yen, the strength of the Euro has contributed to 
intense growth and trade integration.762,763,764,765. It has contributed to the rise of 
cross-border trade, increased price and cost transparency and the absence of 
exchange rate risks. By eliminating exchange rate volatility and providing complete 
price transparency, the Euro has greatly enhanced the forces of cross-border activity. 
Evidence from pricing regressions suggests that the Euro did have a pro-competitive 
effect on exporters’ prices, for both Eurozone and non-Eurozone-based exporters.766 
The Euro further induced firms to export a wider range of their products to the 
Eurozone.767 Thus, it was not merely that trade in existing products was stimulated; 
the pro-trade effect also came from newly traded goods.768 At the same time, the 
increase in trade with the rest of the world has recently been even greater than the 
increase in intra-Eurozone trade, showing that the Eurozone is very open.769  
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Besides solid economic growth the Euro has brought about monetary stability with low 
inflation and convergence of long-term interest rates to low levels prevailing in the 
countries that had the highest monetary policy credibility before the Euro was 
introduced.770 This was not an obvious outcome. In fact, given differences across 
countries and the complexity of the task at hand, many commentators doubted 
whether the Eurozone area could ever achieve the high degree of monetary stability 
and credibility of some of its legacy currencies. Moreover, despite significant economic 
shocks over the years, due for instance to oil price and financial market developments, 
inflation and inflation expectations have remained closely anchored to price stability, 
as defined by the ECB.771 
There are two lessons here.  First, the case of Malta and Cyprus stand out.  Despite 
their size, lack of resources and small populations, they jointly exported US$1.3 billion 
worth of products to the Eurozone. This is in line with data which shows that small and 
open economies who adopted the Euro are provided stronger protection against 
international financial disturbances. With exchange rate stability, the Euro has enabled 
economies of scale thereby providing the conditions for a more efficient allocation of 
resources.772  This example could help alleviate the fears of smaller African states who 
fear being overrun by monetary union dynamics. Second, is the point that four-fifths of 
intra-Eurozone trade were manufactured products. This is unfavourable evidence 
against African states who, although rich in raw materials, manufacture very little. For 
example, in 2005, total sub-Saharan African manufacturing accounted for US$48 
billion with South Africa accounting for US$27 billion. In comparison, Sweden in 2005 
manufactured US$60 billion worth of goods.773 Agriculture which provides 40 per cent 
of Africa’s GDP and provides livelihood for 60 per cent of the population is a possible 
way of expanding the manufacturing sector.    
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6.3.3 The Exchange Rate Mechanism   
A monetary union requires that money in all its forms may move freely between 
member states and that changes of exchange rates between them are abolished.774 
The ERM was a system introduced by the EEC in 1979, as part of the European 
Monetary System (EMS).  Its aim was to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve 
monetary stability in preparation for EMU and the introduction of the Euro. The ERM 
required central banks to intervene in the currency markets to keep fluctuations of their 
mutual exchange rates within narrow bands.775 
After the adoption of the Euro, policy changed to linking currencies of EU countries 
outside the Eurozone to the Euro (having the common currency as a central point). 
The goal was to improve the stability of those currencies, as well as to gain an 
evaluation mechanism for potential Eurozone members. This mechanism is known as 
ERM II which superseded the ERM.776  
The ERM II ensures that exchange rate fluctuations between the Euro and other EU 
currencies do not disrupt economic stability within the single market, and to help non-
Eurozone countries prepare themselves for participation in the Eurozone. ERM II 
provides the framework to manage the exchange rates between EU currencies, and 
ensures stability. ERM II mimics conditions thereby helping non-Eurozone member 
states to prepare for them.777 
Participation in ERM II is voluntary, although, as one of the convergence criteria for 
entry to the Eurozone, a country must participate in the mechanism without instability 
for at least two years before it can qualify to adopt the Euro. Ultimately, the point of 
the ERM is that states no longer have recourse to currency appreciation or 
depreciation to manage their economies or respond to economic shocks. In particular, 
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they should not devalue their central rate on their own initiative nor devalue their 
currency to slow imports and encourage exports. Instead, they must use budgetary 
and structural policies to manage their economies prudently. It also provides an 
indication of the appropriate conversion rate that should be applied when the member 
state qualifies and its currency is irrevocably fixed. 
The ERM then is the pinnacle of supranational governance. In relation to Africa, the 
research is almost non-existent on how an ERM will be set up and implemented. Just 
to elaborate, the rationality for the ERM was set up 22 years before the first Euro was 
minted. Theoretically then, the single African currency is in its “minus x years” stage. 
Given what the EU has achieved through the ERM, the blueprint exists and should be 
explored. A further lesson is that the ERM is not inclusive and should not be forced 
upon states. An ERM is for strong economies only and it creates a precedent for the 
weak to adjust their economy.   
6.3.4 Convergence 
Convergence refers to states narrowing their international differences in the 
development of certain economic variables and is a requirement for a system of stable 
exchange rates.778 It is the reduction of disparities in economic indicators, that is, 
inflation, growth levels, and per capita income and is a key target in the creation of a 
currency union. Convergence seeks to make states react similarly in the face of 
shocks in order to make macroeconomic policy manageable.  
The convergence process outlined in the Copenhagen criteria determines the entry 
requirements for new members to the currency union. The criteria ensure that 
participation of the new member is beneficial to the member and the union. The 
requirements include a stable democracy, a functioning market economy capable of 
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competition within the EU, and accepting EU law. Macroeconomic benchmarks such 
as price stability, budget deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio are further criteria779   
In a monetary union, inflation rates must be similar, and hence it is prudent to insist 
that states demonstrate the willingness and ability to converge in this respect. This 
demonstration involves getting inflation rates into line and doing so without strain.780 
The strain would show up in indices of competitiveness, in unemployment and in 
external balance. Lack of strain implies some conditions on underlying economic 
variables, such as fiscal and external balances. Diversities in economic structures may 
well engender differing responses to external shocks, and differential experience of 
common events may make it politically impossible to hold a union together.781 Some 
differences in structure, such as those stemming from natural resources or from 
culture may be immutable.782 The UK, Norway and the Netherlands are energy 
producers and hence their response to an oil price shock will differ from the rest of the 
community. Trading patterns, for example, particularly Britain’s links with the US, 
inevitably depends on culture.783  Some differences between countries will, however, 
always exist and are a natural feature in all currency areas, reflecting regional 
adjustments to changes in demand and supply. As long as markets are free to adjust 
to the changing economic conditions, country differentials should largely be of a 
transitory nature.  
The convergence process is accompanied by several reports made by the EU 
Commission and ECB which examine progress relating to inflation, public finances, 
exchange rate and long-term interest rate developments, as well as legal 
convergence. These findings are presented to the EU Council, which takes the final 
decision on which states fulfil the conditions for adopting the Euro. The Council also 
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decides the final conversion rate to the Euro. It is then that the technical preparations 
for Euro adoption can start.  
Convergence thus is a filter which makes a state “union ready.” Convergence, 
however, is not a strictly necessary condition for a country’s participation in a single 
currency; efforts at convergence can only produce limited results. The task of 
modifying structures of the real sector economy requires time. If a rich region such as 
the EU has struggled to cope with convergence pressures, the likelihood for the poorer 
and less well-governed places hoping to adopt a common currency is quite difficult.784 
Countries must therefore learn to live with the single currency while accepting a 
reasonable level of divergence in their economies. Solidarity among member states 
which depend on interstate transfers, can mitigate, if not totally eliminate the impacts 
of such divergence. Overall, an advanced level of macroeconomic integration and 
factor mobility are the most important convergence techniques. 
As the EU example shows, convergence is not an end-game. In light of the Euro crises, 
greater convergence between member states will be needed to restore EU-wide 
competitive forces and allow firms to truly compete within the single market. Overall, 
businesses and investors’ trust in EU economic potential would be restored and would 
again create the conditions for investment and growth.785 
African states would need to be cautious on how they go about converging. There is 
the possibility that adopting stringent convergence criteria may possibly limit policy 
space to address current and emerging development challenges.786 Timing and 
sustainability of convergence are two further considerations. Only when a country is 
certain of being able to maintain simultaneously an environment of low inflation and a 
stable exchange rate can it be confident of functioning smoothly within a Monetary 
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Union. Divergences may arise from radically different economic structures or from 
differences in economic policies; hence, it is important that states commit to agendas. 
6.3.5 Defeating Nationalism 
Nationalism, influentially expressed in the thinking of Jean-Jacques Rousseau “raises 
the emotional temperature of national and international politics.”787 From a classical 
functionalist perspective, nationalist tendencies and regard for sovereignty threaten 
peace and security in the international system.788 The outcome of European 
nationalism was genocide in between two World Wars. Unsurprisingly Europe has 
since cautiously meddled with the subject.  
However, coinciding with the rise of US President Donald Trump on the other side of 
the Atlantic, far-right movements have gained momentum in France, Holland, Eastern 
Europe and the UK. In Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, the far-right has even been 
elected to top government portfolios. In other states, the far-right has even gained a 
political foothold strong enough to force centrist leaders to adapt.789 Nationalism is not 
on the rise in Europe alone. In 2018, Brazil, who pioneered socialist programmes 
which have been copied worldwide, elected a “right-winger” to power. European 
nationalism is a result of “Euroscepticism.” Euroscepticism is the general term used to 
describe various forms of criticism of the EU and opposition to continued European 
integration. One of the main complaints of the Eurosceptic is that integration weakens 
the nation state and undermines national identity.   
Brexit, to an extent is the culmination of European nationalism. It speaks to the 
backlash against the political establishment in the wake of the financial crises and 
more especially the immigrant crises caused by Western aggression. The wave of 
discontent also taps into long-standing fears about globalisation and a dilution of 
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national identity.790  With so much focus on the economic aspects of the integration, 
the sociological aspects of nationality have been ignored; contributing to a weak 
European identity and allowing nationalism to simmer.791 Despite all of the progress 
in the EU, states have not yet fully internalised the values and benefits of full economic 
and political integration. This is seen in the lack of consensus around a unified 
European constitution.792 It is also apparent in Turkey’s change in attitude towards EU 
membership. For almost two decades, Turkey’s entire foreign policy was centred 
around joining the Eurozone. Today, the 2016 attempted coup and killing of journalist 
Jamal Kashoggi suggest a lack of interest in joining the EU.  
In any free trade zone there are winners and losers. Less developed regions will suffer 
from unemployment and other losses because of the increased competition. This will 
create resentment and renewed nationalism on the part of the losers. If unemployment 
and business failures occur on a large scale in any one state, then undoubtedly 
nationalism, prejudice and bigotry will increase.793 According to Halliday, the outcome 
of nationalism need not be military conflict, but can serve as an obstacle to co-
operation on international issues, be this trade, migration, or the environment.794 
Abrahams refers to African nationalism as “cobwebs that still linger.” As a result, 
persuading leaders to abandon nationalism in favour of a Pan-African identity has 
proven difficult.795 Even a state as modern as South Africa with a deeply entrenched 
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anti-African history has been unable to create a Pan-African identity. (The dismissal 
of the African renaissance founder Thabo Mbeki in favour of the nationalist Zuma in 
2008 speaks to this). Soyinka has attributed the lack of African identity on the “crises 
of African emergence into modernity.”796 
Creating a Pan-African identity requires the forging of a common understanding 
around the state of being. If not then the roadmap towards unity and integration will 
simply continue to be conducted  blindly or on the basis of symbolic gestures.797  Pan-
Africanism can no longer be constructed alongside or on the foundation of the nation 
state.798  Nationalism for the past two centuries has been the moral, normative, basis 
for the system of states. There is a definite need for change which places nationalism 
as a means of negotiating a favourable position in the international market.799 This is 
not to say that nationalism should be shunned. As Nyerere noted “African Nationalism 
is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan 
African.”800 
The main lesson for African policy planners is that replacement of one identity with 
another one does not mean the disappearance of the previous identity, but only an 
upgrade and reorganisation of the existing hierarchical identity characteristics.801  As 
the case of Europe has shown, defeating nationalistic agendas is not an easy task.   
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6.3.6 Visa Free Passage  
Visa free passage provides access to cheaper and wider variety markets and services 
which can lower trade and operating costs. It can eliminate wasteful bureaucracy, 
time-consuming procedures and expensive visa application costs. The frequent 
requirement to apply in person at offices that can be hundreds or even thousands of 
miles from where the potential traveler lives, acts as a severe deterrent to travel to 
some states. The importance of visa free travel is highlighted in joint research by the 
United Welfare Organization (UNWO) and the World Travel and Tourism Council 
(WTTC) which suggested that improving visa processes could generate an extra 
US$206 billion in tourism receipts in a span of two years in the G20 economies alone. 
European visa free travel was enacted by the Schengen Agreement which proposed 
measures to gradually abolish border checks at the signatories' common borders. This 
included reduced speed vehicle checks which allowed vehicles to cross borders 
without stopping, allowing residents in border areas freedom to cross borders away 
from fixed checkpoints, and the harmonisation of visa policies. In 1990, the Agreement 
was supplemented by the Schengen Convention which proposed the complete 
abolition of systematic internal border controls and a common visa policy. Today, the 
Schengen Area operates very much like a single state for international travel purposes 
with external border controls for travelers entering and exiting the area, and common 
visas, but with no internal border controls. It consists of 28 states covering a population 
of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometers.  
Consequently, cross-border labour migration has increased and average 
unemployment has decreased by 6 per cent in Europe. Since 2013, the Eurozone 
unemployment rate has been on a steady decrease.802  Between 2004 and 2009, the 
free movement from new member states increased the GDP of the old EU states by 
almost one per cent.  About 1.7 million people commute to work across a European 
border each day, and in some regions these people constitute up to a third of the 
workforce. In Luxembourg for example, 70 per cent of the workforce is composed of 
immigrants or cross-border workers. According to the IMF, free movement has 
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resulted in better institutions and better economic management in Eastern Europe. In 
2014, around 14 million EU citizens resided in a different country.803     
Despite research which shows that restricting free movement may weaken the overall 
economic power and influence of a state, only 13 of 54 AU states offer liberal access 
(visa free or visa on arrival) to all Africans.804 Africans require visas to travel to 
approximately 55 per cent of other African states.  In contrast, Americans can travel to 
20 African states without visas or with visas on arrival.805 Africa’s richest man, Aliko 
Dangote said he needs 38 visas to travel within the continent.806  Bureaucratic 
idiosyncrasies and the lack of policy regarding work permits or double taxation issues 
have stultified integration.807 Burkina Faso, for example, charges US$200 for a visa 
on arrival. South Africa represents double standards allowing only 15 African states 
visa free entry while 28 different European passports can enter freely.808 Chad’s visa 
application form is in French only, while Nigeria’s involves three separate payments; 
one to the Nigerian government, one to the High Commission and one to the Visa 
centre.809 Intra-African travel is fraught with suspicion. 
With the initiative of the AU, the continent is slowly shifting towards ending restrictive 
practices. In 2016, Africans did not need visas to travel to 22 per cent of other African 
countries, compared to 20 per cent in 2015.810 A 2016 AfDB report highlighting the 
economic benefits of visa openness cited the Seychelles as an example, whose 
tourism grew annually by 7 per cent between 2009 and 2014 after eliminating visas 
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for Africans. The Seychelles is becoming a high-income country with thriving real 
estate, aviation and service industries.811 Rwanda’s visa free travel for Africans has 
seen an increase of 22 per cent in visitors since 2013.812 Rwanda’s President, Paul 
Kagame elaborating on his state’s visa free travel mentioned that “when we opened 
our borders, removed restrictions on work permits and visas, everyone benefited. We 
have benefited.” 
Recently, Namibia, Mauritius, Ghana, Benin and Kenya have relaxed travel 
restrictions. In July 2016, Ghana began to allow AU member states’ citizens visas on 
arrival with the aim of stimulating air travel, trade, investment and tourism. In 2018, the 
AU adopted a Free Movement Protocol that was signed by 32 states with only one 
(Rwanda) ratifying it.  For the programme to come into force 15 states will have to sign 
the agreement.813  
To help facilitate the visa free process the AfDB has put forward key policy 
recommendations such as: 
• Visa on arrival for Africans (such as in the policies of Mauritius and the newly 
announced policy by Ghana) 
• Visa free regional blocks (such as the ECOWAS free movement of person’s 
protocol) 
• Regional bloc visas (such as the East African Tourist Visa of Kenya, Rwanda 
and Uganda) 
                                                          
811 Gwatiwa, Tshepo T. and Sam, Michael N., 2018, “How the Free movement of people could benefit 
Africa”, 14 March 2018, TheConversation.com, Available at: https://theconversation.com/how-the-free-
movement-of-people-could-benefit-africa-92057 (Accessed 29 April 2019) 
812 Dimmer, Kerry, 2017, "A visa-free Africa still facing hurdles", Africa Renewal Online, United Nations, 
Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2017-march-2018/visa-free-africa-
still-facing-hurdles (Accessed 24 April 2019) 
813 Author Unknown, 2018, “AU adopts new protocol on Free movement of people across Africa”, South 
African Broadcasting (SABC), 23 July 2018, Available at: www.sabcenews.com/sabcnews/au-adopts-
new-protocol-on-free-movement-of-people-across-Africa/ (Accessed 29 July 2018)  
240 
 
• Multiyear visas after assessing the applicant (such as with the US and UK 10-
year visitors’ visas) 
• Promoting reciprocity (for citizens of countries that relaxed visa requirements 
to benefit from similar requirements when visiting other African countries). 
In summary, opening borders, aligning education systems, pooling visa regimes, and 
removing work permit requirements for AU citizens, must be part of an overall strategy 
to increase intra-Africa trade and regional integration. According to Sindiso Ngwenya, 
the Secretary General of COMESA:  
“Whereas many countries have signed and ratified FTA for free movement of goods, 
they have not done the same for the movement of business people who are the owners 
of these goods! Immigration Departments exist to facilitate movement of persons and 
not to control them.” 
The diaspora must be included here. With the exception of Ghana, no African country 
has a policy of relationships with African-Americans. The Ghanaian government has 
made it clear that African-Americans are free to return to Ghana and carry Ghanaian 
passports.  But beyond this cosmetic relationship, the Ghanaian government has not 
much in the way of policy to encourage business relationships between African 
Americans and Ghana.814  
Lastly, freedom of movement encourages tolerance and understanding among people 
of different cultures. This can help to break down harmful stereotypes and prejudices 
and help to build solidarity between people and governments of different countries.   
6.3.7 Lessons from the Euro Crises  
The European debt crises (aka Eurozone crises or European sovereign debt crises) 
was a reaction to the 2008 global financial crises. It was a combination of intricate 
factors, namely, household and government debt levels, trade imbalances, structural 
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system problems, and monetary policy inflexibility.815,816  The crises slowed down 
European integration resulting in a decrease in funding sources and cross-border 
activity.817 The effects on the labour market were particularly severe with Greece and 
Spain reaching 27 per cent unemployment. Not only did subdued economic growth 
affect the entire Eurozone but the entire EU. In hindsight, the structure of the Eurozone 
as a currency union without fiscal union contributed to the crises and limited the ability 
of supranational governance to respond. The crises showed that political 
consternations will always override economic rationalities. 
The EU’s ability to bounce back with a remarkable recovery, returning to the pace of 
progress before 2008; to an extent vindicates itself. At the onset of the crises, the EU 
mobilised billions in bailouts towards revamping states most affected.818 In 2018 the 
Eurozone bailout was declared over with all Eurozone economies growing.819 Some, 
such as Ireland, have staged strong recoveries with a GDP 50 per cent above its pre-
crisis level. 
Since the EU was built around economic imperatives, they were able to deal with the 
crises effectively. Instead of political thumb-sucking, EU institutions reacted with their 
mandates. For example, a key response was from the ECB. It created a new 
programme, called “Outright monetary transactions”, to buy the government debts of 
countries with bailout programmes and under severe pressure in the markets. The aim 
was to bring down their borrowing costs to sustainable levels.  Merely proposing to do 
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it did the trick. The ECB did not spend a single Euro under this programme. It did, 
however, subsequently start a programme of buying the debts of all Eurozone 
countries troubled or not, known as quantitative easing. The objective was to tackle 
the economic weakness and too-low inflation across the Eurozone, but it did help the 
government finances in the bailout countries.820 Furthermore, in the aftermath, 
initiatives to redesign important elements of the fiscal union were undertaken.  
• The banking union project sought to create a system of regulation to be 
integrated under the ECB. The project seeks to reduce the need for bank 
bailouts with new rules that require creditors to take losses.821  
• The Pan-European deposit insurance scheme will ensure that people do not 
lose their savings if the bank fails. Individual countries in the Eurozone have 
such arrangements but the worry is they can be overwhelmed if a crisis is 
widespread enough. Some sort of Eurozone-wide scheme could address that. 
The European Commission developed a proposal in 2015 but no agreement 
has been reached.822 
Overall, the fiscal discipline mechanisms must be overhauled as the Eurozone needs 
more integration of the government finances/fiscal policy to cope with economic 
shocks that affect specific countries. The clash between states’ dependent policies but 
independent fiscal policies have come to summarise the Euro crises. At the core of 
the EU’s problems is the fact that it imposes a single currency on member countries 
while allowing countries to maintain fiscal control.  As long as regulatory/supervisory 
power and fiscal responsibility for crisis resolution remain in national hands, the 
incomplete single market will face a continuous danger of fragmentation and 
renationalisation, especially in a time of financial distress.823   According to Dabrowski, 
fiscal policy would work better at supranational level than the national level due to 
collective action problems, the risk of “free-riding”, and cross- border “leakages” of 
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demand.824 This, however, would require building a much bigger fiscal capacity at the 
European level (probably in the range of at least of 10 per cent of the Union’s GDP), 
including far-reaching tax schemes, social transfers and other expenditure 
responsibilities.  
Criticisms and challenges notwithstanding, the EU is unlikely to disappear.825 Indeed 
the EU has not only come to represent the entire Europe but established strong 
relations with other regions of the world.826 For example, the EU’s 28 members are 
Africa’s principal trading partner, main foreign investor, chief source of remittances 
and largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance.827 
In summary, policies will fail, transform and evolve, crises will come and go. A greater 
push to seek coordinated measures at the international level rather than at national 
level, is a step in the right direction of supranational governance.828  The structure of 
the Eurozone as a monetary union without fiscal union contributed to the crisis and 
harmed the ability of European leaders to respond. The Eurozone example shows that 
the establishment of a monetary union is facilitated when there is prior monetary 
coordination and macroeconomic convergence.829 
The Eurozone model should motivate African RECs to fulfil minimum prerequisite 
conditions. On one hand the Eurozone model has demonstrated that the adopting of 
a common currency has fostered economic integration and provided many European 
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states with the benefits of low inflation and to some degree financial stability.  On the 
other hand, however, the Eurozone crisis has also threatened to disorganise the 
European monetary integration model that Africa sought to imitate. The Eurozone 
crisis is a vital case study for African RECs, in particular for the EAC and West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as both regional blocs progressively move to unveil a 
monetary union.830 
6.4 Views from the East  
In the era of independence, the continents of Asia and Africa shared similar economic 
levels as well as characteristics such as high levels of corruption and neo-
patrimonialism, a notorious lack of good governance and personalistic power 
relationships. 831,832,833, 834 Certain features of African policies which were often said 
to explain economic stagnation were also present in Asia at the time.  According to 
Henley, in 1960, South-East Asians were on average much poorer than Africans; but 
by 1980 Asia had caught up, and by 2010 they were 2.5 times richer.835   Terms like 
“East Asian miracles”, “Asian tiger” and “emerging markets” are now synonymous with 
Asia. Today, Asia has even disappeared from the donor’s view. 836  
Such Asian success has led to Ethiopia and Kenya, for example, looking East and in 
the process borrowing heavily from Malaysia’s and Singapore’s transformation plans.  
In fact, in 2011, all four foreign advisers on Kenya's key national planning body 
originated from East Asia. In Ethiopia, government propaganda uses examples of 
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agricultural development and state intervention from Taiwan, South Korea and 
China.837 Henley provides three points to South-East Asia’s road to development; 
sound macroeconomic management, economic freedom and pro-poor or poor rural 
public spending.838   Likewise Berendsen et al provide three points; namely, “political 
institutions and ethics”, “agricultural policies” and a “political commitment to shared 
growth.” 839 Such simple understanding of development speaks to the idea that Africa 
views Asia’s development experience as replicable in comparison to those of the West 
which seems slow, remote and academic.840 
How did these two continents end up in different situations 60 years later?  How has 
Asia come to represent the position of neocolonialist?  This short analysis examines 
three points of interest; theoretical underpinnings, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), and 
entrepreneurship, manufacturing and industrialisation. Each point provides a certain 
lesson for Africa’s common currency project. Incidentally, the three points also loosely 
characterise the main points discovered in this research.  
6.4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
From a theoretical perspective, Asia has confronted head-on the “global imperial 
designs” which is shorthand for how the world is described, conceptualised and ranked 
via a Western lens.841  Modernity is then the self-description of the West’s role of 
history rather than an ontological historical process.842 Simply put, global imperial 
designs are those processes that drove the making of a capitalist, patriarchal, Euro-
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American-centric, Christian-centric, imperial, colonial, hetero-normative and the 
modern-world system.843 
Little and Reed denote that the West’s philosophies of development or their “global 
imperial designs” could not be applied in Asia because it was too culturally specific to 
the West’s emphasis on individualism, consumption and the idea of a perfect market. 
Rather, Asian states have placed emphasis on the community rather than the 
individual, on production rather than consumption, on managing the imperfections of 
the market rather than paying homage to the perfect market.844 Mirungi took this 
argument a step further arguing that Asian indigenous values and institutions were 
incompatible with external influences.845 
Not only has Asia confronted the West but it has backed up this claim with serious 
human development.  Of the states that invested the most in human capital in 2018, 
the top four are Asian; Singapore, Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong.846 
Asia then exemplifies that there is no universal development model but rather 
development is a multidimensional and dialectic process which differs from society to 
society.847 That is, each society must delineate its own developmental path.848 The 
theoretical lesson for Africa then is that Western prescriptions for development are not 
universally applicable. Sri Lanka exemplifies this, contesting that the West’s 
developmental approach was preoccupied with the notion that macro-economic 
aspects of economic growth would assumedly “trickle down to the poor.” The Sri 
Lankan case showed that poverty alleviation was more dependent on external 
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financing and in case of deterioration of the external environment, the result would be 
inappropriate policies which put the entire financial system under stress.849 It suggests 
that Asian pro-poor policies can work.850 Similarly, Thailand stressed the need to look 
at the qualitative aspects of development, rather than confining attention merely to 
quantitative economic growth.851  
In summary then, adherence to and recognition of African values could well prove to 
be the main drivers of African transformation. The experience from Asia points not 
only to the multidimensional nature of development but also underscores the need for 
each region to recognise its peculiar circumstances and situation, determine what is 
important, and set its own developmental objectives and agenda. 
6.4.2 The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)  
The rationale behind the CMI speaks to the above theoretical lesson, that is, the Asian 
“do it alone” framework. The CMI is South East Asia’s quest for monetary integration 
based on gradual deeper financial cooperation.852 The grouping is made of the ASEAN 
plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN +3)853  and is a result of the region’s 
dissatisfaction with the West’s role in the 1997-98 Asian financial crises.  The period 
saw “George Soros and other derivative traders undermine Asian currencies”854 which 
resulted in decades of successful development in the form of real transformation 
reduced to ashes; forcing Asia to turn to non-Asian forces for assistance.855  Related 
to the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Asian Bond Fund, the CMI is a tool to 
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escape the surveillance and strictures of the IMF.856  Thus all three institutions are 
steps towards a single currency in Asia. To seal this pathway, they have now launched 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which was concluded in 
2015.  
A later version of the CMI, the CMIM (CMI-Multilateralisation) focuses on enhancing 
regional trade, as well as crises prevention and resolution.857  The CMIM is a 
testament to the strong cooperative spirit in Asia and is often regarded as a 
resurrection of the AMF idea.858  The CMIM established the Asian Macroeconomic 
Research Office (AMRO) which serves as an independent regional surveillance 
organisation that aims to ensure monitoring and analysis at the state and regional level 
as well as sectoral and functional surveillance.859 This surveillance mechanism will aid 
in the early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective 
decision-making of the CMIM, which is expected to help promote stability in the 
region.860 To say the AMRO was assembled along the lines of Africa’s own APRM is 
an understatement.   
Asian integration in the form of CMI and its subsidiaries or institutional relatives 
provides the thesis with two retrospective lessons. First, the CMI, arguably the premier 
institution in this regard, has a very loose configuration.  There is no central secretariat, 
no binding organisational treaty and no public votes. 861 This “lukewarm” arrangement 
is at the request of the US, EU and IMF who object to an independent Asia. 862  Why 
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does the West fear stronger developing -world cooperation? Such was the crux of this 
thesis.  
A second lesson is that Africa should not be viewed with a different lens in international 
politics because regional integration challenges are universal. African challenges are 
often viewed with a stronger “magnification.” Barrat-Brown refers to this scenario as 
the “dreaming up of essentialist discourses for the failure of African solidarity and lack 
of organizational spirit and confidence.” Similar commentators often reduce the 
problem of the African crises to the essentialism of what they call “African character 
and culture.”863  The issue of political will, referred to as a chief problem in examining 
Africa, is also prominent in the Asian integration paradigm as seen in Asia’s 
“uneasiness of restructuring.”864  The 13 CMI states have failed to articulate the 
ultimate objectives of the CMI arrangement and have been unclear on whether the 
CMI is going to be fostered as a regional liquidity support programme or as a building 
block for a fully-fledged regional monetary system in East Asia. Furthermore  Asia like 
Africa has its challenges with hegemony as seen in the Sino-Japanese political shift.865 
China and Japan have different interests and hence different strategies for economic 
integration in East Asia.866 How these two giants lead and interact will determine Asian 
development trajectory. Therefore, being over-critical in explaining African integration 
might not be fair as globally, similar challenges manifest themselves.   
6.4.3 Entrepreneurship, Manufacturing and Industrialisation 
Vital to the economy of emerging states, entrepreneurs represent the engine of 
economic growth. Entrepreneurs create jobs, drive and shape innovation and 
contribute to national productivity. Entrepreneurship is thus a catalyst for development.   
Entrepreneurship is considered here as the use of perceived opportunities to provide 
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a service or product in local or global markets. Entrepreneurship can pursue profit or 
provide solutions to social problems. Entrepreneurs can thus be either own-account 
workers with no employees (self-employed) or employers paying employees. The 
International Labour Organisation estimates that 42.6 per cent of Africa’s labour force 
in 2015 were own-account workers and 2.6 per cent were employers.867 No consensus 
exists on the definitions of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. The empirical 
literature often takes a bottom-up approach to define entrepreneurship. It equates 
entrepreneurship with a specific empirical measure such as self-employment or the 
level of involvement in nascent businesses. 
Certain types of entrepreneurs increase growth more than others. Opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs are the most productive. They are motivated by a desire for self-
realisation or by a wish to exploit a business opportunity. Africa needs to unlock the 
potential of opportunity-driven entrepreneurs for industrialisation. They account for 11 
per cent of the working-age population and 44 per cent of all early stage 
entrepreneurial activity. 
When the MDGs were adopted in 2000, Asia’s manufacturing value added as a 
proportion of the world’s US$5 trillion stood at 11 per cent while Africa represented 1 
per cent of the world total. As the world total grew significantly to reach US$12 trillion 
at the global level in 2014, Asia’s share climbed to 39 per cent but Africa’s share 
peaked at 2 per cent in 2014.868    
Moving into the second decade of the 21st century, the bulk of Asian exports are 
manufactured goods while Africa manufactures almost “nothing which the rest of the 
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world wants to buy.” 869 Even worse, parts of Asia have outstripped Africa even in the 
export of traditional African agricultural products such as palm oil, coffee and cocoa.870 
Many would say that Asia’s success in manufacturing is attributed to governmental 
industrialisation policy but this is quite the opposite. Asian governments that we know 
today initially lacked the sophistication and depth in talent they are now synonymous 
with. In fact, in the aftermath of WWII, Japan, Korea and China radically restructured 
the agricultural sector to focus their modernisation efforts on manufacturing. To 
achieve this, their financial systems had to be tweaked.871  In the more contemporary 
era, successful Asian governments have pioneered new ways of technological 
upgrading in manufacturing through subsidies that were conditioned on export 
performance. This combination of subsidy is referred to as “export discipline”, which 
took the pace of industrialisation to a level never seen before.872   
The evidence of this “export discipline” is in the figures. Cambodia, for example, 
exported US$10 billion worth of manufactured goods in 2015.873  In comparison, 
Rwanda, Djibouti, Burundi and the Seychelles exported a combined manufactured 
total of US$168 million.874  Actually in 2015, only 15 states accounted for almost 91 
per cent of Africa’s US$90 billion of exports of manufactured goods. Even worse, only 
six states take the lion’s share of 80 per cent of the 91 per cent. 
If the Cambodian example is an exaggeration, the case of Vietnam is even more 
perplexing. Africa has lost its global competitiveness in exports of manufactured goods 
to Vietnam, who endured an American-led devastating civil war between 1955 and 
1973. World exports of manufactured goods grew from about US$4 trillion in 1995 to 
US$11 trillion in 2015. Between 1995 and 2012, Africa had a dominant annual average 
share of those exports in comparison to Vietnam. However, the period 2013-2015 
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shows that the continent was overtaken by Vietnam, which registered a 1.1 per cent 
share compared with Africa’s 0.8 per cent in 2015.875  Africa’s exports of manufactured 
goods as a proportion of its total exports eroded from 26 per cent in 1995 to 23 per 
cent in 2015. During the same period, the share of manufactured goods in Asian 
exports increased from 74 to 77 per cent.876 
Asia’s trade surplus of US$1 trillion in 2015 is in stark contrast to Africa’s own US$266 
billion deficit.877 The result has been what Issa Shivji terms "structural disarticulation”, 
where Africa exhibits a disarticulation between the structure of production and the 
structure of consumption. What is produced is not consumed and what is consumed 
is not produced."878 
In summary, manufacturing remains the central sector on which Africa’s 
industrialisation policies can rest; however, high-growth opportunities also exist in 
other sectors. For certain tradable services and farming activities such as horticulture 
and the agro-industry, production methods have become comparable to those of 
conventional manufacturing. These activities produce higher quantities of goods at 
lower marginal costs. These goods can then be exported, increasing competition and 
productivity. Investing all resources only in manufacturing may not always prove 
efficient, nor reflect the comparative advantages of all African countries. 
In order to close the gap on this deficit there are lessons from Asia in specific regard 
to the concatenation of entrepreneur, manufacturing and industrialisation. While it is 
true that a key responsibility of the government is to develop a well-coordinated policy 
framework that facilitates indigenous participation in the economy, the case of Asia 
shows that the laissez faire approach epitomised in the Hong Kong experiment works. 
This is not to say that the African informal sector can be boosted by more 
governmental assistance, but where a government focuses on core essentials such 
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as health care, education and democracy; then entrepreneurs will thrive in such a 
conducive environment.879 
6.5 Conclusion 
The rationality behind chapter 5 was that the AU must transform into an economic 
government. This chapter showed that that success of European integration which 
resulted in the Euro and deepening of integration is due to treaties, laws, and 
regulations which encompass economic governance. Indeed, after the big political 
push organised by Helmut Kohl, Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Delors after the 
“One Market, One Money” report, economics became prioritised. Economics is what 
matters most for Eurozone enlargement and smooth functioning of the area.  
For the AU to spark an economic renaissance, the key issues in this chapter should 
be the focus of its drive.  The success of a single European currency was the result of 
gradual integration since 1945, an evolution when one level of union was seen to work, 
gave confidence and motivation for the next level. Only after a solid 40 years of policy 
and intergovernmental cooperation did the EU begin to talk of a common currency. 
Driven by the purpose to create a single market and achieve a high degree of trade 
integration, the Euro was the by-product of this outcome. Over time, members built an 
impressive architecture of processes, institutions and regulations.880 Most importantly, 
the political will was there.  
In summary, the key lessons for African planners of the integration/single currency 
project are: 
• Hegemonic initiative is required. Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux 
continuously pressed for greater integration to a point where other European 
states queued to join the union.   
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• The evolution of a framework of law; common political and judicial institutions 
and their subsequent transfer to supranational bodies. Integration of modern 
economies requires this.   
• Scrutiny of new potential members thoroughly. Not to fear the maintenance of 
a small exclusive union. 
• That common markets and free regional areas are in fact beneficial culturally in 
terms of identity as well as economically. 
• The importance of stable macroeconomic policies. Wide differences in the 
degree of fiscal discipline across member states can create challenges for the 
survival and stability of a union.  
• Increasing cross-country labour mobility and high degree of synchronisation of 
business cycles. 
• In times of uncertainty, flexibility rather than being “locked-in”, can be more 
appealing.881 
• The Eurozone experience underscores the need for countries that are about to 
participate in a monetary union to have a credible and feasible mechanism for 
fiscal transfers as well as enabling them to respond and adjust to asymmetric 
shocks. In the absence of such a mechanism, any monetary union will be 
susceptible to enormous pressure when its members are affected by such 
asymmetric shocks.882 
Lastly, a particular aspect ignored in this chapter is “the human element.”  Several EU 
practices have proved politically unpalatable. For example, in Italy banks robbed small 
savers. The bailouts have stabilized the future of the Eurozone but at what cost? Greek 
pensioners have no pension and Greek hospitals have no medicine.  The human fall-
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out has been tremendous. Economics and theoretical assumptions cannot be divorced 
from human beings. 
The East provides evidence that Asian states are diverse and man are rivals with 
fraught histories. Despite nationalistic agendas, meaningful cooperation emphasised 
the necessity of regional solidarity. Although these states do not always agree 
politically, where they have agreed is the most important; they should not be at the 
mercy of the West. The Asian integration experience has been therefore characterised 
by: 
• Financial cooperation, market confidence and forms of unity 
• Investment in institutions to support regional integration processes 
• Regional policy coordination (even sometimes at the expense of pure national 
interests)  
• Continuation of dialogues on what goals can be pursued collectively taking into 
consideration not all states are at the same stage of economic development.883 
In summary, Asia exemplifies that Africa needs to create its own development path. 
According to Park, Africa and Asia were systematically excluded from modern histories 
of philosophy. The difference is, Asia has emphasised its own.884 What is clear is that 
Asian states followed a markedly different course from that recommended by the neo-
liberal “Washington Consensus.” Until the turn of the century, it would be fair to say 
that many African economies were dependent on the West's international financial 
institutions and donors for establishing key ideas and approaches to their development 
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models and for access to capital and policy advice.885 The Pan-African debate and 
ideology then offers a break from the past.   
The AU and the RECs will benefit from reflecting on the successes and failures of 
Asia.886  A very important question, however, is to what extent regional integration was 
the result of state policies.887 Such retrospective knowledge affirms the idea then that 
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Chapter 7: Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The information provided thus far may be considered iconoclastic in the sense that it 
has challenged the cherished ideas of the existing system. In challenging the system, 
the research has examined African problems and solutions, new conceptual tools, and 
issues of governance, systems and institutions with the aim of developing the 
continent. At the same time, the research has been informed by a Pan-Africanist 
agenda which seeks cohesion and the capacity to act in unity.  In this penultimate 
chapter the thesis title becomes animated. What are the benefits and constraints of a 
Pan-African currency? Is a Pan-African currency a viable solution to Africa’s 
development challenges or does it lie elsewhere? How must the project morph from 
vision to reality?  
To answer these questions thoroughly, an inductive research approach was chosen. 
Such a method amalgamates the key points previously explored but takes them into 
consideration as a whole. In considering the diverse contributions to such a varying 
field, instead of regurgitating previous information, this section brings forth fresh 
examples to justify previously validated points. Both the benefits and constraints 
analyses are written in an argumentative fashion. Argumentative writing also known 
as “logos”, corresponds well with the inductive research approach.   
Regarding the benefits of a common currency, this section is split into the benefits of 
integration leading to a common currency and the benefits of having a common 
currency. This as will be shown are two separate arrangements which require the split 
for clear understanding. Both sections, however, relate to the concept of a 
supranational central bank which is used as a focus point. Regarding the constraints 
section, the evidence at times overwhelms against the notion that Africa is ready for a 
common currency. Several key constraints are explored with attention to the numerous 
obstacles preventing a monetary union from unfolding.   
The analyses of the benefits and constraints informs the subsequent section which 
puts forward key recommendations to policy and practice. The recommendations here 
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are separated into three spheres; economic and financial, political and policy. Lastly, 
the chapter explores the study’s limitation as well as ways of strengthening further 
studies.   
7.2 Findings Discussion 
This section presents the key research findings. The key research findings are 
amalgamations of the key points explored in previous chapters. The key points were 
chosen because of their high interrelation factor. The main findings are grouped into 
benefits and constraints sections.   
Structurally, the chapter starts off exploring the benefits.  The benefits of having a Pan-
African currency may be split into two parts; the benefits which emanate from 
integration, and the benefits of having a common currency. This is because the idea 
alone of working towards a common currency requires substantial integration which 
brings about benefits on its own. It is argued here that all benefits leading to a common 
currency are in fact working towards a supranational central bank which is the critical 
benefit for Africa. These benefits therefore can be categorised prior to the benefits of 
an actual common currency. The implementation of a supranational central bank 
would eventually lead to it issuing the common currency which has many benefits of 
its own.   
The constraints section largely focuses on the foundational aspects of a common 
currency which are far from ready. A lacklustre environment largely created by Africa’s 
elites is the major impediment here. The section further explored theoretical aspects 
which argue against monetary union especially from the perspective of a developing 
state.   
7.2.1 Benefits  
Research shows that states that group together have experienced higher economic 
growth and improvement in the quality of life of their citizens.889 A growing trend in IR, 
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instead of behaving like “competition states” which vie for access to international 
capital and the right to regulate it; integration has offered better options for the 21st 
century state.890 Integration has led to the most advanced industrial states abandoning 
their capital controls as well as their independent pursuit of monetary policies. This 
trend has led some theorists to refer to the contemporary era as a period of “merged 
international finance.”   
Integration, while encompassing an array of socio-politico and economic factors, is 
mostly associated with the creation of single markets. Global experiments in single 
markets have increased FDI levels and created more attractive markets. This growing 
trend is largely due to the realisation that small and protected markets have been 
rendered non-viable by globalisation and has thus made the state an anachronism. 
The state as a “defunct operation” is prominent in the work of Fukuyama who created 
a linkage between state failure and regional and international stability. In this 
perception, the failed state is presented as the one which is responsible for the 
humanitarian crisis, waves of immigration, and regional conflicts. Failed states then 
are the source of very dangerous problems challenging the international order today 
such as poverty, terrorism and drug trafficking.891 Fukuyama’s perspective is  
beneficial to the African unity paradigm as the birth of the state and sustenance of its 
sovereignty has been responsible for so much conflict and lack of development.  
Whether it is conflict that causes lack of development or vice-versa, the rationality 
remains that the African state must be de-territorialised. Such an emphasis is further 
extenuated by the knowledge that international financial disturbances are more likely 
to have a disproportional effect on smaller economies, hence raising the risks of 
instability. Integration then increases the openness of an economy and decreases the 
potential for economic shocks. This allegory may be translated into the phrase “stable 
economy.” 
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A “stable economy” is characterised by high levels of competition and product 
diversification which enhances trade.892  The relationship between trade and economic 
growth are inseparable. The importance of trade is seen in the fact that the world’s 
most powerful states have structured their economies along the lines of trade with 
some 50 per cent of world trade taking place between North America, the EU and East 
Asia.893 Together these regions comprise only 15 per cent of the world population but 
account for 70 per cent of world trade.894 The greatest benefit of trade from the African 
perspective is its capacity to drive unity. Trade questions colonial era customs and 
barriers which seek the sole export of raw materials to the West.895  An environment 
where trade flourishes will be characterised by advances in innovation and cheaper 
public goods provision and higher income levels. Africa’s slow realisation of this is 
seen in the recent mega-transport infrastructure projects being built across the 
continent; the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, the mega-port and economic zone of 
Bagamoyo, the Algeria-Morocco A1 Highway, and the Mombasa-Kigali railway.   
Trade is often wrongly perceived as the movement of goods across borders. Trade is 
more than this and has an impact on people’s intellect, knowledge, and creativity which 
is the epicentre of technological revolutions in the world economy.896  For example,  
many of the tools we use daily were created by persons whose thoughts and ideas  
were “easily facilitated across borders”;  Elon Musk of Tesla (South Africa), Steve 
Chen of YouTube (Taiwan), Jawad Karim of Youtube (Germany), Sergey Brin of 
Google (Russia), and Jan Koum of WhatsApp (Ukraine). Such examples of trade 
technology have further undermined the traditional economic rationale of the nation-
state.897    
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Trade may also encompass the “abstract.”  Non-tangible phenomena such as the spill-
over effect is a perfect example of this. Spill-over is a process that begins with 
integration in a restricted area and as the process continues, it inevitably “spills-over” 
into other areas. In essence, integration would gradually extend from economic to 
political areas and the outcome would be a merger of states and their different 
constituencies.898 The spill-over effect provokes surrounding states to join  to 
participate in the benefits of integration.  Morocco’s application to join ECOWAS is an 
example of this.   
As integration benefits accumulate and entrench cohesion among states, economic 
zones, single markets, free trade areas and customs unions may arise to cement this 
unity. These groupings would allow for significant integration of individual states’ 
financial sectors. As these arrangements grow in stature, the impetus is for the 
creation of supranational institutions which are largely associated with the concept of 
“accountability.”899,900 Supranationalism stretches the limits of internationalism or 
mere international cooperation by redefining accepted norms of state sovereignty.901 
Building and running a supranational institution, however, is not enough; institutions 
must focus on fiscal discipline as the success of a supranational union depends on 
how fiscal discipline is enacted, monitored and evaluated. The benefits of 
accountability to governance need not be explained.  
More benefits would become visible if a monetary union was to arise from the above- 
mentioned arrangements. Monetary unions can be effective agents of restraint on 
fiscal policies not only for states who seek to join but for their entire stay in the union.902 
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According to Dabrowski, fiscal policy conducted at the supranational level would work 
better than the national level due to collective action problems, the risk of free-riding, 
and cross-border “leakages” of demand.903 If a supranational authority was to co-
ordinate monetary policy, sustained macroeconomic convergence can be achieved.  
Basically, all these functions encapsulate the idea of the supranational central bank.  
A supranational central bank would have better options to maintain financial stability, 
and maintain confidence in the potential currency that it would eventually issue.904  It 
would be able to address the many problems associated with ACB, for example, their 
inability to create strong financial markets, the limited linkages between their banking 
systems or their obsolete mandates.905 On the last point, the mandate of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, for example, is derived from the 1958 Parliament Act, as amended 
up until 2007.  According to Taaoumoui, African central banks are among 
policymakers that suffer the most from the weak availability of statistics. In view of their 
relatively frequent and heavy data consuming decision-making mainly in monetary 
policy, they face the lack of reliable economic data on many key indicators upon which 
they base their decisions. In a study of 42 African central banks it was found that only 
50 per cent have a statistical department or division, while 24 per cent do not seem to 
have one.906  For the remaining banks, either they do not publish clear information 
about their departments or they do not publish any information at all (around 7 per 
cent).907  Furthermore, a key objective of a central bank is to target inflation effectively. 
908 To measure inflation, all African central banks use the variation of the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). Despite the support of the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
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through its International Comparison Programme (ICP) Africa programme, in many 
states, market prices are not properly collected to produce representative CPI and 
hence many difficulties persist.909 
If the internal problems of African central banks are bad, the external challenges are 
considerably worse. The “African Central Bank” often lacks independence as 
governments use their central banks as credit facilities to divert funds.910  Furthermore, 
the central banks are often pressured to finance public deficits or other quasi-fiscal 
activities. Research shows that high credit to the government reduces growth and 
explains the phenomena that the common cross-country regression finding that high 
government budget deficits are associated with lower growth. This is the main reason 
why African states suffer from high inflation, macroeconomic instability and worthless 
currencies. On the latter point, Africa has a number of currencies characterised by the 
sign of worthlessness; many zeros.  In the early 2000s, the Uganda shilling had an 
exchange rate of 1US$ to 1600 UGX.  Today the ratio is 1: 3600. The Tanzania shilling 
likewise was 1:1200 in 2006 and today it is 1:2400. The South African Rand, the 
continent’s strongest currency has also lost more than 100 per cent of its value since 
2006.   
The emphasis on a “Central Bank” as a focal point presents us with two immediate 
benefits.  First, the only way to clamp down on the negative trends associated with the 
impotent central bank is to build a supranational one. A supranational central bank 
would also be conducive to the African environment because of the many structural 
differences between states.911 Second, a supranational central bank could produce 
clear development, growth and implementation goals at the national and regional level. 
This would result in states in a region working in tandem rather than at odds. Such an 
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enterprise would then allow for a supranational central bank to issue a common 
currency.  
The issuing of a common currency has numerous benefits, one of the most important 
being a decrease in transaction costs. As prominent in OCA theory, member states of 
a monetary union that adopt a common currency eliminate a range of transaction 
costs. Consequently, this presupposes that states will relinquish the value-regulatory 
mechanism of their currency, particularly in such a manner as to influence the 
exchange rate between the latter and foreign currencies. Hence, member states of a 
monetary union give up their instrument of adjustment to asymmetric shocks. 
Consequently, the central bank will endeavour to lay down conditions under which a 
monetary union should be able to circumvent the adverse impacts of a fixed exchange 
rate, while enjoying the benefits incidental to a single currency policy. 
A further saving is the reduced costs associated with exchange rate uncertainty. A 
monetary union can only be realised if the exchange rate is fixed within the member 
states and for this reason openness of the economy becomes a prerequisite for an 
area to be regarded as an optimum currency area. The floating exchange rate is 
eliminated and replaced by the fixed rate that will not allow room for fluctuations. This 
would result in permanent resource savings which would be expected from the 
elimination of the direct transaction costs involved in converting one currency into 
another. The need for US dollar reserves would become obsolete as well as foreign 
exchange which will no longer be needed to finance intra-union trade. By eliminating 
intra-area exchange rate risk and boosting price transparency, a common currency 
would enhance market competition which as a knock-on effect facilitates intra-African 
trade and investment.912 Furthermore, a common currency allows for exporters to 
predict future markets better rather than being at the mercy of the Wall Street traders 
and Washington Consensus.  
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In summary, two major points stand out. First, as the case of the Euro has shown as 
well as this section’s emphasis on the central bank, there is great benefit in “severing 
the link between the state and money.” This essentially improves the purpose of 
government which is governance. As noted in chapter 5, the majority of Africans tend 
to view democracy or “good governance” as profound or visible economic 
improvements to their lives. Thus, if states are able to provide more economic 
improvements, less conflict will arise.    
Second, using the European common currency experience again, Europe has been 
boosted by the Euro’s status as an investment and financing currency. Today the Euro 
is one of the world’s most valuable currencies; having replaced many worthless 
currencies such as the Italian Lira and Greek Drachma. The Euro has further shown 
that membership of a currency union can protect its members against international 
financial disturbances. Most importantly, as the Euro has shown, implementation of a 
common currency was never meant to be a cul-de-sac of integration. A common 
currency only serves to speed up the process of integration and innovation.   
These two points are then beneficial to the AU’s goal of working towards a UGA. 
Therefore, a common currency is the pinnacle of Pan-Africanism in action. It negates 
notions that Pan-Africanism is a utopian ideology unfit for the 21st century. An 
integrated Africa has the ability to strengthen Africa’s bargaining power vis-a-vis 
Western hegemony.913 It speaks against the current world order and its subjugation of 
the continent.  A Pan-African currency will strengthen African monetary dynamics and 
sever the umbilical cord which maintains adverse neocolonial relations.    
7.2.2 Constraints   
The many variants of modernisation theory suggest that transformation at the state 
level largely depends on the extent of the level of economic development.914 Major 
transformations of the international economy notably include the state-induced 
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internationalisation of capital markets, the growth of FDI, the emergence of global 
production changes, the growth of international trade, and the increase in international 
labour migration. Under these conditions, states must adequately integrate their 
economies into the world market to ensure the advantages of a strong domestic 
market.915 
Has the African state complied with the above-mentioned conditions to undergo 
transformation? Economic transformation largely depends on political will, which is a 
combination of sacrifice and commitment. At the state, regional and continental levels, 
the political will has not matched the desired economic reform which could be achieved 
via a common currency path. The actors at the three levels have moved sluggishly in 
fulfilling the basic foundational functions and hence considerable obstacles remain 
undisputed.916 This “wait-and-see” philosophy does not support key integration criteria 
such as transparency, accountability or enforcement mechanisms. For example, 
states are keen to boost intra-African trade and desire the economic advantages of 
larger and more open markets but refuse to relinquish their political sovereignty.917 
According to Muchie, “African leaders rhetorically are for Pan-Africanism while in 
reality they manifest hardly any credible will to make moves even if these may be small 
to build a Pan-African alternative to the continent’s future.”918  Le Pere also backs up 
this view noting that :  
African states and governments have been rather reticent in their support of the AU’s 
integration programme and this is symptomatic of their reluctance to cede or pool 
sovereignty to regional and continental organizations for the larger public and 
developmental good.919  
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It is a case of wanting to have one’s cake and eat it. The lackadaisical integration 
approach is aptly summarised by Udombana:  
African leaders lack the certitude to face the challenges of integration. Integration 
requires that each constituent party have clearly defined national plans and strategies 
to achieve economic development. Like a child in a toyshop, most leaders in Africa do 
not know which way to look. They have been unable to make the changes that will 
sustain growth and development. Others are not prepared to subordinate immediate 
national plans to long-term economic regional goals or to cede essential elements of 
sovereignty to regional institutions.920 
A serious question to ask is whether the ruling elites actually want to improve their 
states’ fiscal and monetary policy or are they happy with the status quo which gives 
them uncontested power? According to Byiers in “Political drivers of Africa’s regional 
economic integration”, political survival is now more widely assumed to be the key 
motivation for ruling elites.921 When governments face the choice between their own 
political survival and long-term interests in stability and collective development, 
whether at the national or regional level, they tend to prioritise the former in ways  that 
may not align with the latter,  and  may  even  undermine  or compromise it. 
Furthermore, political survival in a democracy depends on being able to maintain a 
ruling coalition and win elections. This involves, even in the strongest democracies, 
the use of patron-client relations by ruling coalitions. Such relations imply favours or 
patronage by ruling elites for clients in exchange for electoral or other support. This 
creates strong incentives for “rent-seeking”, including aid to cement alliances and to 
serve these clients for maintaining or gaining a hold on power. 
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In such an environment, the preference for state power over institutional power is the 
natural choice. This explains the proliferation of powerless regional and subregional 
groupings and multilateral arrangements.922 As a result, the  dominant  pattern  since  
the  1960s has  been  that  most  of  the  regional  institutions have  played  primarily  
political,  rather  than  economic roles and this  is  why  most  African regional  
institutions  have  overlapping  memberships  that  defy economic  logic. Institutions 
like CEMAC, for example, are a complete sham. CEMAC borders are not free and 
tariffs are increased more often than not. The wide gap between theoretical aspirations 
and empirical evidence institutionalises itself in unrealistic schedules which undermine 
credibility and considerably weaken the support of participants. In sum, nothing really 
gets accomplished. Article 17 of the AU Constitutive Act specifically visualised the AU 
and its RECs as a supranational entity, but the “principle of subsidiarity” reigns.923 This 
doctrine implies that supranational organisations should only deal with matters that 
cannot be sufficiently handled at the national level. This doctrine has been noted by 
Ogochukwi who claims that African leaders appear to prefer “a strictly inter-
governmental approach to regional decision making and thus may view supranational 
leaning institutions as a departure from a familiar and predictable path.”924 That said, 
the conditions for the voluntary sacrifice of national autonomy are therefore not yet 
favourable.925 Across the Mediterranean, between 1950 and 2000, the driving force of 
European unity was states parting with their sovereignty. As states ceded portions of 
their sovereignty, ranging from trade policy to internal market regulation to fiscal policy, 
integration functioned. Where one stage of union worked, it gave rise to the next level. 
In comparison to Africa’s path then, the rationality for pursing integration in the 
absence of supranationalism is highly debatable.  
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Besides the basic practical constraints, a number of theories disagree that integration 
is beneficial. Schools of thought exist which purport that integration cannot guarantee 
better economic performance.926 The neo-realists, for example, ascertain that 
integration cannot transform the anarchical arrangement of the international system 
and therefore, integration is not an “alternative to a state-centered international 
system.”927 Mansfield observed that : 
While it is frequently acknowledged that politics shape regionalism, surprisingly few 
systematic attempts have been made to address exactly which ones most heavily 
influence why states choose to pursue regional strategies and the precise nature of 
their effects.928  
This proposition builds on Gathii’s insights that the purpose  of  regional  integration  
is  very  different  in  Africa than in  other  regions.929 
Beyond the integration ideal, the creation of a market-driven economy is constrained 
by the absence of an investment friendly public coupled with the low regulatory 
capacity of most states.930 Regional integration is plainly no substitute for sound 
domestic economic policies, and is unlikely to succeed in their absence.931 The 2019 
Doing Business World Bank Report, for example, reveals that the majority of African 
states took up the last 190 spots and only 10 made it into the top 100.932 This is hardly 
a difference from the 2009 report which featured six African states in the top 100.933  
Such stats imply that in a 10-year period, neither the world nor Africa  cared to do 
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business with the continent. This is not due to Afro-pessimism, other sociological 
perceptions or the belief that exported products are superior but simply because doing 
business in Africa is problematic.  
NTBs summarise the difficulty of doing business in Africa. It is often easier to get a 
product from overseas than to source it from a neighbouring state. In Europe, NTBs 
proliferated in the early stages of European unity, becoming the main obstacle to 
integration among EEC member states.934 To eliminate the NTBs, Europe sought the 
creation of a single market.935 In Africa, the prevalence of NTBs has resulted in intra-
continental trade being the lowest of all the continents. Trade is characterised by 
onerous and time-consuming procedures.936,937, 938 The elimination of NTBs is 
essential to the success of free trade areas yet regional mechanisms to monitor NTBs 
are not in place in many regions.  In COMESA, for example, there are new NTBs such 
as limits on eight-axel trucks. In West Africa, NTBs include unofficial fees collected 
from traders at border crossings, administrative delays at ports, cumbersome customs 
formalities and excessive roadblocks.  Research shows that a one-day increase in 
transit time reduces exports by an average of 7 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa. A one-
day delay in transport time for landlocked economies and for time-sensitive agricultural 
and manufacturing products reduces trade by more than 1 per cent for each day of 
delay.939 Delays in customs clearance also negatively impact a firm’s ability to export, 
particularly when goods are destined for new clients. In economies with flexible entry 
regulations, a 1 per cent increase in trade is associated with an increase of more than 
0.5 per cent in income per capita but has no positive income effects in economies with 
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more rigid regulation. Research has also shown that potential gains for consumers 
from import competition are reduced in economies with cumbersome regulation.940 A 
2013 Vice documentary entitled “West African Truckers” brilliantly captures the 
situation:  
Driving a truck full of margarine, a US state's length to its delivery point often involves 
passing through three or four separate countries and navigating the byzantine customs 
and immigration processes at each port of entry. Then there are the internal 
checkpoints manned by local police and customs agents on the lookout for smugglers, 
or non-smugglers who can be intimidated into coughing up a bribe. Then there's just 
fuckers who'll pull you over and straight-up rob you. Infrastructure ain't always so hot 
here, either. 
The severity of this problem is made worse when we consider that many of Africa’s 
largest cities are “natural” trading posts. The cities of Brazzaville and Kinshasa, 
Gabarone, Bangui, Fort-Lamy, Juba, Lilongwe, Maputo, Mussina, Lomé, Mbabane, 
Lagos, Porto Novo, Freetown, Dar es Salaam, Durban, and Lubumbashi are all cities 
built along borders or are ports or both. The outcome of neglecting intra-African trade 
is reduced economic freedom. This could be why Scerri noted: 
The endeavour to start off with a continental programme of economic integration and 
the development of this continual system may be politically futile. The prospects for 
integration are poor if we think along a linear progression.941  
Even if Africa was to achieve the necessary integration, its structural differences could 
make a monetary union tricky. Debrun et al note that: 
                                                          
940 Ibid 
941Scerri, Mario, 2013, “Economic integration in Africa: The systems of Innovation Approach”, in Muchie, 
Mammo, Osha, Sanya and Matlou, Matlotleng, 2013 “The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unit 
and Renaissance, Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Pretoria, RSA, p. 232 
272 
 
Disparities in fiscal discipline constitute a challenge to the construction of monetary 
unions, because they make it un-attractive to admit countries whose large financing 
needs would put pressure on a common central bank.942  
According to Dearden, “the loss of the exchange rate policy instrument, in the context 
of a developing country undergoing rapid economic transformation, may prove 
problematic.”943 Similarly, the creation of significant constraints upon national fiscal as 
well as monetary policy, as required with monetary unions, may compromise the ability 
of governments to respond appropriately to their individual economic 
circumstances.944 The divergent structures of African economies leaves them 
particularly vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, compromising the ability of any 
multilateral monetary authority to set appropriate monetary and fiscal policies.945 
Former Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, stated that despite 
Ghana being one of Africa’s largest economies, it has consistently never achieved the 
fiscal deficit target.946 In more recent times, former South African, Nigerian and 
Ghanaian Central Bank governors have reckoned that the path to a common currency 
is littered with obstacles.947 According to Landsberg, “South Africa has fittingly 
expressed concern that the process of monetary union at the continental level” is “very 
vague and unformed” and “also risks undermining the positive and practical initiatives 
underway at the SADC level”.948 South African Reserve Bank Governor Gill Marcus 
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pointed out that a single currency was the outcome of a convergence process and 
would not forge closer links.949 Her Nigerian counterpart Sanusi agreed, arguing that 
a common currency should be the result of "underlying, fundamental integration in 
trade," rather than something that is decided upon upfront and worked towards.950 
According to Ramya, currency unions remain a distant prospect and are not being 
“sought for the right reasons.”951  
The biggest threat to a monetary union is the interrelated concepts of inflation and 
price stability which makes “optimality” difficult to achieve.952 To counteract high 
inflation in a monetary union, lower inflation is usually obtained at the cost of lower 
growth rates and higher unemployment stats and other welfare-reducing distortions 
such as an increase in taxes.953  Price stability, which implies avoiding both prolonged 
inflation and deflation, is important as a common currency will largely depend on 
whether authorities are able to assure price stability.954 By creating uncertainty about 
the extent to which actual price changes are relative or aggregate, inflation hampers 
the intricacies of the market system.955 Uncertainty over future price increases cuts 
the contract length in labour and credit markets, and puts a risk premium on interest 
rates and wages, thereby negatively affecting long-term capital formation.956 These 
threats could be alleviated with the introduction of a supranational central bank but as 
shown previously, this institution occurs only after years of implementation.  
A key question to the current “intergovernmental” institutions is what can they offer 
states?  In order for states to part with portions of their sovereignty, a “drawing card” 
is required. The EU, for example, was able to offer generous aid, credit and investment 
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flows from potential member states to non-members. What does Africa’s supranational 
seeking institutions have to offer states? Not too much. For example, can West African 
states remove NTBs which contribute to as much as 40 per cent of their tax revenue? 
According to Mwanza, trade liberalisation is a potential source of fiscal instability for 
African countries because of their high dependence on trade taxes for public 
revenue.957 Taxes on international trade are an important part of fiscal revenue in 
African states because when tax administration is inefficient, governments tend to 
concentrate on easy ways to collect taxes such as trade taxes.958 Taxation has been 
a serious issue in Africa. Tilly’s classical argument suggests that the availability of 
natural resources limits states’ need to develop effective taxation systems and so a 
culture of not paying taxes has prospered.959  Since the 1990s, the most basic agents 
of the state, agricultural extension agents, tax collectors and census takers are no 
longer to be found in many rural areas.960 This could explain why African governments 
are over-taxing everything to make up for the fact that their revenue bases have been 
seriously eroded. 961 It would also explain why Uganda recently introduced a social 
media tax and the reason why South Africa has a 40 per cent tax on petrol. This is 
why Anglo-American companies head east to open their factories.  
In summary, Africa’s relationship with itself and the external world is the biggest 
constraint to a common currency. The Pan-African ideology has been refuted and 
states continue to operate comfortably along the lines of the 1881 Berlin conference. 
Many cite 1881 as a way to explain Africa’s inherent problems but everyone is ignoring 
what needs to be done to stop using that excuse. Africa’s situation is not for lack of 
skill, personnel or resources to develop but primarily due to prevailing socio-political 
situations that are not enabling. Going beyond economic resources, one can certainly 
argue that states’ governing societies with stronger human resources have an 
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advantage in adapting to the requirements of competition in the knowledge 
economy.962 The implication of this is that African energy, intelligence and creativity 
has been used to develop societies other than Africa.   
7.2.3 Research questions and Hypothesis 
In framing the discussion, five research questions were provided from the onset to 
help answer the research problem.   
• What are the driving forces of the common African currency project? In whose 
interest and for what purpose? 
• How would genuine economic and monetary integration go about in Africa? To 
what extent are these systems viable?  
• What can the African common currency project learn from the European and 
Asian experience? 
• How is an African currency the antithesis of global capitalist system?  
• What are the new modes of thinking about African development? 
These questions helped to navigate the complexities of the benefits and constraints of 
a Pan-African currency.  They also helped to create the following hypothesis.   
 “Pan-African currency” embodies the ideaology of Pan-Africanism.  Pan-Africanism is 
about uniting Africa so that it becomes one solitary cohesive piece  in a globalized 
world. The implementation of a Pan-African currency has the abilty for Africa to foster 
the notion of unity, come to terms with its challenges and overcome those nagging 
challenges which have pestered the continent for decades.   
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In succesfully answering the research questions, the hypothesis was validated. In 
terms of “testing” the hypothesis, this is unessary because qualitiatve research does 
not aim to “test” and/ or “prove” the reserachers hypothesis. Hypothesis testing is 
primarily based upon the positivist paradigm, qualitative research is based upon 
interpretivism and constructivism. Qualitative research is inductive and aims to 
understand culture/process/events/meanings/experiences within particular social 
contexts etc. The findings are bound to particular social/cultural contexts and are not 
generalizable to particular 'groups' and/or 'population'.  A hypothesis in qualitative 
research however allows for quantitative studies or theories to emerge from it.  
Regarding theory, Pan-Africanism should not be ignored as a theory of change and 
development.  Furthermore, in continuously manipulating and altering Pan-Africanism 
it appears that a Pan-African currency can become a valid and provable conclusion. 
In terms of possible quantitative studies, many options emerge.  Examples could 
include comparative studies of non-common currency areas vs common currency 
areas in Africa or the effects of the British economy in the wake of leaving a monetary 
union.  
The following section systemizes the knowledge provided and is meta-analytical, 
which is a form of secondary analysis of pre-existing data with the intent to summarize 
and provide an answer to whether a common currency is worth the hassle.  
The research commenced by exploring Pan-Africanism’s development and evolution 
with the aim of assessing its potential to unify and therefore develop Africa via a 
common currency. It was discovered that Pan-Africanism is an aggregation of a 
number of different ideas but its assumptions of solidarity and equality are not in tune 
with the realism of power in the international system. That is, the vision of Pan-
Africanism and the reality of Africa are two separate entities.963 Therefore in visualising 
the realism in making the Pan-African enterprise meaningful, concrete initiatives are 
required from this ideology to reposition Africa in the globalised world. Pan-Africanism 
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must be shaped as a worldview with realistic, viable sets of goals rather than pleasant-
sounding fantasy.964 
This “repositioning” speaks to ending the post-colonial state’s negative and detrimental 
authority which has been referred to as “state death” by Fazal.965 The Pan-Africanist 
Tajudeen aptly describes the post-colonial state as “a contributor in making it difficult 
for Africans to interact and relate to themselves.”966 This disunity is at the prerogative 
of external forces, who maintain this classic divide and conquer stratagem.  Gatsheni-
Ndlovu refers to this as “the illusion of freedom and myth of de-colonialization.”  He 
notes that “there can be no freedom and decolonization as long as global imperial 
designs are in place since conquest still shapes and informs the character of the 
modern world system”. This point is well captured by Grosfoguel who noted: 
One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the 
elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. 
This led to the myth of a ‘post-colonial’ world. The heterogeneous and multiple global 
structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-
political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live 
under the same ‘colonial power matrix’. With juridical-political decolonization we 
moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global 
coloniality’.967 
This theoretical understanding provided the context to understand the notion of 
currency which since the 2008 financial crises has exposed the extent of a flawed 
world economy. This flawed world economy is rigged in favour of Wall Street who 
make trillions through stock price surges and currency manipulations. Under QE, the 
US Federal Reserve can simply offload dollars on the world which either restricts trade 
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or lets it flow.968  Such a statement is verified in the US government’s printing of over 
a trillion dollars a year. In such a system, central banks across the globe are, in times 
of volatility, forced to use their reserves to buffer their currencies against sharp decline 
by buying even more US dollars to support their currency. Such policy has had a real 
impact on African economies, especially causing African currencies to fluctuate.  
Bakoup et al refer to these actions as “Quantitive Easing policies”, which generate 
African inflationary pressures.969  A good example of such policies can be seen in the 
2017 financial scandal which exposed that global giants Barclays, JP Morgan and 
HSBC were among 17 banks who were colluding to rig the South African Rand.970  
Unsurprisingly, such corporate greed is overlooked as being the status quo.  Zama-
Moyo brilliantly captures the inherently evil system by noting “indeed one the 
perplexing features of the post-crises era is the enduring presence and credibility of 
the same institutions implicated in the crises itself.”971   
The unfair system is further exacerbated by the “debt burden”, summarised in Ron 
Perkins’ Confessions of an Economic Hitman.   On average, the debt owed by African 
states oscillated between 110 per cent of their GDP in the 2000s. By 2010 debt had 
been reduced to approximately 40 per cent of GDP.  In 2012, this ratio dropped to 
about 37 per cent.  According to IMF statistics, the debt sustainability outlook 
worsened with the global financial crises in 2013.  The number of low-income countries 
in debt distress or facing high risk of debt distress increased from seven in 2013 to 12 
in 2016. Likewise, the debt to GDP ratio jumped up to 56 per cent in 2016. This is not 
to say that the debt burden is placed squarely at the feet of the unfair global system 
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as African leaders are also complicit in the arrangement; consistently importing more 
than they export, and hence borrowing from abroad to bridge their financing gaps.972  
The rigged world economy and the debt burden are two examples of how the 
Washington Consensus controls states.973 The gains for African countries from 
opening up to international economic forces without adequate internal preparation 
have been limited and far outweighed by the adverse impact of the continent’s 
engagement with economic globalisation.974  These particularities of the “new world 
order”  have led some to argue  that the “War on Terror” has evolved into a “War on 
Economies.” With American hegemony decaying, China, India, and Russia are 
exerting an influence which the Global South has found enticing. As history shows, 
hegemonic transfer is accompanied by war and therefore understanding Africa’s 
position in the midst of such global anarchy is paramount.  If African visionaries do not 
begin to shape the new era of IR, then Africa will remain as an exporter of wealth. 
What is Africa’s position in the midst of changing world structures?  
In attempting to address the status quo, the study focused on the idea of integration 
which is intertwined with the Pan-African ideal. 975  From the onset it was noticed that 
regional integration is particularly complex and different from what is obtainable in 
other parts of the world because of the socio-economic and political dynamics which 
impact on the process.976 Perhaps adding to the complexity is the fact that African 
regional integration arrangements have been largely established on certain 
philosophical premises which developed generally from the practice of Western 
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industrialised societies.977  Overall, however, the premise is that regional integration 
is the driving force of unity which will lift Africa out of the “economic doldrums of the 
past century.”978  Such vision is articulated in the official goals of the AU, whose 
Assembly in 2005 noted that “full political and economic integration leading to the 
United States of Africa” was to be the final AU goal.979  
This optimistic future, however, relies on giving credence to economic factors, 
encompassed in the ideas of economic integration, monetary integration as well as 
OCA literature. OCA theory explores the intricacies of monetary integration and 
whether a common currency will be beneficial or not. OCA in this thesis was viewed 
as a tool for assessing suitability for deeper integration.   
It was understood that OCA theory reveals the many prerequisites for monetary union 
are in fact reinforced by the creation of a monetary union.980 This idea combined with 
other similarities particular to the African case meant that monetary union is a 
desirable objective.  It was further uncovered that OCA criteria is highly dependent on 
political determination in the building of a successful monetary union. OCA, however, 
as the main theory in currency unions was found to be a precarious subject in regard 
to Africa. On paper, African states tend to meet and not meet the OCA criteria. 
Therefore, it is premature to speak of OCA theory in Africa when only the most basic 
forms of economic integration have only recently taken off. The adequate legal 
mechanisms are not yet in place and most  integration occurring takes place outside 
the realm of official policy and regulation.981  
That said, the thesis focused on the RECs as the main agent in implementing a 
common currency via integration. RECs, their mandates, vision and mission, offer 
opportunities to move beyond artificial colonial boundaries and to pool resources to 
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develop. RECs do not only constitute key building blocks for economic integration, but 
are also key actors working in collaboration with the AU in ensuring peace and stability. 
As the building blocks and implementing arms of the AU, the RECs have been central 
to various transformative programmes, including NEPAD and the AU’s Agenda 2063 
adopted in January 2015.982   
The challenge, however, is that the RECs are as much the problem as the solution.  
The same problems which came to characterise them in the OAU era have persisted.  
Even the more advanced RECs such as SADC and the EAC with long histories still 
lack credible strong players to lead the creation of mechanisms and norms. It was 
concurred that without hegemonic initiative, attempts to articulate and project shared 
frameworks will remain ineffective without the political will. Improving the policy 
environment does not lie with political gestures and grand schemes but requires 
understanding, less political interference from states and more resources.983   
What was surmised from the regional integration ideal is that policy planners must 
promote “convergence criteria.” This is the coming together of national institutions to 
promote regional harmonisation in the financial, banking and political systems so that 
participation is beneficial for all. The European experience shows that intent alone of 
potential union helped to promote convergence.984  In other words, as states foresee 
potential union, they must begin to act accordingly in order to benefit best from the 
future arrangement. Examples include how the European labour market institutions 
evolved in relation to a more potentially stable environment or even the increase in 
trade flows and competitiveness.985  
With the background understanding provided, the thesis turned its attention to Africa’s 
quest for a common currency which is motivated by the desire to counteract political 
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and economic weaknesses.986 It speaks to the idea that without serious financial 
architecture and the ability to manage and redirect its own development path, 
fragmentation and disunity will prevail.  
A common currency addresses issues of self-sufficiency and autonomy by freeing 
Africa from neocolonial and capitalist exploitation.  The challenges of Pan-Africanism 
and the global context of currency augment the rationality that a common African 
currency has not developed ex nihilo.  Furthermore, a common currency goes beyond 
the economic and political realms; as Azikiwe noted, the use of separate currencies 
has accentuated social differences.987  
With the advent of a common currency, the eventual dynamics of international finance 
would yield the much-desired smooth trade transactions within the continent. Only as 
a unified, integrated body, either federalist or confederalist, will Africa  be able to 
transcend its long-term roles as merely a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour, 
and play a major, authentically voiced role in the evolving globalisations of trade, 
resources and politics.988  As a pillar of the AU’s plan for unity, a common currency is 
perceived as an accelerant towards continental integration.989 This perception, while 
a silent goal of the OAU, has become a major goal in the AU’s quest for political and 
economic unity in the context of globalisation.990 According to Murithi, the transition 
now from AU to UGA  would be the realisation of the ideas and objectives of a common 
currency.991  
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A common currency can only be achieved by overcoming various hurdles. The thesis 
then framed and addressed some of the common and more persistent African 
challenges. It was surmised that despite the rhetoric, very little has been achieved in 
terms of building the foundations of a common currency.  Even worse, intra-African 
trade has only garnered serious interest in the past three to four years as the partial 
implementation of AfCFTA shows. In surveying the literature, it was uncovered that 
four key factors characterise African challenges; hegemony and political will, state 
sovereignty and globalisation, lack of democratic governance, and weak policy 
environment. If these challenges persist, a common currency can never materialise.  
The thesis then put forward the notion that to overcome the challenges, the AU needs 
to undergo an institutional shift. This idea is captured by the 2018 Kagame report which 
highlighted the deficiencies in supranational institutional quality. The report was unique 
in that it sought to acknowledge challenges which have been ignored for some time. 
For example, the AU has been characterised as “waterlogged by over-
bureaucratization”992 and in a 2005 speech, Muamar Gaddafi denounced the snail’s 
pace of AU growth and operational development, which he decried as too reminiscent 
of the OAU.993 He further bemoaned the fact that not enough current African states 
were fulfilling the task of implementing necessities.994 Despite his political 
shortcomings, Gaddafi was one of those leaders who contributed towards the revival 
of the Pan-African project and he had taken the place of Nkrumah pushing for 
realisation of a UGA in our time.995 
The AU’s chronic structural weaknesses and dysfunctionalities meant that the 
institution remains a political one.  If the AU is to truly become a “Union Government” 
then economic governance must take precedence. Seven issues were found to help 
with this shift, which would also create the foundations for a common currency; 
improving fiscal policy, promoting economic cooperation, industrialisation policy, 
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economic governance and financial institutions, infrastructure, the central bank, and 
merging of institutions.   
Of the seven issues the interlinking concept is trade, which explains the relationship. 
Globally, technological innovations, economic trends, and government policies have 
brought international trade to extremely high levels.996  While cross-border production 
networks have spurred economic dynamism in Asia, Europe and South America, trade 
in Africa is almost non-existent.  
The AfCFTA seeks to overcome trade constraints by bringing economies closer and 
improving coherency, operational efficiency and opportunities for intra-African trade.  
AfCFTA seeks to spur higher domestic production and investment into different 
sectors of the economy. Such heterogeneity of the economy enhances growth in 
exports across sectors and boosts value addition in production and exports, further 
deepening intra-industry trade across the continent. An integrated continental market 
offers the best hope for Africa to build its manufacturing sector  to diversify its economy 
away from primary products.997 To increase trade, countries will need to not only 
ensure macroeconomic stability but also improve the business climate, reduce the 
hard infrastructure gap, and invest in soft infrastructure such as skills and 
technology.998 This, in other words, is “industrialisation.”   
Successful industrialisation, however, requires financial institutions to govern 
economics. This is where an ACB comes in to support efforts by targeted and focused 
interventions.999 While price stability remains a core objective of central banks, the 
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persistence of the global crisis has raised expectations about what central banks can 
and should do and, in particular, how their expanding mandates regarding economic 
growth and financial stability should interact with their core objective.1000 As the 
financial sector in Africa is strongly risk-averse, an ACB must be focused on trade 
finance expertise.   
Trade, however, should not be glorified as the saviour as effective integration is more 
than cross-border trade. It is about addressing on-the-ground constraints that paralyse 
the daily operations of producers and traders. To overcome such challenges fiscal 
policies emphasising economic cooperation can overcome high trade tariffs, 
regulations and complicated customs procedures. The importance of consistent policy 
rules in determining credible and therefore achievable monetary targets cannot be 
underestimated. A mixture between irrevocable policy and discretionary policy is 
required for the African scenario.  
Overall, the challenges and what needs to be done only address the required 
foundational work. The next step requires deeper political thinking and economic 
actioning. From here, the thesis examined Europe’s own currency quest as the 
similarities between continental integration and currency cannot be ignored.  The idea 
here was not to imitate but rather to find what Africa’s own technocrats and 
policymakers need to take heed of when developing Africa’s common currency. Such 
a statement is quite valid given that Campbell has highlighted that “Africa’s own 
economic planners have no sense of urgency; vision statements of the AU focusing 
on targets for 2030 or 2040 are without reference to the current Eurozone crises.”   
In addressing Campbell’s concerns, the research began by surveying the roots of a 
single European currency, noting the evolutionary aspects, that is, when one level of 
union was seen to work, giving confidence and motivation for the next level. Only after 
a solid 40 years of policy and intergovernmental cooperation did the EU begin to “talk” 
of a common currency. Driven by the purpose to create a single market and achieve 
a high degree of trade integration, the Euro was the by-product of this outcome. Over 
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time, members built an impressive architecture of processes, institutions and 
regulations.1001 Most importantly, the political will was there.  
The European experience provided seven key issues; namely; supranational 
governance, trade in Euros, the ERM, convergence, defeating nationalism, visa free 
passage, and lessons from the Euro crises. These issues are a combination of past 
and present and speak to Europe’s emphasis on constant restructuring. In this 
endeavour, issues such as good corporate governance, efficient competition, research 
and development and education policies were placed as key targets.1002 The 
prevailing school of thought is that the EU constitutes an advanced, international 
political entity with a correspondingly well-developed legal system. The EU’s 
competences are set out in the EU Treaties, which provide the basis for any actions 
the EU institutions take. The EU can only act within the limits of the competences 
conferred on it by the Treaties, and where the Treaties do not confer competences on 
the EU, they remain with the member states. The obligation of the EU member states 
to comply with EU law is a subject of international law which is the addressee of the 
pacta sunt servanda rule. When member states enter into an agreement, they are 
expected to willingly commit to its content.1003   
Not all the factors from Europe were in the form of lessons. The concept of defeating 
nationalism is important for the AU’s own mission. Nationalism has the potential to 
derail the entire unity project. Nationalism often evokes “scapegoating” which is as old 
a tactic as political power itself, and a vital tool in the perpetuation of political, economic 
and social privilege.1004  
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Overall, however, the European sui generis prototype shows us that for the single 
African currency project to really take off, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel, but 
rather copy, discard, and build upon what has been already done. This, however, will 
not be an easy task.  For example, when we realise the DRC alone is about half the 
size of the EU, we could even pretend that at least that much territory is integrated 
within the continent. However, the reality is that even in one single country, like the 
DRC, national integration is a challenge. Just over a decade ago, the entire DRC had 
a public budget smaller than Brussels.1005  
The information combined as a whole provided an understanding of the benefits and 
constraints of a common currency.  It was discovered that a common currency would 
be beneficial to developing Africa. The constraints, while sincere and deeply 
entrenched, can be overcome by the key recommendations as provided in the 
previous chapter.   
7.3 Research Recommendations to Policy and Practice  
Generic phrases like “transparency”, “prudent management of public resources”, 
“implementation of sound macroeconomic policies” and “good governance”,  have 
been deployed since the 1960s to describe solutions to Africa’s challenges.1006  These 
phrases are unfortunately still very relevant today. Taking this into consideration, the 
research design aimed to evaluate the benefits and constraints of a common currency 
by simplifiying key challenges and providing new ways of exploring African solutions. 
The research always considered policymakers and regional integration experts as the 
envisioned readers. Furthermore, the research can be used as a framework or manual 
to guide the common currency path. This thesis is then a tool for empowering African 
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unity having taken into consideraion policy as “everchanging, with multiple strands, 
practioners, goals and audiences.”1007  
The decisive recommendation is that those who lead the Pan-African agenda must 
focus on economic governance. Without this the AU will remain as an advisor to states 
not interested in unity. Landsberg on Africa’s policy direction, notes that there is a need 
to posit a new economic paradigm that incorporates both democratic governance and 
an accountable and responsible marketplace; the paradigm needs to go beyond the 
“anti” in anti-globalisation.1008 The forming of new institutions, stregthening of existing 
ones, or dissolution of dormant ones is required to promote an economic governance 
agenda. Institutions must be the functional equivalents rather than poor imitations of 
what actually works. Most importantly, there must be a rise in policy coordination in 
favour of supranational governance.   
Pan Africanism does make economic sense provided that it is based on new political 
and economic institutions that motivate and reward all Africans. The immediate task 
is to cultivate a shared and commonly implementable framework of policy reform that 
enables African communities to replace extractive institutions with decentralised, 
participatory, and inclusive institutions that would support sustainable and continental 
economic development. 
On the innovation side also, the application of the national system of innovation to the 
African context has to be elaborated. We know that regardless of whether system-
building occurs or not, in real economic systems the national system of innovation 
perspective has been popularised. It has constituted perhaps a significant 
development of appreciative theorising. If we proceed with the search and selection of 
an alternative framework that employs evolutionary economics and innovation 
systems perspectives on the problems of development and underdevelopment in 
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Africa, it comes with the opportunity and need to advance theoretical knowledge 
further for empirical research framing, and for policy design application and learning. 
In terms of human resources those who aspire to future policymaking positions in 
Africa should orient themselves well to the Pan-Africanist plans promulgated by the 
AU.1009 They should recognise and understand that  it is only as a unified, integrated 
body − federalist or confederalist − that Africa will be able to transcend its long-term 
roles as merely a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour, and play a major, 
authentically voiced role in the evolving globalisations of trade, resources and 
politics.1010  
The recommendations to policy and practice may be grouped into economic and 
financial, political, and policy recommendations.   
7.3.1 Economics and Finance 
In terms of economic recommendations, the importance of infrastructure, especially in 
the forms of transport and communication links; cannot be over-emphasised. 2018 
was the AU’s year of “Boosting Intra-African Trade” and whatever gains were made 
that year, such as the signing of AfCFTA, need to be built upon. A key constraint 
discussed earlier was the issue of removing NTBs. How will states react to falls in 
revenue as tariffs are cut? The challenge is then how to maintain fiscal stabilty while 
liberalising trade. Nevertheless, effective regional integration is more than removing 
tariffs, it is about addressing on-the-ground constraints that paralyse the daily 
operations of ordinary producers and traders. To deliver integrated markets that attract 
investment in agro-processing, manufacturing and new service activities, it is vital to 
move beyond tariff reduction towards a more holistic process of deeper regional 
integration.1011  
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It is incumbent on African states to forge meaningful economic partnerships with each 
other in order to overcome the various structural obstacles; otherwise even under the 
best of conditions the establishment of a continent-wide free trade agreement will 
hardly make a difference in boosting intra-regional trade. The challenge is not so much 
on tariff reduction but Agenda 2063 should focus sharply on issues of economic 
transformation in order to boost productive capacity through systematic 
industrialisation initiatives and developing appropriate infrastructure for this purpose. 
This must be complemented with special attention to harnessing Africa’s assets in 
agricultural production and how mitigating strategies could be put in place to manage 
the effects of climate change on Africa’s food output; lest the problems of food 
insecurity and importing food becomes a serious constraint on growth and 
development.1012 
To ensure that intra-regional trade is beneficial, states will have to focus on exporting 
products that give comparative advantage.1013 The growth of the continent can be 
better achieved through diversified economic structures. Preferential trading areas 
should be implemented as agreed, and further progress towards regional customs 
unions could be made.1014 Allowing and maintaining the free movement of labour, 
capital, goods, and services within these areas is crucial.1015 
In the absence of a grand design of effective regional integration or a best-practice 
model there is value in paying more attention to ‘less-than-optimal ’or ‘good enough’ 
processes of functional or cross-border cooperation. Regional projects range in 
                                                          
Economic Co-operation and African Perspectives on the Future of the Multilateral Trading System, 
December 14, 2015, Nairobi, Kenya, Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/12/14/deepening-african-integration-intra-africa-
trade-for-development-and-poverty-reduction (Accessed 23 April 2019) 
1012 Le Pere, Garth L, 2015, "Risk associated with the implementation of Agenda 2063", Prepared for 
the African Capacity Building Foundation, p. 51 
1013 Oyeranmi, Soji, 2014, “European Union and African Union: A Study of Regionalism for Global 
Integration and Development”, University of South Africa, Pretoria, RSA, Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=jade (Accessed 1 
September 2019) 
1014 Masson, Paul R., 2006, "New monetary unions in Africa: A major change in the monetary 
landscape?", Economie Internationle, 2006/3, p 87-106, Available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-
economie-internationale-2006-3-page-87.htm (Accessed 25 April 2019) 
1015 Coulibaly, Souleymane, 2017, “Six steps to start changing how Africa does development”, 
Brookings Institute, July 19, 2017 Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-




complexity and scope from bilateral cooperation on one-stop border posts, for 
example, to multicountry and multisector investment programmes such as the North-
South Corridor. Integration raises the payoffs for increased competitiveness but 
compounds the losses from failure to act. The Kagame report states this, “the costs 
for non-compliance are much lower than the enormous prices of doing nothing.”   
In terms of financial recommendations, a common currency is dependent on a 
supranational central bank.1016 In 1991, the ACB project was outlined in the Abuja 
Treaty but it was only in 2018 that the first ACB meeting took place. The success of 
Africa’s integration lies squarely in the ACB’s ability to develop sound macroeconomic 
policies and secure fiscal sustainability by establishing fiscal legitimacy.1017 An ACB is 
key to harmonisation and financial integration between members in a grouping. To 
reach a strong supranational ACB, there is need to empower the existing nationals 
first. As a statistics producer, an ACB should invest in strong framework of data 
collection in monetary and financial spheres. As credibility is the greatest asset of 
central banks, they also need to be more transparent about the statistics they produce 
and disseminate on a regular basis.1018 
More importantly developing financial models applicable to the African situation is 
essential. Markets can work for the poor but they can also work against the poor, or 
be irrelevant to them.1019 The growth and governance models being pursued in Africa 
are based on facilitating market-based actors’ profit and capital accumulation, but 
generally ignore conditions that enhance Africa's productive base. Not only has the 
current model of growth promotion so far been unsuccessful in generating sustainable 
development outcomes, it has made things worse regarding issues such as equality, 
the environment and Africa's dependent status within the global political economy.1020 
It is therefore imperative that Africa shifts from a poverty reduction mindset (move 
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away from development aid) to a job creation mindset to accelerate its 
industrialisation. 
Lastly, financial lessons from the Eurozone crises cannot be ignored. African states 
must minimise raising household and government debt levels, trade imbalances, 
structural system problems, and monetary policy inflexibility, which were the major 
causes of the Eurozone crises.1021  
7.3.2 Political  
The success of integration efforts is linked to leadership roles and hence hegemonic 
initiative is essential.1022 Benevolent hegemony is vital in ensuring that smaller states 
willingly part with portions of their sovereignty. Ideational dissemination is a powerful 
force which can make the impossible, possible. This will play a pivotal role as the 
emotional commitment to African unity has never translated into national political 
programmes.1023 According to Adebajo, supranational governance must be implanted 
in the African mindset so that when Africans make use of the services and rights made 
possible by the existence of Pan-African institutions, they begin to understand their 
impact.1024 Pan-Africanism provides a mobilising and uniting force for Africa in its 
attempts to confront the challenges of globalisation; and as a socio-political framework 
it has become a legitimate basis for African action and collective solidarity in the new 
world order.1025 
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According to Campbell two serious confrontations must occur. First, a principal 
obstacle to the unification of Africa remains the position and actions of France. Its 2011 
unilateral exploits in Cote d’ Ivoire under the guise of NATO, for example, was a pre-
emptive coup and it speaks to France’s larger role on the continent. There can be no 
discussion of the future of the African currency without a political confrontation with 
France and the countries ensnared in the CFA.  Mamadou Koulibaly, former finance 
minister and speaker of the Parliament of the Ivory Coast and now an economics 
professor and leader of an opposition party, says the CFA franc’s peg to the Euro 
discourages companies from investing. “The CFA franc does not favour exports and 
trade,” he says. “It does not favour industrialization. It keeps prices high. It does not 
make sense in a globalized world.”1026 
Second, if illicit financial flows, mispricing and other forms of capital flight are not 
confronted, then no one will take the Pan-African agenda seriously. The continent 
loses close to US$50 billion annually with a large portion of this from the extractive 
industries, such as oil and gas exploration. The High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows from Africa, headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, estimated 
that roughly 60 per cent of the US$50 billion is from aggressive tax avoidance by 
multinational corporations, which organise their accounts so that they make their 
profits in tax havens. It is estimated that from 2005-2014, Togo and Liberia lost 94 per 
cent and 83 per cent (respectively) of their total trade to illicit flows.1027 For every US$1 
of aid that developing countries receive, they lose US$24 in net outflows. These 
outflows strip developing countries of an important source of revenue and finance for 
industrialisation and development at large.1028 This concurs with analysis of illicit 
financial flows by Global Financial Integrity (GFI) which showed that in seven of the 
last 10 years the global volume of illicit financial flows was greater than the combined 
value of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI flowing into poor 
                                                          
1026 Neuwirth, Robert, 2014, “African Monetary Union stirs criticism of France, Bloomberg, April 18, 
2014, Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-17/african-monetary-union-stirs-
criticism-of-france, April 18, 2014 (Accessed 23 April 2019)  
1027 Banon, Leandre, 2018, “African under pressure to tackle burgeoning youth unemployment”, Mail & 
Guardian, 28 May, 2018, Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-28-africa-under-
pressure-to-tackle-burgeoning-youth-unemployment/ (Accessed 24 April 2019)  
1028 Ibid  
294 
 
nations.1029 The challenge remains how to adopt meaningful measures to minimise 
corruption or to stop its recurrence. Enforcing the rule of law and strengthening 
accountability measures will go a long way towards reducing the corrupt practices in 
public and private sector institutions.1030 The reserves set free would redirect to other 
uses.1031 They could partially offset the costs associated with the introduction of a 
common currency, which would be considerable. 
Related to corruption is the elites’ stranglehold on power. Politicians have on many 
occasions proven incapable of bringing solutions to technical issues.1032 The key 
recommendation then is that there needs to be a technocratic revolution. Concepts 
like “terms of trade”, “convergence”, and “Exchange Rate Mechanism” are better 
suited to experts and specialists. Therefore, states must cede power to supranational 
governance structures. In the modern age, it is not difficult to believe that 
econometrists and financial technocrats are better suited to handling issues of the 
economy than politicians. African democracy has been badly hindered by the state's 
control of the economy; this has meant that the only way to get rich has been through 
political office, intensifying the problem of corruption, and inducing leaders to cling to 
political power.1033 Such a scenario is found in the Friedman Doctrine which in a 
nutshell advises that experts must deal with the economy. Such an initiative could be 
achieved by creating dedicated “Pan-African Ministries.” Here a full-time ministry 
would be appointed and there would be no more excuses for the foreign ministers to 
miss important continental and regional summits where policy is formed and 
implemented. These Pan-African ministries would oversee integration, infrastructure 
gaps and grassroots trade. They would also act as fiscal councils, overseeing private 
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and governmental auditing. These ministries would also shape a much needed “Pan-
African Foreign Policy.” In the absence of such a foreign policy, Africa’s agenda will 
be shaped by others. The presence of a common foreign policy will help Africa to have 
a clearly defined strategic partnership and approach to external relations. In designing 
the common foreign policy there is a need to have unanimous consensus among the 
member states of the AU. However, the policy of the continent should not come down 
to specific policy details.1034 
7.3.3 Policy  
The problem with the African Agenda over the past 15 years has not been in the area 
of policy; policy has been clear, measurable and achievable. The problem is in the 
realm of policy implementation. In this regard the various policy level actors have faced 
challenges located in the political and strategic environment, as well as with macro- 
and micro-institutional challenges.1035 
Simply put, there is a great need for transformational planning and execution. New 
thinking is required which transcends restricting policies on innovation to the national 
level only; that is, designing regional policies is a must. Furthermore, the institutional 
framework which guides these policies must correspond with Pan-African values and 
norms. Policymaking requires regulatory reform and capacity building within 
institutions. Such radical actions are necessary given that African institutions are 
notoriously weak and moulded on historical ideas. According to Park, the way forward  
is “conscientious and calculated reforms.”1036  
Overall, there are eight main policy points to consider. 
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First, and most importantly is that the AU must focus on supranational powers; having 
existed for almost two decades with little to none. The AU must start engaging in policy 
discourses on how to implement these powers provided for in its constitutive act. The 
“how to” is there, the task unpacking the degree of political will is the challenge. This 
would include the evolution of a framework of law; common political and judicial 
institutions and their subsequent transfer to supranational bodies. Integration of 
modern economies requires this.   
The second policy point concerns the impetus on adapting policies to focus on sectors 
and areas that generate support for regional cooperation and integration through 
coalitions of national and regional stakeholders. This will involve creating institutional 
arrangements which are in place for ensuring follow-through of the multiple and hard 
tasks needed for implementation. By strengthening the capacities of institutional 
frameworks, improved coordination between different government levels will 
evolve.1037 In sectors where the potential costs and benefits of regional cooperation 
are not clear, policies might focus on providing information and analysis to help alter 
the incentives in play and create political traction, and adapt, to incrementally build on 
where a minimum degree of traction lies. This would, for example, involve the AU 
replicating REC successes in other regions.  Furthermore, there is no need to create 
policy out of the blue, the EU road map exists and can be copied where applicable.  
A third point is that policy must shift gears towards performance. Here, for example, 
the introduction of a practical and comprehensive e-government system to enhance 
service and transparency, and to curb irregularities and corruption; would be useful. 
Furthermore, as seen in a number of states, is the setting up of ministries or 
commissions which oversee policy. 1038 This would require two things. One, a sensible 
and practical evaluation system; and two, the freeing up of government data for 
scrutiny. And it is important not to fall into ‘legislature-institutional traps’; it is equally 
important to maintain a sense of balance as well as some degree of flexibility in 
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upholding norms and regulations on the one hand and making things work on the other 
hand.1039 
A fourth point is emphasis on creating regional economic policy. Macroeconomic 
stability, free markets, an open economy, a business-friendly environment, industrial 
policy, and a conducive environment for growth and development of entrepreneurs; 
are just a few of the ideas which an economic policy would entail. For the substantive 
economic transformation of Africa, the task cannot be left only to the private sector, 
economic dynamism is required. This framework would involve the effective allocation 
of resources and stamping out of Illicit financial flows. 
A fifth point is revisiting NEPAD’s APRM to enhance policy.  As a modernisation 
development plan, NEPAD is a recognition that governance problems are key. NEPAD 
holds the potential to tackle the most important causes for the failings of African 
policymaking.1040 The APRM enshrined in NEPAD makes provision for states to 
monitor their own behaviour. Landsberg describes the APRM as “an instrument 
voluntarily acceded to by states as an African self-monitoring mechanism. It is a 
mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by participating states.”  The APRM’s 
primary purpose is to “foster the adoption of policies.” Through a series of voluntary 
governance “peer reviews”, member states diagnose deficiencies, propose solutions, 
share best practices and follow recommendations made by the APRM Panel of 
Eminent Persons (African Peer Review Panel).1041 The APRM remains the most useful 
tool to strengthening African policy.  
A seventh point is that Pan-African values and norms must cascade down from the 
AU to the regional level.1042  In this respect, the multiplicity, capabilities, functions, 
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objectives, and accomplishments of the plethora of intergovernmental organisations 
on the continent must be analysed with a view to their rationalisation. This will ensure 
that they make effective contributions to subregional cooperation and integration, a 
sine qua non for regional economic cooperation and integration.1043 
An eighth policy point is the lack of one which speaks to the diaspora.1044,1045 Only 
Ghana has official policy between, for example, African-Americans and itself. Pan-
African linkage can increase economic and political leverage for Africans 
everywhere.1046 The diaspora could add to the size of the market base of interAfrican 
trade.1047 The addition of Haiti to the AU in 2018 is a welcome initiative.  
7.4 Study Limitations   
Retrospectively examining the study there are several limitations. First and foremost 
is the quantitative nature of the study which is highly interpretive. The underlying 
approach was detailed observation, explanation and assumption, which is at times 
unquantifiable.1048 Overall the inductive nature of the research is unique and different 
from a pure economics research approach. A pure economics approach often 
overlooks the rich body of literature in political sciences, policy studies and sociology 
of knowledge, which offer more complex and nuanced accounts. A pure economics 
approach also seeks definite solutions in a highly political and contextual world.   
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The research sought to intellectually engage in concepts and ideas, some which were 
built from the researcher’s experience having lived in West, East and southern Africa.  
This experiential learning is not easily translated into the realm of science.  
The longitudinal nature of the study has proven to be a limitation. Preliminary research 
of a Pan-African currency began in 2013. This resulted in a large proportion of the 
surveyed literature coming from the 1990s and early 2000s. As the research came to 
a close, more updated literature was required to keep pace with the rapid changes.  
Furthermore, key events such as AfCFTA (2018) and the Kagame report (2017) 
altered the flow of discussion.   
A further limitation is the use of English-only documents. This ignores the large 
contribution to the Pan-African field as well as monetary integration field in the French 
language.  Further studies could make use of translators to interpret work.  
Regarding subject matter, the study continuously viewed Africa as a whole.  Africa, 
however, is not restricted to the continent. Africa’s sphere of influence dives in the 
Mediterranean as well as the Red Sea. States like Madagascar or Mauritius or 
Zanzibar were largely ignored in terms of research yet their affinity lies with Africa.   
A retrospective concern, and brought up by Moloi in 2019, is the notion of “Man-
Africanism.” That is, the lack of women’s voices in the Pan-African debate. Absurdly, 
the thesis makes use of very few female authors which further exacerbates the point 
of Moloi who noted “The (Pan-Africanisms’) two gravest shortcomings include the lack 
of acknowledgement of its original scholar-activist founders and a strikingly sparse 
recognition of women as participants, in its historical trajectory”.1049  Moloi further notes 
that : 
Observably the bulk of historical accounts to do with Pan-Afrikanism, sparsely mention 
any women yet evidence from archives, support the view that women were present 
from the initial congress of 1900 and actively participated on the agenda of pursuing 
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Afrika’s self-determination and agency, with some elected to serve as part of the initial 
executive committee, at the closing of the first conference.1050 
Lastly, regarding the interviews, several limitations arose from this.  Interviewing too 
early had an impact on the choice of questions.  As more concrete information was 
derived from the literature later on in the study, more specific or helpful questions have 
certainly been left out of the study.  Sample size too has played a limiting role. Here, 
the number of responses were less than expected.  Interviews which are “self-reported 
data” have their own constraints such as selective memory, telescoping, attribution 
and exaggeration.  Future researchers could put more pressure on the AU technocrats 
to respond to the study and therefore improve the “access” to the study.   
7.5 Conclusion 
Pan-Africanism provides a mobilising and uniting force for Africa in its attempts to 
confront the challenges of globalisation; and as a socio-political framework it has 
become a legitimate basis for African action and collective solidarity in the new world 
order.1051A Pan-African currency has the potential to transform the political and 
economic landscape of the globe. The project, however, is in its infantile stage. The 
right conditions are not yet ready and it is only in the last three years that continental-
centred actors are beginning to understand the need for intra-African trade.  As of 
2019, the most economically thriving African states are Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Mauritius, and Ethiopia; states which are opening their borders for business. Pan-
Africanism must be where “a structure of power relations is fully legitimized by an 
integrated system of cultural and normative assumptions.”1052 
Initially, the Pan-Africanist movement was a redemptive project that embodied ideals 
of freedom from slavery; freedom from racism; freedom from colonialism; equality of 
human beings, right of Africans to unite under a Pan-African nation, right of Africans 
to own resources, self-determination and the building of Africa into an economic and 
                                                          
1050 Ibid 
1051 Felix, Chinewe, 2002, "Africa and the Challenges of Globalization: A critical appraisal of the 
relevance of Pan-Africanism", Enugu State University of Science & Technology, Nigeria, p. 12 
1052Wilkinson, Adrian, Armstrong, Steven J., and Lounsbury, Michael, (Eds), 2017, "The Oxford 
Handbook of Management", Oxford University Press 
301 
 
political giant capable of rivalling Europe and America. Pan-Africanism arose not only 
as part of Africa’s quest for liberty, freedom, justice and liberation but also as a direct 
response to the historical reality of enslavement of black races.1053 
Today, Pan-Africanism and the demands for a new international order simultaneously 
seek the renegotiation of African and Western dependencies and a favourable 
treatment of Africa within the present world system.1054 The Pan-African ideology 
insists that Africa must set its own economic, political and international politics and 
processes that will place it on a power pedestal that at the minimum, will make the 
continent viable and relevant enough to compete effectively with the world powers in 
the international power game.1055 In totality, it is a counter-hegemonic world view to 
the “distorted conformist neo-liberal project.”1056 
Its nature as a counter-hegemonic world view makes it an enemy of the system which 
seeks to keep Africa the way it is; poor and underdeveloped, well in line with the 
definition of negative connotations. Pan-Africanism is often castigated for being futile 
and utopian. But when too many fragmented states scramble for the breadcrumbs 
carefully doled out to them by the “global imperial design” to pursue goals they can 
hardly meet, no one dares to say this path is even more utopian than the Pan-African 
one. 
To be realistic, Pan-Africanism requires a project to pave the path to the future.  Pan-
Africanism has to be re-thought of as a shared goal, potentiality and ideal to generate 
the political resources for integration. Instead of looking to the existing states to unite 
(the top), it is helpful to think of how the unity of the peoples, regions, economies, 
learning systems and communities can be forged. States must be asked to facilitate 
this unity process and not  themselves become barriers.1057 Unity is not an act. It is a 
process which comes by a sustained fostering of communication, conversation, 
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deliberation, dialogue, coordination, cooperation and solidarity among the population 
in Africa as equal and different African citizens; based on a sustained development of 
a shared African identity, consciousness and interest; irrespective of colour, creed, 
racial origin, nationality, region and so on.1058  
A Pan-African currency offers a creatable future that can reinvent or redefine Africa’s 
position on the globe.  The creation of new definitions breaks boundaries, moving 
away from Eurocentric epistemologies that are “reluctant to provide definitions.”1059  
Western prescriptions do not provide the sort of transformative Pan-Africanism that is 
required to meet today's challenges. A common currency facilitates the reversal of the 
impact and effects of the colonial system and experience which were designed to 
expropriate Africa’s natural resources for transatlantic profit/benefit and to 
simultaneously create disunity for control purposes via foreign-imposed literature, 
theology, and social policy.1060  If states are able to give up their monetary autonomy, 
then the gains originating in the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers will 
become apparent. Decades long research has shown that in the case of a currency 
union, membership of such can increase trade levels and triple the amount of trade 
over non-membership.1061 The impetus must be on unity. What, however, is the critical 
junction or “window of opportunity” for the plan of African unity to jump-start?  
A Pan-African currency project is practical, achievable and valid but it will be 
accomplished through an accumulation of small-scale and large-scale interventions 
rather than as one big ceremonious event. Hence the impetus is at the regional bloc 
level; to strengthen regions, institutions, processes, actors and policies.    
The abundance of physical and financial capital is not enough. Wealth in the form of 
strong human and mental capital is needed. As it stands, there is weak human agency 
at all levels and this is an indictment to the lack of effective and progressive leaders. 
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African governance is synonymous with leaders placing their retention of power and 
personal enrichments ahead of state welfare. As a result, their ties with the people 
they rule have been weakened, while their dependence on external support to stay in 
power has increased. It is thus not astonishing that in international negotiations, these 
leaders lack both the interest and the domestic support needed to effectively defend 
the interests of their people.1062 
The integration/currency project requires leaders who have the commitment to 
transcend the narrow nationalism that privileges individual and fragile state 
sovereignties.1063 The contribution of progressive leaders, who are people-centred, 
and the dialectical link with pro-people policies that utilise the African resources is 
necessary to genuinely address the African situation. 
Pan-Africanism still is and will continue to be measured by the work done, not by the 
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